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The primary purpose of this dissertation is to state a modal account
of impredicativity. A (formal or explicit) definition (under a p -ticular
interpretation) is impredicative if the object defined )n that
interpretation is a value of a bound variable occurring in the detinition.
An object may also be called impredicative (with respect to a given
language), namely just in case it can be defined in that language but only
by means of an impredicative definition. Poincar6 charged in (1906) that
impredicative definitions are viciously circular and that impredicative
objects dc not exist. Russell agreed with these charges and went on to
formulate a logic (ramified type theory) on the basis of a principle which
banned imprediwativity (vicious circle principle). The main purpose in
this dissertation is to show how certain modal-semantic considerations can
be used to mtke sense of the subject of impredicativity, and give an
interesting account of what it is for an object to be impredicative. A
secondary purpose is to rebut in amore direct manner the charge of vicious
circularity.
Chapters 1 and 3 are on Russell. In Chapter 1, I examine Russell's
early idealist work (1895-1898) in the foundations of geometry. Although
Russell increasingly disassociated himself from this work, as indeed from
Kant and Hegel, an examination of Russell's idealist foundations can shed
light on Russell's later ban on impredicativity. Russell's idealist
metaphysical views (especially regarding the continuum) make extensive
appeal to modal notions such as essentiality and presupposition
(ontologic&l dependency). It was largely his change in attitude toward
just these modal notions that lead him to reject idealism and adopt in its
place logical atomism and an analytic philosophical methodology. The modal
account of impredicativity I give in Chapter 3 will rely chiefly on modal
notions Russell rejected when he abandoned his idealist philosophy. Thus
the purpose of the first chapter is largely historical: to sketch
Russell's views regarding essentiality and ontological presupposition as
they were applied in foundations of mathematics.
Chapter 2 concerns Poincard. I present Poincar6's views in the
foundations of arithmetic and geometry prior to his rejection of
impredicativity in 1906. I then try to highlight certain tensions in his
thought which the rejection of impredicativity created. These tensions
arise from Poincar4's use of Kant's claim that mathematical knowledge is
based upon synthetic a priori intuition. The principles Poincar4 held such
intuition to justify require, for their proof, the use of impredicative
definitions or the postulation of impredicative objects. Poincar6 took his
ban on impredicativity to show that explicit proofs of these principles
were not possible, and that therefore these principles presupposed a role
for synthetic a priori intuition. I argue that this conclusion is
misguided, and that Poincar4 does not successfully avoid impredicativity
in the foundations.
In Chapter 3 I discuss Russell's ramified type theory and argue
first that Russell's motivations for introducing this theory can be
expressed as certain modal prejudices Russell held. I then extend the
modal notions used to express Russell's motivations to define a notion of
mutual presupposition or reciprocal ontological dependency, which can be
seen to constitute the impredicativity of objects in the context of
ramified type theory. One outcome of my modal account of impredicativity
is an explanation why Russell thought his restriction to predicative
definition could be justified on strictly logical grounds. Russell's later
atomistic metaphysics simply ruled out the use of the modal notions
required to make sense of impredicative objects.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Richard Cartwright
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The subject of this dissertation is impredicativity. The term
"impredicative" can significantly be applied to a variety of things. I
will begin by saying how the term "impredicative" is to be used in this
work, and then go on to say why impredicativity has been thought to be
problematic.
The word "impredicative" was applied originally to definitions,
which one can think of for present purposes as stated in a formal or
symbolic language. A definition or, more precisely, a definition under a
particular interpretation, is called impredicative if the object defined
on that interpretation is a value of a bound variable occurring in the
definition. By extension, the term "impredicative" can be applied to
objects, which is to say, to the values of bound variables. It is in fact
here that the subject of impredicativity becomes most interesting
philosophically. An object may be said to be impredicative (with respect
to a given language) just in case it can be defined in that language but
only by means of an impredicative definition. The idea here, very roughly,
is that if it is impossible to say what an object is without supposing
that it exists, then the object is impredicative. This comment, and these
definitions of "impredicative," are subject to qualifications, which I
will only get to below. First I want to say why impredicativity has been
thought to be controversial.
Objections to impredicativity are usually framed in terms of
definitions, but the harder philosophical problems have to do with
impredicative objects. It is said that impredicative definitions are
viciously circular. From this, it has been charged, one may conclude that
there are no impredicative objects (at least with respect to languages
used in the foundations of mathematics, where the subject of
impredicativity first arose). Henri Poincar6, who first objected to
impredicative definitions in a general way, held that we humans create
mathematical objects by an act of definition. He claimed that it was
impossible to create an impredicative object, because such an object had
already to be presupposed to exist before it could be defined at all. If
an object can be defined only by assuming that it is there to be
quantified over in the first place, then we can't be said to have created
it ourselves. Since all mathematical objects are created by our defining
them, impredicative objects cannot exist.
Poincar6's argument has had its followers. Bertrand Russell, though
he disagreed with almost everything else Poincar6 believed in the
philosophy of mathematics, was among those who accepted the basic drift of
Poincar4's idea. What Russell did not accept was that mathematical objects
were created by the mind. Still, Russell accepted that impredicative
definitions were viciously circular, and he denied that any impredicative
objects existed (as far as any language was concerned which he used in the
foundations of mathematics). Obviously, Russell based these conclusions on
arguments very different from Poincar4's as stated above. Somehow, the
combined efforts of two thinkers of otherwise very different outlooks has
seemed to leave impredicativity very much in need of defense.
I believe that impredicative definitions are not in general
viciously circular, and also that impredicative objects might well exist.
(I do not believe that we create mathematical objects, but that is not my
main concern in this thesis). I want to show here how certain semantical
considerations can be used to make sense of the subject of
impredicativity, and give an interesting account of what it is for an
object to be impredicative. The semantical considerations involved use
modal notions such as necessity, essentiality and presupposition. In this
sense, my account of what it is for an object to be impredicative is an
importantly modal account.
The literature on the objections of Russell and Poincar6 to
impredicativity has tended to concentrate almost exclusively on the series
of articles in which the notion of impredicativity received its initial
formulations.' I take a different tack. Anyone who has looked at this
exchange is impressed by the pervasive mutual misunderstanding that occurs
in it. Several of the key terms (such as "logic," "intuition" and
"definition") are understood quite differently by the two writers. It
seems to me that one way around this interpretive difficulty is to look
farther back in the writings of both authors. In this way, some of the
presuppositions with which they entered the debate may be recognized more
distinctly. In addition, some of their own ideas about modality can be
used to motivate my own modal account of impredicative.
0.1.1 Outline
I would like now to give some indication of the overall structure of
the present work. In Chapter 1, I examine Russell's very early work in the
foundations of geometry. Despite the fact that Russell increasingly
disassociated himself from this work, and from the idealist philosophical
framework in which it was carried out, I believe there is much to learn
from Russell's early efforts about the notion of impredicativity.
Russell's metaphysical views at this time make extensive appeal to modal
notions such as necessity and essentiality, and his eventual rejection of
his early work was very largely motivated by a change in attitude
concerning just these notions. I will claim that certain of the modal
'This series is: Russell (1905a), Poincar4 (1905), Russell (1906), (1908),
Poincar4 (1909), (1912). Heinzmann (1986) collects all these and other primary
source materials.
notions he rejected when he abandoned his idealist philosophy are
precisely those required for a correct understanding of impredicativity.
One outcome of my modal account of impredicativity is an explanation why
Russell thought his restriction to predicative definition could be
justified on strictly logical grounds. Russell's later metaphysics simply
ruled out the modal notions required to make sense of impredicative
objects.
In Chapter 2, I turn to Poincar4. Poincar4 developed many of his
opinions in the philosophy of mathematics long before he formulated the
notion of impredicativity in 1906. There are some strains in his early
thought which anticipated the notion, but there are others which did not
sit well with the notion once it had been introduced. My general purpose
in this chapter is to highlight the tensions in his thought which the
introduction of the notion of impredicativity creates. These tensions
arise primarily from Poincard's reliance in the foundations of mathematics
upon the ideas of Immanuel Kant. In particular, Poincar6 insisted that our
mathematical knowledge was founded upon synthetic a priori intuition. But
the principles he held such intuition to justify are such as require, for
their proof, the use of impredicative definitions. When Poincar6 came to
reject the legitimacy of such definitions, he thought he had a new
argument why the proofs of these principles should be rejected. He wished
to conclude from this, not that the principles themselves should be
rejected, but rather that they should be accepted on the basis of so-
called pure intuition. I argue that this conclusion is misguided, and that
Poincard does not successfully avoid impredicativity in the foundations.
Chapter 3 is the heart of the present work. In it I discuss
Russell's ramified type theory and argue first that Russell's motivations
for introducing this theory can be expressed as certain modal prejudices
Russell held. I conclude that Russell's prejudices which led him to the
conclusion that impredicative definitions were impermissible, and that
impredicative objects cannot exist. I then extend the modal notions used
to express Russell's motivations to a
define a notion of mutual presupposition or reciprocal ontological
dependency, which can be seen to constitute the impredicativity of objects
in the context of ramified type theory.
This dissertation also includes two bibliographies. One is a list of
the works referred to in body of the dissertation. I explain there how
references are to be made in this work. The other bibliography covers the
subjects of predicativity and impredicativity. It is, I think, the most
extensive on the subject.
0.2 Two Informal Examples.
In this section, I discuss the concept of impredicativity in more
detail and sketch a fuller account of its nature. As is clear from the
above definitions, the concept of impredicativity is formal and rather
technical, but a few informal examples are fairly widely discussed. I try
here to motivate some of the technicalities by showing how two of the
earliest and most common informal examples are in certain respects
misleading.
In the philosophical literature surrounding the formal studies of
impredicativity there exist several non-technical examples of
impredicativity. Although useful for introductory purposes, these examples
bear undeniable limitations. A closer consideration of two of these
examples will bring these limitations into clearer focus. The examples may
be put in the form of definite descriptions, thus: "the tallest person in
the room" and "the property of having all the properties of a great
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generalW'. The impredicative feature of both these examples consists in
the use of the universal quantifier all. In the second example, one
quantifies over all properties of a certain sort, and the impredicativity
consists in the fact that the property to which one wishes in particular
to refer falls within the quantifier's intended range. And when we speak
of the tallest person in the room we mean a person in the room tallest
among all those in the room, who thus, on grammatical grounds alone, falls
into the intended range of the quantifier implicit in the superlative.
When, therefore, we seek to define (single out or uniquely characterize)
an entity such as this tall person or that martial property, we do so
impredicatively if we employ the concept all and intend this to cover,
among other entities, precisely that which we seek to define.3
The limitations are as follows. The first example is fine as an
impredicative definition, but it does not define an impredicative entity.
This distinction is of paramount importance to the study of
impredicativity. It is easy enough, in most cases, to go up to the tallest
person and point to him or her. We could also call out an appropriate
proper name, if we know one; or, provided with suitable instruments, we
could make various measurements, and discuss instead the person of such-
and-such a height (there being, as it eventuates, just one of them in the
room). These methods, on assorted assumptions, single out the tallest
person just as well as the impredicative method, and there seems in
2Definite descriptions may be thought of as definiens of explicit
definitions; thus I will sometimes speak of the descriptions as themselves
definitions. The first example is slightly modified from Ramsey (1926 204), the
second is found in Russell (1919 189 ff; 1959 120-6), who supplies a number of
inessential variations. The problems with two examples chosen are quite distinct.
Many informal examples discussed in the literature on impredicativity fall in
with Ramsey's, for instance Quine (1969 243) and von Kutschera (1976 171), "Die
Spezies mit der kleinsten Umfang aus der Menge der Spezies der Gattung Rosa". The
remarks I wish to make about Ramsey's example carry over to these.
'The existential quantifier "some" can also be used impredicatively. We may
provisionally define "some" in the usual way as "not all not" and continue to
speak simply of "all'.
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principle always to be some way to refer to ordinary objects other than
through an impredicative use of the word "all". Objects ordinarily have no
shortage of characteristic features expressible without any quantification
whatsoever, and the mention of any one of these as a definition suffices,
as does, often enough, the mention in context of non-unique features.
Hence if we can not in fact predicatively refer to such an object, it
seems this will always be due to an artificial restriction in our
capabilities - tied hands, inessential ignorance, or a shortness in
metersticks - and will have nothing to do with the object itself. Yet it
is precisely when our inability stems from the object itself that we say
that it, and not just our means of characterizing it, is impredicative.
Impredicativity is an ontological issue.
The second example appears, in our need, to be just such a case, for
it is difficult to imagine being given the special property of having all
the properties of every great general in a way which avoids quantifying
over all such properties. One speaks here of a particular property (which
if it exists at all is certainly an object) but one can do so, it might
seem, only in terms of all the properties of a sort to which the first
already belongs. There are, however, two related objections that curtail
the philosophical utility of this second impredicative definition. The
first is that it isn't at all obvious that this property is an object
(that is, a value of a bound variable); and the second is that properties
generally speaking, if indeed objects, are not obvious objects. Both of
these objections require explanation.
When discoursing of generals and their properties, the times are few
when we must irreducibly speak of a special property P of having all the
properties of a great general. Why not instead speak severally of all
those properties? Now surely, if P exists, it falls within the intended
range of the quantifier "all', so that to speak of all here is to speak of
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P as well. But we lack good reasons to admit P's existence in the first
place. For when is it theoretically necessary to attribute a single
property P rather than a variety of properties, each displayed by every
great general? More precisely: need a general who has each of these
properties besides P also have a single property consisting in having all
of them (and P)? Not obviously so, in any case. Moreover, in order to
turn these questions into affirmations, we might just have to survey all
the contexts in which discourse of the properties of generals could find
a place. This would not be easy -- it might even be impossible -- which
alone shows that the need to quantify over P is not obvious. P is not
obviously an object, a fortiori not obviously an impredicative object.
The second objection to the second example is that properties, if
sometimes obviously objects, are not obvious objects: we don't really know
what they are. To see the force of this, we admit outright, contrary to
the last objection, that P is after all an object, and we inquire whether
it really is impredicative. If so, it must not be possible to characterize
P without admitting it as the value of a bound variable. We must try,
therefore, to restrict the range of our variables so that P is excluded,
and check if our words are thereby invariably prevented from denoting P.
Now, if this be the test, we needn't go very far to conclude that P seems
predicative. For we need merely relegate P to a higher logical type than
everything else in the intended range of the variables occurring in the
given description. As in the last objection, we remove P from the intended
interpretation of the variables and consider only, so to speak, all the
properties besides P of great generals. Unlike the last objection,
however, we admit P to be an object, and indeed to be a property of all
great generals: we question merely whether it is not equally well denoted
by the description under the modified interpretation (with types) as it
was under the unmodified interpretation (without types). Certainly nothing
appears to prevent us from referring to P in the new situation (nor even
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to suggest, if we do not, whether we refer to something other than P).
Admittedly, to note these appearances and to raise our question is not yet
to argue. But this is just the point: to argue one way or another would
require having a good idea of what counts as the same property: it would
require an account of the identity conditions of properties. We should
have to know more about properties than we do. Properties are for us in
this respect inobvious ,bjects, and this prevents us from honestly
deciding on the predicativity of P.'
To sum up, if P is either not obviously an object, or not obviously
distinguishable from the entity (if any) referred to by the typified
description just discussed, then P is not obviously an impredicative
object. The second example, quite as much as the first, fails to present
us with an impredicative object.
The moral of all this is that the study of ontological
impredicativity does best when we have clear identity conditions for the
objects under consideration. Typically we have clear identity conditions
only in somewhat artificial settings, such as formal theories concerning
sets or mereological wholes. In a formal setting, we have the related
advantage of being in a position to survey all the strings of symbols
which may be used as a definition. In these convenient circumstances we
can sometimes even say when it is theoretically necessary to attribute to
an object a property whose any adequate expression employs quantification
over that object, something which is, naturally, of crucial importance in
regard to judging ontological impredicativity in individual cases.
Finally, we may even quite literally speak of not being able to define an
'The discussion here has an entirely different point than Russell's. For
Russell the description as interpreted without types has no meaning or denotation
at all (even in context). Thus, for him, we do not even have a candidate example
of an impredicative entity, in the sense of "impredicative" being introduced
here. Outside the context of Russell's type-theoretic assumptions, however, the
suggestion of impredicativity is clear, if ultimately misleading.
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object, or of being able to define it only under certain assumptions, for
that will be understood relative to the interpretations of the kinds of
languages in question. This relativization may appear to weaken the
informal claim, but in a sense it strengthens it by lending it a clarity
and exactitude not accessible to the informal approach. With these
advantages in mind, I turn now to a more detailed discussion of the term
"impredicative" as it is used in such contexts.
0.3 Definitions
In this Section I discuss certain of the more technical terms that
occur in this dissertation. The first of these is the term "impredicative"
itself. Above I defined the term "impredicative" as it applies to
definitions as follows: An interpreted definition is said to be
impredicative just in case the object defined on that interpretation is a
value of a bound variable occurring in the definition. To this certain
qualifications must be added. In first-order logic there is only one type
of bound variable. Consequently, if one defines a symbol "S" in such a
language and uses bound variables at all, then, provided that the
existence of S is provable on the basis of the definition, the definition
will be impredicative in the above sense. Since we can typically prove
existence when we make definitions (definitions are not particularly
useful unless we can prove existence) our definitions will typically be
impredicative. This creates a problem: did the opponents of impredicative
definitions really want to ban typical definitions?
This problem is in fact rather superficial. In the first place, the
usual formal setting for a discussion of impredicativity is not first-
order logic, so that more than one type of bound variable will be in use.
So long as the type of bound variable used in the statement that S exists
is not the same as the type of any bound variable used in the definition
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itself, the definition will not be impredicative in the above sense. Thus
in the usual formal setting for a discussion of impredicativity,
definitions will not be impredicative whenever they are useful.
But even when we assume the underlying logic is first-order, there
is a conventional way to avoid the conclusion that definitions are
typically impredicative. All that is needed is a judicious use of bounded
quantification. For example: consider a definition of "S," stated in the
language of first-order set theory, that employs a bound variable; and
suppose we can conclude in this theory that S exists. By relativizing the
quantifiers in the definition to a given set M - that is, by replacing
every occurrence of "Vx(...)" in the definition by "Vx(xeM-4 ... )" -- one
can imitate a logic with distinct types of variables. Although strictly,
the bound variable *x" in the definition still ranges over everything in
the domain of the interpretation (and thus over S), we can reasonably
speak of the variable "x" as if it ranged only over the elements of M.
After all, the definition relativized to M will define exactly the same
entity as that which the original definition would define if the bound "x"
in it were interpreted as ranging over just the elements of M. We can then
make the convention that our original definition of "S" is impredicative
with respect to a given M just in case SEM and the relativization of the
definition to M still defines S. Similarly, the object S itself can be
said to be impredicative (with respect to the language of set theory) just
in case no relativization to any set M of a definition in the language
defines S unless SEM. In this way, we can avoid the difficulty that most
definitions in first-order languages are impredicative.
The term "impredicative" can also be applied, not just to
definitions and objects, but also to theorems of a given theory. It
sometimes happens that a particular theorem of a given theory cannot be
proved unless certain objects can be proved to exist. In the simplest
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case, the theorem itself affirms the existence of the objects satisfying
the definition. In other cases, it is simply not clear how a particular
theorem could be proven except by way of defining certain objects. If the
objects that must be shown to exist in order for proofs of the theorem to
go ahead are impredicative (with respect to the language of the theory),
then we can reasonably speak of an impredicative theorem (again understood
relative to the language). This intuitive idea can be made precise.
Feferman (1964) for instance has given a precise sense to "predicatively
provable theorem of analysis" and has identified subsystems of classical
analysis from which exactly the predicatively provable theorems of
analysis are deducible. If a theory has only predicative theorems, it may
itself by called predicative. If it contains some impredicative theorems,
it may be called an impredicative theories. In a similar way, a proof or
an informal justification of a theorem may be called impredicative if the
theorem is impredicative.
The fact that the term "impredicative" can sensibly be applied to
theorems, as opposed to just definitions or objects, has useful
consequences. One relatively common view in the philosophy of mathematics,
dating back to Kant, states that certain theorems are knowable through
"intuition." Now whatever quite is meant by a given author who employs the
term "intuition" to make such a claim, it is clear that the
impredicativity (with respect to a given language) of the theorems
allegedly knowable through this "intuition" may be ascertainable in the
way just now discussed. Under these conditions, it is convenient shorthand
to say that the intuition itself is impredicative. A similar remark
applies to such familiar (if obscure) phrases from the philosophy of
mathematics as "form of experience," "form of understanding" and
"category." In most cases (certainly in Russell and Poincar6) these
phrases are thought to denote some fact about our minds in virtue of which
we may know that specific theorems are true. So long as knowledge of
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specific mathematical theorems is believed to be based upon a "form of
experience" or a "category," we can meaningfully speak of such "forms" or
categories as predicative or impredicative. They are impredicative just in
case the theorems which are thought to be knowable by way of them are
impredicative. 5
There is a further remark to be made concerning the use of
"impredicative" as it applies to a theorem. Generality in a theorem is a
natural desideratum. Occasionally, a very general version of a theorem is
impredicative, while a less general version is not. Again, a convenient
shorthand permits one to speak of the instances of impredicative instances
of a theorem. These are instances of a theorem which follow from a general
impredicative theorem, but which do not follow from any less general
predicative version.
Before leaving this section I would like to say something about the
use of the word "continuous" in this dissertation. In its most technical
significance, the term applies to series.' A series is an ordered pair
(K,<) such that K is a non-empty set and < is a 2-place relation
satisfying the following conditions (for a,bEK):
a~b -+ (a<b v b<a)
a<b -+ asb
(a<b A h<c) -+ a<c
A series is dense if it is also true of it that, for any a,beK,
a<b -9 3xEK(a<x A x<b).
A series is then said to be continuous if it is dense and satisfies the
following important postulate: for any S and T,
'A natural requirement might be that if a given author has principled
objections to impredicativity in mathematics, then no theorems he or she holds
to be knowable on the basis of an intuition, category or form of experience may
be impredicative. It is just such a requirement that Poincar4 will be seen to
violate.
6The following definitions are based on those given by Huntington (1905).
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(*) ( S,T0 A S,TSK A VxEK(xES V xeT) A VxESVyET(x<y))
- 3zeK(Vx<z(xeS) A Vz<y(yET))
Although the term "continuous" applies to series (K,<), it can be extended
to apply to the set K alone provided that the relation < is obvious in the
context (e.g.: for real numbers, "<" denotes the relation less than).'
When in the chapter on Poincar6 I speak of "continuity in the mathematical
sense" it is this technical sense of continuity that I mean (the phrase is
a rough translation of a phrase in Poincar6).
This notion of continuity is important in discussion of
impredicativity because to show that the real numbers are continuous in
the above sense requires the use of an impredicative definition. The
theorem that shows this is often called the least upper bound theorem (lub
theorem). A set of real numbers is said to be upwardly bounded when it has
an upper bound, i.e., when there is some real number greater than or equal
to every number in the set. Then the lub theorem says that any upwardly
bounded set of real numbers has a least upper bound. It is fairly
straightforward to verify that, if the least upper bound theorem obtains,
then the set of real numbers is continuous according to the above
definition. Briefly, the least upper bound of an upwardly bounded set S of
real numbers will be an element z of K which makes the existentially
quantified consequent of (*) true. Speaking very roughly, one might define
such a real number z as follows:
the zeK such that Vx<z(xES) A VyeT(z<y)
The definiens here, however, contains bound variables "x" and "y" ranging
over all real numbers, so this definition is impredicative. It follows
from the work of Feferman (1964 98, 126-7) that it will not always be
possible to define the least upper bound of a set of real numbers without
7Space can be said to be continuous in a related sense, but there is some
additional complexity here since space has several dimensions. Full detail is
perhaps not required here but, roughly, n-dimensional space can be regarded as
the n-th Cartesian product of K. Then, we may say space is continuous if K is
continuous.
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making a similar use of quantification. In other words, the least upper
bound theorem is impredicative, for it affirms the existence of real
numbers definable (in the language of set theory) only by means of
impredicative definitions.
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Chapter 1: Early Russell
1.0 Introduction
In 1898, Bertrand Russell underwent a wholesale change in outlook.
This change was so broad Russell called it a "revolution" in his thought,
and later stated that it was the only revolution in thought he had
experienced (1959 11, 54-64). In this revolution, Russell changed from a
follower of Kant and Hegel to an analytic philosopher. It is an
interesting historical question just what Russell abandoned at this time
and just what he came to believe in its place.8 In the present chapter I
discuss Russell's early work in the foundations of geometry in an effort
to highlight certain modal notions and principles which Russell adopted as
an idealist, but which he rejected when he came to endorse analytic
philosophy. I do not mean to claim that these are the only notions or
principles he abandoned in 1898, but they are among the most important.
The notions I highlight will be fundamental in Chapter 3 to my account of
impredicativity.
I begin the present chapter with a rare example of Russell's
dialectical skill. My intention in discussing this dialectical argument is
to outline three broad philosophical frameworks in terms of which Russell,
at various times in his career, attempted to give an account of
mathematical continuity. I go on in the rest of the present chapter to
discuss one of these philosophical frameworks in more detail. In Sections
1.2 and 1.3, I sketch the general outlines of Russell's early work in
foundations of geometry. This may be expeditiously done by documenting
Russell's indebtedness to Kant. In Sections 1.4, I discuss the geometrical
principle Russell called the "axiom of relativity," making particular
'Recent books relating to the subject include Hylton (1990) and Griffin
(1991).
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reference to the modal notions implicit in Russell's understanding of this
*axiom." These modal notions raise a certain problem for Russell's view,
which is presented in Section 1.5. Russell's changing solution to the
problem is the subject of Section 1.6. Finally, in Section 1.7, I return
to the dialectical argument with which I began and try to show in terms of
it, and in terms of the preceding discussion, what it meant to Russell to
abandon idealism. The particular modal notions and principles he abandoned
in 1898 will be taken up again in Chapter 3, in order to show their
importance for the subject of impredicativity.
1.1 The Philosophy of the Continuum.
The principle of our dialectic appears to lie in making the
Whole gradually more explicit. Our separate particles turn
out, first to be related to other particles, and then to be
necessarily related to all other particles, and finally to err
in being separate particles at all. With this we pass to the
plenum. (1897x 23)
The unlikely author of this passage is Bertrand Russell. He wrote it
in 1897, when the dominant influences on his thinking were idealists such
as Hegel and Bradley. It is in fact one of the few surviving passages in
which some indication is given of how Russell understood and applied
dialectical reasoning during his idealist period (1894-1898). More than
this, however, the passage suggests three broad philosophical frameworks
in terms of which Russell, at various stages of his career, conceived of
continuity. The notion of continuity is important to this dissertation
because the theory of continuity is impredicative. In my view, an account
of impredicativity can learn much from Russell's various efforts to supply
a logically adequate account of the continuum. Thus I now offer a brief
exegesis of what Russell is asserting in this early passage.
Hegel's influence on the early Russell is noticeable in the latter's
choice of a dialectical form of argument; but one should not assume that
Russell, even at this time, is entirely faithful to Hegel. In fact, the
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stages of Russell's dialectic are related to one another in a way quite
different from that in which the stages of a hegelian dialectic are
related. It is common to think of a hegelian dialectical argument
proceeding in three stages as follows. A thesis is affirmed at the initial
stage, but its contradictory is affirmed at the second. In the final
stage, the two earlier theses are "synthesized" -- something from both is
retained and something from both is rejected. The result is held to be a
more satisfactory explanation than those hitherto available in the
procedure of the subject at hand.
Whether a dialectical explanation of this sort is ever required, or
even makes sense, is not the issue here. The point is rather that Russell
departs here from this customary pattern of dialectical explanation. At
the second stage, Russell supplements his initial affirmation ("particles
[are] related to other particles') with a compatible, not a contradictory,
thesis ("'particles [are] necessarily related to all other particles").
Only at the third stage does a contradiction emerge, and then what is
contradicted is not one of the earlier theses per se, but a claim implied
by (Russell might have said "presupposed by") the natural interpretations
of both earlier theses. It is denied, in the end, that there are after all
useparate" or distinct "particles". (The significance of the term
"particle" is discussed later.) Russell expresses this by saying that, at
the third stage, the "particles" err in being separate. Strictly speaking,
of course, the "particles" don't err in the sense of holding false
beliefs. But nor does Russell mean that he made a simple mistake earlier
in dialectic. Rather, as we shall see, the "error" that was committed was
a necessary one, and would have to be made again.
For Russell, no doubt, the differences between the two kinds of
dialectic were less important than the similarities. A further similarity
lies in the conviction that the final stages of both provide the most
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satisfactory explanation of the subject, free from whatever errors must
occur at the earlier stages. But what exactly is the subject here? What
is "the Whole" Russell is trying to make gradually more explicit? The
context from which the quoted passage is taken leaves no doubt about the
answer: "the Whole" is the material or spatio-temporal world. It is this
which, at the final stage of Russell's dialectic, is seen to be a
mplenum'. Now to be a "plenum", in Russell's early terminology, is to be
a "material continuum", i.e., to be both continuous and made of matter.
Thus it was in order to account for the continuity of the material or
spatio-temporal world that Russell, in 1897, appealed to the dialectic.
Before I proceed to examine the three stages of this dialectical
account of the continuity of the material world, something should be said
about Russell's use of the word "particle". The particles Russell has in
mind here are mass points, which he thinks of as actual material entities.
For my purposes, however, the fact that the particles are material is
unimportant. What is important is what is said about the particles in the
course of the dialectic. At the beginning, they are taken to be "separate"
or distinct, but in the end they turn out not to be distinct. This
contradiction is not only what makes Russell's explanation "dialectical"
(as was mentioned above), it is also precisely similar to a contradiction
occurring in Russell's earlier account of continuity in pure geometry. In
(1897 189), Russell had argued that geometrical points ("particles" of a
non-material kind) had to be thought of for certain purposes as distinct,
but for others as identical. Thus the fact that the "particles" Russell is
speaking of in (1897x) are material plays no role in his account of
continuity per se, but is relevant only insofar as he happens to be
discussing the "plenum" or "material continuum'. As regards the account of
continuity itself, the crucial fact is quite simply that the "particles"
are logical subjects. A logical subject, in the terminology Russell
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employs at the time, is that of which something true can be said.9 Russell
believed that, in order to explain the continuity of geometrical space or
the spatio-temporal world, one had in the end to treat it as a single
logical subject not composed of distinct logical subjects. To get this
explanation off the ground, however, he also thought something true had to
be said about distinct logical subjects which collectively composed the
continuum in question. The contradiction, then, as to whether or not the
continuum was composed of distinct logical subjects was held to be
unavoidable, and indeed to demonstrate the necessity of a dialectical
account of continuity.
I come now to the individual stages of Russell's dialectical
explanation of the continuity of the spatio-temporal world. A closer
examination of these will lead to a sketch of three general philosophical
standpoints in terms of which Russell, at various times, attempted to give
an account of continuity. In the fiast stage of the dialectic, "separate
particles" turn out to be related to other "particles'. From what was said
above, it follows that the crucial claim here is that distinct logical
subjects are related to other logical subjects. Of course, if being
distinct is one way of being related, this first stage in the dialectic is
trivial. But Russell denies the hypothesis; difference, according to him,
is not a relation but, as he says, "presupposed by relations" (cf. 1897
198). Evidently, Russell is thinking of relations on the model of those
denoted by "x lies some distance from y" and "x lies to the left of y". If
these are seen to be instantiated (as spatial experience in fact suggests)
then there must be distinct logical subjects: something true must be said
about more than one "particle'. The claim at this first stage of the
dialectic, then, or at least part of it, might be formulated as follows:
'See (1898x 167-8) By this definition, anything at all is a logical subject.
Although Russell does want this kind of generality here, we will find him
elsewhere imposing further conditions on logical subjects. His equivocation is
discussed later in Chapter 1.
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there is some irreflexive relation, and it is instantiated. This
apparently obvious move already puts Russell into prima facie opposition
with Bradley, who held that no relation was "ultimately real" and that
there was only one logical subject.
At the second stage of the dialectic, "particles" turn out to be
mnecessarily related to all other particles'. Two additional claims are in
fact being made here. First, all logical subjects turn out to be related
to all others, just as every geometrical point is some distance from every
other geometrical point, and every mass point exerts some gravitational
influence upon every other. The second claim made here is that all
particles are "necessarily related" to all others. This second claim is
itself ambiguous in several respects.10 Let us assume first of all that
some particular irreflexive two-place relation R is in question, and that
R is not difference. Then the second claim might be: it is necessarily
true that, for any distinct logical subjects x and y, xRy. Or it might be
the stronger thesis that, of any two distinct logical subjects x and y, it
is necessarily true that xRy. This stronger claim is sometimes expressed
by saying that it is essential to x and y that xRy. It is not clear from
the text alone which of these two claims Russell is making here, but
circumstantial evidence suggests he intended the stronger second reading.
Years later Russell would take the second reading, and the notion of
essentiality that it may be taken to explicate, as characteristic of views
he held between 1894 and 1898, and characteristic in fact of a great many
philosophers, from Leibniz to Bradley. If this is so, and I shall present
more evidence to this effect below, then the second stage of Russell's
1897 explanation of continuity may be said to consist in the claim that
the logical subjects involved are all necessarily related (in the strong
'"Russell might mean either "xVyVR (x is necessarily related by R to y)" or
"RVxVy (x is necessarily related by R to y)." At present I am more concerned
with the ambiguity inside the parenthesis. I assume here that the formner is
intended, but the entire matter is discussed again at the end of this chapter.
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sense) by the relation R to all the others.
At the third and final stage of the dialectic, the particles "err in
being separate particles at all'. A good deal has already been said about
this stage. Perhaps all that remains is to indicate the drastic
consequences. If the material world is a 'plenum', as Russell held, then
it consists of a single incomposite logical subject. The rift with Bradley
which appeared at the outset of the dialectic is now repaired, and Russell
thought of himself as accepting here something like Bradlian monism, which
consists in the view that there is but one logical subject. The similarity
with Bradley goes further, since Bradley and Russell would agree that the
single logical subject is both continuous and incomposite. Except perhaps
the "logical subject' terminology, this a position endorsed by Parmenides,
and it is worth noting that the point of Russell's dialectic is similar to
the paradox of continuity sometimes attributed to Parmenides' most
renowned disciple, Zeno of Elea." If something is continuous, it is
incomposite. Now monism, if filled out in further detail, may not be as
bizarre as it .. initially appears, but left as it is stated here it is
certainly unsatisfactory. Quine once complained that Russell's ontology of
a later date was 'intolerably indiscriminate'. But however zealously one
sides with Quine in preferring desert landscapes in ontology, one
understandably hesitates to embrace the desert consisting of a single
grain of sand.
The stages of Russell's 1897 dialectic have not been drawn out in
order to show precisely what Russell's early views were. This is discussed
in more detail below. The point rather is that the different stages of the
dialectic correspond to general philosophical standpoints Russell held at
"See Grtnbaum (1952). Roughly, the paradox states that spatial continua (of
finite length), which seem ultimately to be composed of points, cannot be, since
points have no finite size and thus no number of them can combine to form a whole
of finite size. This and similar paradoxes involving motion also attributed to
Zeno were originally meant to demonstrate Parmenides' monism.
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different stages of his career, and to the accounts of continuity he gave
in terms of these standpoints. This has already been done sufficiently for
the final stage. Russell understood this stage as committing him to a sort
of materialistic monism, as he could not conceive of attributing
continuity to anything except a single logical subject. I turn now to the
other stages of Russell's 1897 dialectic.
In his mature period, of course, Russell dispensed altogether with
the dialectic. He refused, to put it another way, to go beyond its first
stage, or at least very far beyond it. At the first stage of the
dialectic, distinct logical subjects are said to be related to other
logical subjects: some irreflexive relation is instantiated. This,
certainly, is in accord with Russell's mature metaphysics, where distinct
logical subjects (he would eventually call them "logical atoms") do stand
in relations, and where these relations are in certain cases irreflexive.
More importantly, however, the mature Russell would maintain part of the
second stage of the 1897 dialectic, namely the view that every logical
subject is related to every other. (The relation of difference may even be
excluded from consideration here.) But Russell would go no further along
the dialectic: "logical atoms" were never "necessarily related" (in the
strong sense mentioned above) to one another; for if one logical atom were
ever to cease to stand in a relation to another, it would not thereby
become something else or cease to be at all. Indeed, after 1900, Russell
denied that this strong sense of "necessarily related" was even coherent.
Certainly his theory of continuity made no explicit appeal to it. Instead,
Russell relied on the theories of continuity developed by Cantor and
Dedekind, which consist in the specification of what must be true of a
relation if it is continuously to order the elements of its domain. These
conditions on the ordering relation, according to Russell, do not require
one to suppose there to be only one logical subject. More important,
Russell denied that any single logical subject is ever itself said to be
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continuous. Russell's logical atomism is characterized by the claims that
there are many logical subjects; that there are relations in which these
logical subjects stand; and that none of these relations hold necessarily
(in the strong sense given above). His view of continuity reflects all of
these: continuity consists in distinct logical subjects related non-
essentially in a certain way.
Now the second stage of Russell' 3 1897 dialectic similarly
corresponds to a philosophical framework in terms of which Russell tried
to give an account of continuity. In the second stage of the dialectic
every particle is "necessarily related" to every other in the strong sense
given above. The corresponding framework consists in the view that there
are many logical subjects; that these stand in various relations to one
another; and that all these relations are necessary in the strong sense
above. Except for the brief period in 1897 when Russell wrote the passage
quoted above, the early Russell worked entirely within this framework. I
shall call this framework monadism despite the fact that Russell sometimes
used this word somewhat differently. The difference turns mainly on
ambiguities of the term "internal relation", and the important question of
the relation between the various relevant senses of this term is addressed
in more detail below. The conception of the continuum corresponding to
monadism in my sense consists in the claim that the logical subjects
composing the continuum are essentially related to one another: they are
what they are only in relation to each other. As we shall see, the
relativistic view of space which Russell argued for in (1897) held
analogously that points are what they are only in relation to the other
points. Between 1896 and 1898 Russell worked on generalizing this view of
space to continua in general.
It was while working on the details of this generalization that
Russell came to see serious difficulties with monadism, and eventually to
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abandon altogether the notion of internal relation. Although it is an
exaggeration to say that with this move analytic philosophy was born, it
is certainly true that Russell's shift gave the fledgling philosophy a new
lease on life. Below I will give an account of the difficulties Russell
thought monadism faced, and trace this momentous change in Russell's
philosophical development. The role of the theory of continuity in this
transition will be seen to be quite paramount.
There is, however, a further reason for interest in early Russell's
monadism. In my view the corresponding view of the continuum is not quite
as mistaken as Russell thought. This can be seen by a careful study of the
inadequacies of Russell's final atomistic theory. In 1925, Russell
admitted that his official "logic" (ramified type theory without the axiom
of reducibility) was inadequate to the Dedekind-Cantor account of
continuity he endorsed. In short, this inadequacy is due to the fact that
the Cantor-Dedekind theory of continuity is impredicative and Russell's
"logic" is not. In chapter 3 I argue that the principle upon which Russell
based ramified type theory and which banned impredicative definition is in
fact a modal principle (despite Russell's claim to have dispensed with
modal notions in logic). Impredicative objects, then, (such as those
Russell would have needed to accept in order to render his logic adequate
to the Dedekind-Cantor theory of continuity) can be understood as
violations of this modal principle underlying ramified type theory. I
shall argue that this modal understanding of impredicative objects
strongly suggests the modal principles characteristic of Russell's earlier
monadist metaphysics. This is the central thesis of the present
dissertation. But before I come to it in chapter 3, I want now to discuss
Russell's monadist philosophy in more detail.
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1.2 Russell's Early Foundational Program: Contrasts with Kant.
The major philosophical topics in Bertrand Russell's early
professional work come from the foundations of geometry. His 1895 Trinity
College dissertation dealt with our knowledge of geometry and with the
metaphysics of space; and although his original fellowship-winning work is
now lost, part of it probably appeared in (1896y 267-86), and a revised
version was published two years later in (1897). From these two sources,
as well as from others, such as numerous notes unpublished until (1990x),
it is possible to get a fairly clear interpretation of Russell's ideas *.n
the foundations of geometry at the time. I will discuss these ideas as the
first part of an effort to show that certain of the metaphysical problems
Russell treated in the 1890s are intimately related to the metaphysics of
impredicativity. Since Russell at the time was rather Kantian, I will
develop Russell's early views in part by contrasting them with Kant's.
In the foundations of geometry, as indeed in all epistemic
inquiries, Russell took sensation as his starting point. Space, he says,
is "given in sensation" and "immediately experienced" (1897 188; cf. 1896x
48). Thus the knowledge of space in which geometry was thought to consist
starts with spatial sensations. Now sensations, in Russell's terminology,
like Enpfindungen in Kant's [A19-20/834], are "the only mental states
whose immediate causes lie in the external world" (1897 ; cf. 1895y 258).
But (again as in Kant) the external cause of a sensation cannot alone
account for its appearance or nature. Rather "its nature is composite, in
part due to the external cause, in part to the nature of the subject
affected" (1895y 258; cf. Kant [A20/B34]). The former is the "material
element" of the sensation, the latter the "formal" or "a priori" element,
which was held to be presupposed in actual experience (1897 2). Now
spatial sensation has its own particular formal element, which Russell
called the "form of externality." The "content" of this form is given by
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describing it, i.e., by articulating it as a set of principles. With these
principles Russell hoped to arrive at necessary conditions of the
possibility of spatial experience in general (1897 3). Such axioms of
geometry as followed from these principles were to be regarded as
themselves a priori and necessary. The primary purpose of Russell's 1895
dissertation, then, as well as several papers on the same subject from
around the same time, was to isolate and identify the necessary conditions
of any possible spatial sensation, and to deduce from these the necessity
of axioms of geometry.
Already it is evident that Russell's task had a strongly Kantian
cast to it; and the similarities do not stop here. As a general principle,
however, differences of opinion are often concealed by similarities in
terminology, and this applies already to Russell's starting point. While
Kant would agree that space is "given in sensation" and "immediately
experienced,m both these phrases have a rather different significance for
Kant than for Russell, who leaned heavily on the tradition of idealist
monism represented by Hegel and Bradley. These differences are deep and
important, but it will not be possible to do justice to them here. I will
return briefly to the notion of sensation, but only after more has been
said about Russell's positive views in the foundations of geometry.
Russell's early foundational program in geometry overlapped with
Kant's at more points than those just mentioned. It was certainly a major
part of Kant's goal to isolate and identify the formal or a priori element
of spatial sensation [A22/B36], and Kant also expected principles
articulating this "reine Form der Sinnlichkeit* to express necessary
conditions of every possible spatial experience. Furthermore, it was
originally Kant's idea to derive "geometrische Grundsitze" from such
principles. His and Russell's common goal was to demonstrate the necessity
of geometrical truthe on this basis. There is reason to think, however,
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that this type of argument cannot succeed. Moore (1899) severely
criticized Russell (and indirectly Kant) on a crucial inference required
by the purported demonstration, namely from the so-called a priori (that
presupposed by actual experience) to necessary conditions of any possible
experience. The problem of moving from the latter to necessity tout court
is also serious. These are traditional errors which we will find Poincar6
conmmitting as well. My use of Russell's early work does not depend on his
success on either of these points.
Another reason Kant's efforts to demonstrate the necessity of the
axioms of geometry fell short is that he never actually provided explicit
deductions of this kind; nor did he articulate especially clearly the
principles of the pure form of sensibility. Russell, on the other hand,
tried to improve on Kant in both these respects. He gave a list of alleged
geometrical axioms and explicit arguments to the effect that some of
these, at least, followed from a refined description of the form of
externality. Although Russell's work also lacks formal precision, his
attempt is certainly to improve upon Kant.
At several points, however, Russell ventured into open disagreement
with the "creator of modern epistemology" (1897 1). Only some of these are
relevant to the subject of impredicativity. Whereas Kant maintained that
principles of the pure form of sensibility were synthetic, Russell, citing
the authority of Bradley and Bosanquet (1897 57), tells us that "modern
logic" has rejected any exclusive distinction between synthetic and
analytic propositions:
although we cannot retain the term synthetic, we can retain
the term a priori, for those assumptions, or those postulates,
from which alone the possibility of experience follows. (1897
59-60)
Russell's preference for the notion of the a priori over that of the
synthetic corresponds to the expanded role he accorded, even at this early
date, to logic. At one point Russell calls the whole project of
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demonstrating A la Kant the necessity of geometrical axioms "purely
logicalP (1896y 291), and elsewhere a similar point is made:
Of course Kant is right in maintaining that something must be
presupposed to make experience possible [... but] logic alone
must be presupposed. (1895y 261)
The purview of logic in the early Russell is stunningly broad, just as it
was later in Russell's analytic period. Thus at (1895x 259) Russell
casually remarks that all arithmetical axioms are attributable "to purely
logical motives." It would be wrong to say Russell was already a logicist
in 1895, but the views he held then must have made it easier for him later
to accept the idea that arithmetic was reducible to logic. Both the
expanded view of logic and the reluctance to accord the Kantian notion of
synthetic a priori much significance continue in Russell past his 1898
*revolution;" and both will cause considerable confusion in his debate
over logicism with Poincar4, during which the concept of impredicativity
is first introduced. Poincard puts a predicativity constraint on logic and
accepts certain impredicative principles only if they are viewed as
deriving from synthetic a priori intuition. The implications of this are
dealt with later, but it is already obvious thit the extent of logic and
the role of the synthetic a priori in mathematics are both bound up with
the problems of impredicativity. For the present, however, we need say
little about the synthetic a priori, except to point out that it is a
notion Russell makes no use of, even at this early stage.
By far the most important area of open disagreement between the
early Russell and Kant concerns the positive content of the a priori form
of sensibility. Differences of this kind can be brought out in two ways:
directly, via consideration of their alternative descriptions of the a
priori form of sensibility; or indirectly, via consideration of the
geometrical axioms held to be deducible from this description. I have
already mentioned that Russell refined the description of the form of
sensibility beyond what one finds in Kant. This refinement stems in part
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from differences as to the nature of sensation, and in part from
differences as to the nature of immediacy. In both, but especially in the
latter, Russell exhibits the influence of Hegel and Bradley. Again,
however, it is best to discuss Russell's refinements later.
The indirect way of exhibiting differences as to the content of the
a priori form of sensibility yields quicker results. Here we compare the
geometrical axioms thought to be deducible from the form. Even here,
however, difficulties arise, for Kant was not entirely explicit on this
point. Still, in Russell's day it was widely assumed that Kant held
Euclid's parallel postulate to be so deducible. If this were correct (and
Kant knew nothing of non-Euclidean geometries), then Kant would have
maintained that we know Euclidean geometry a priori. Russell, at any rate,
interpreted Kant in this way, and then took issue. It is not a priori
determinable whether actual space is Euclidean or not, Russell argued,
because no information regarding the curvature of space was deducible from
the form of sensibility beyond the fact that this curvature was constant.
All the axioms of geometry common to both Euclidean and non-Euclidean
geometry were deducible from the form of sensibility, Russell thought, but
the actual value of the constant of space-curvature, and therefore the
parallel postulate, could at best be known empirically. Russell's position
here is perhaps the best known of his early views, but it is not itself my
central concern. One consequence of his view, however, is important to the
issue of impredicativity, since impredicativ, mathematics has often seemed
incompatible with "subjectivisto accounts of mathematical existence. I
turn to this consequence now.
The consequence in question is an effective denial of what Kant
calls the "transcendental idealism of space." Russell's position makes it
necessary that he uphold the objectivity of space. He writes:
Kant contended that extension is subjective in a way in which
the secondary qualities are not so: that is, there is no
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counterpart to it in the object. (1895y 260)
In this, he seems to be correct. Kant denied
daE der Raum eine Form der Dinge sei, die ihnen etwa an sich
selbst eigen ware. [130/3451
This view, that sensed spatial properties of objects have to do
exclusively with our sensation, and nothing at all to do with the objects
in themselves, is what Kant calls the "transcendental idealism" of space.
Admittedly, Russell does not set out to disprove this view, and seeks
rather to leave aside all questions concerning the "subjectivity" of space
(1897 3-4). But his final position leaves him little room to maneuver. In
point of fact, Russell is careful to allow himself just enough room for
the objectivity of space:
necessity for experience [i.e., aprioricity] can only arise
from the nature of the mind which experiences; but it does not
follow that the necessary conditions could be fulfilled,
unless the objective world has certain properties.... Owing to
the constitution of the mind, experiences will be impossible
unless the world accepts certain adjectives. (1897 179).
Now my claim is that, if Russell is correct about exactly what is a
priori, or necessary for experience, then the property of being spatial is
among those the world has to accept. In particular, since Russell holds
that the actual curvature of space is empirically discoverable, he must
obviously hold that there is something there to discover in the first
place. The curvature of space must have "a counterpart to it in the
object." But if the curvature of space has a counterpart in the objects
themselves, how can space itself go without? The metric of space cannot
be an empirically discoverable property of space unless space itself is
objectively present. Russell, then, although importantly Kantian in the
other respects mentioned, denies Kant's transcendental idealism of space.
This brings us back to one of the first differences I mentioned
between Kant and the early Russell, namely the notion of sensation. For
Kant, sensations are intuitions; in fact, they are the only empirical
intuitions humans have. Thus Kant speaks interchangeably of the form of
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(outer) intuition and the form of sensibility. Russell, on the other hand
(most of the time at any rate), distinguishes between sensation and
intuition. He takes it to be a substantive question whether space is given
as a sensation or an intuition (1897 55, 180), and the only remarkable
difference, as far as I can tell, is precisely that, in veridical
sensation, a counterpart in the object is required; whereas, in veridical
intuition, this possibility is excluded (1897 180, 1896y 291-2). Russell's
terminology 'form of externality' is designed to allow him generality
across these two possibilities (even if in the end his view of the details
of the form of externality force him to accept objective space). For Kant,
on the other hand, there simply is no room in the first place for such
added generality, since sensation is already a special case of intuition.
To say that space is the form of sensation is, for Kant, unlike for
Russell, to affirm the transcendental idealism of space. By choosing the
word 'externality' Russell sought to gain neutrality.
1.3 Difficulties with Difference.
Notwithstanding this, Russell's use of the term "externality" is
suggested by one part of Kant 's "metaphysische ErSrterung" of the concept
of space. It is in fact the only part Russell accepted (1897 55-6, 60-1),
and it is also the basis of his refined 'direct" description of the formal
element of spatial sensation.
... damit gewige Empfindungen auf etwas auSer mich bezogen
werden ... , imgleichen damit ich sie als auSer und neben-
einander, mithin nicht blob verschieden sondern in
verschiedenen Orten vorstellen kbnne, dazu muS die Vorstellung
des Raumes schon zu Grund liegen. [838, cf. A23]
Sensation presents things in different places and external to one another.
This "AuSereinandersein" is the motivating connotation of Russell's "form
of externality" terminology. But despite Kant's emphasis on difference of
place, Russell expects his own "metaphysical deduction" to yield insight
into substantival difference. Externality, he says, "must mean, in this
37
argument [i.e., in the metaphysical deduction], the fact of Otherness, the
fact of being different from some other thing."12 aReal diversity" is
intended here, he says, which is man Otherness of substance, rather than
of attribute" (1897 62). The principle articulating the form of
externality, then, at least as Russell understands this, must inform us as
to what it is for one logical subject to be distinct from another.
Interestingly, Russell hesitates to identify the principle
describing his form of externality with the traditional principium
individuationis, but he is happy to call it a "principle of
differentiationo (1897 136). Unfortunately, besides an unhelpful reference
to Bradley (1883 63), Russell does not explain his terms. Still, it is
clear that both principlas purport to explain substantival difference; or,
to put it in other words, which I will henceforth take to be equivalent,
they seek to explain what makes what is, what it is. The difference
between them, I think, lies in how they seek to do this. The former, which
Russell shies away from, puts emphasis on the individuality of the logical
subject: it looks to the qualities (possibly essential) that an individual
substance displays to find what makes it the particular logical subject
that it is. To answer Aristotle's question, "What is it?", this approach
would provide a list of 1-place properties which uniquely characterize the
substance, and possibly indicate its essence. The principle of
differentiation, by contrast, emphasizes the differences between the
logical subject in question and any other: it looks instead to the
relations (possibly essential) that an individual substance displays to
find what makes it the particular logical subject that it is. The answer
to Aristotle's question would importantly include some relations, which
12At this stage, Russell uses the term "thing" interchangeably with
"substance" and "logical subject" (see 1897x 21, 1896x 14; but cf. 1898x 168).
It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to say precisely what Russell intended, but
the only entities which are not logical subjects are qualities (which, following
Bradley, Russell sometimes calls "adjectives') and relations. This traditional,
intuitive distinction suffices for my purposes. I use the term *(n-place)
property' to cover both qualities (n=l) and relations (n>l).
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may form part of the essence of the substance in question. It is this, I
expect, which accounts for Russell's preference, since, as we shall see,
he thinks relations are necessary to explain the difference of substance
presented in sensat 4 on. His explanation of what makes what is, what it is,
contains, and does not merely imply, information regarding what makes what
is not another thing.
These principles suggest different ways, not only of answering
Aristotle's question, but also of satisfying the Identity of
Indiscernibles. As we shall see, Russell makes silent appeal to the
Identity of Indiscernibles in his version of the metaphysical deduction.
Ultimately, Russell failed in his effort to articulate a principle of
differentiation, and to provide an explanation of substantial difference.
Within a few years he would argue that his effort was destined to fail,
and that, that ultimately his early view "collapsed into monism," and was
incompatible with there being more than one thing. The arguments Russell
would later are already suggested by his 1897 dialectic. But it is best to
postpone a discussion of this matter until later (cf. Sec. 1.6).
To return. One major disagreement Russell had with Kant regarding
the positive content of the a priori form of sensibility was that, whereas
Kant expected it to tell us about difference of place, Russell expected it
to tell us about difference in substance. This is obviously connected with
the fact that Russell conceives of space realistically, as a form of
sensation (in his sense), whereas Kant conceives of space idealistically,
as a form of intuition. It is hard to see, however, how even Russell's
stronger expectation will get him what he wants, namely a principle from
which to deduce all the geometrical axioms common to both Euclidean and
non-Euclidean systems. But in practice, Russell supplements the "fact of
Otherness" with another principle which ensures the homogeneity of the
form of externality. Homogeneity consists in the fact that "one position
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[in the form] is exactly like another" (1896x 11, n. 1), or somewhat more
precisely, "positions do not differ from one another in any qualitative
way" (1896y 277). This supplementation is regarded as a simple consequence
of the formal nature of the "fact of Otherness" in question. As Russell
puts it:
when we abstract a form of externality from all material
content, and study it in isolation ... , a position can have no
intrinsic quality (1897 136-7).
It is difficult, of course, to attach any clear meaning to the traditional
philosophical technique of abstraction, but for historical purposes this
is not necessary. Suffice it to say that Russell's view is that the a
priori element of spatial sensation provides us with an awareness of
distinct but qualitatively indistinguishable things, and that this is what
Russell means when he says the principle of differentiation he is seeking
is concerned with "bare diversity" (1897 136).
The homogeneity of the form of externality is a linch pin for
Russell because he took the mathematical work of Georg F. B. Riem&nn to
show that homogeneity was an essential property of space. Thus if Russell
could show that homogeneity is a priori, or a necessary condition of
spatial experience, he would be well on his way to deriving fundamental
properties of space from the form of externality. Using the term
"manifold" to translate Riemann's Mannigfaltiges (which of course occurs
in Kant as well), and distinguishing examples of non-spatial manifolds
also found in Riemann, Russell writes:
This absence of qualitative difference [among the elements of
a manifold] is the distinguishing mark of space as opposed to
other manifolds, such as the colour and tone-systems. (1896y
277; for "manifold" see 1987 14 fn 2)
Essentially, Russell takes Riemann to have shown that the distinctive
property of space is constancy of curvature; and this, Russell says,
implies the homogeneity of space (1896y 277). The details of both
Riemann's and Russell's arguments are not important here, except perhaps
to say that the constancy of curvature was considered necessary to the
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possibility of measurement, which in turn seemed to require 'motion" of
figures through space." Riemann proved that, if figures were to retain
a constant magnitude through "motion', the curvature of space had to be
constant. Russell writes:
since magnitudes are to be independent of place, ... space
must, within the limits of observation, have a constant
measure of curvature, or must, in other words, be homogenous
in all its parts. (1897 22)
The homogeneity of the differences presented in sense is the primary
feature of Russell' s form of externality. But Riemann's work showed
homogeneity to be the essential or defining feature of space. Russell
sought to exploit this happy coincidence in his metaphysical deduction.
The homogeneity of space, Russell writes, is "our great resource"
(1896y 279). From it he will claim to deduce all the axioms of projective
geometry, which are those common to both euclidean and non-euclidean
geometry. I will concentrate mostly on the first axiom, which affirms the
relativity of space, but the "philosophically interdependent" (1897 132)
axiom of the continuity of space became increasingly important for Russell
as time went on. Throughout my concern will be with the metaphysical
difficulties these two properties, relativity and continuity, raise for
Russell, difficulties he attempted to face in the succeeding years. I will
not, however, be concerned with the errors in Russell's sketchy
Ometaphysical deductions" of the axioms from the assumption that
'positions do not differ from one another in any way." His deductions are
so bad criticism is virtually redundant. My point, rather, will be
historical. The difficulties these properties raise are in a new form
raised again by the problem of impredicativity, which remains closely
related to continuity. Russell considered himself to have done away with
these problems once and for all when he abandoned idealism in 1898 and
1The "abstract motion" in question was thought to be required for the
superposition of one geometrical figure upon another, a test of congruence dating
from Euclid at least. Moore (1899a) condemns the idea.
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accepted the metaphysical position I called atomism above. The paradoxes
forced Russell to refine his atomism into type theory. This metaphysical
refinement allowed him to exclude impredicativity on logical grounds
alone, but it also prevented him from giving an account of classical
continuity. Today, the acceptance of classical or impredicative continuity
requires a return to a clarified version of the idealist notion of
relativity which bothered early Russell.
1.4 Relativity
Russell states the first axiom of projective geometry, which affirms
the relativity of space, as follows:
We can distinguish different parts of space, but all parts are
qualitatively similar, and are distinguished only by the
immediate fact that they lie outside one another. (1897 132)
This statement of the so-called "axiom of relativity," Russell says, "is
not intended to have any exclusive precision," and indeed three separate
claims are made. The second claim made is in fact just the claim that
space is homogenous, which is apparently a serious slip of precision,
since this axiom was to be deduced from the homogeneity of space. This
lack of precision shows up elsewhere, for in unpublished notes Russell
writes: "Homogeneity is synonymous with complete relativity" (1896x 14).
More often, however, Russell speaks of the two properties as equivalent,
and I will follow this practice where possible. This leaves the first and
the third claims in the above statement; but of these the third, since it
involves no reference to persons, is evidently the more fundamental. The
relativity of space, then, consists in the fact that parts of space "are
distinguished only by the immediate fact that they lie outside one
another. "
There is a subtle but crucial difference between the homogeneity and
the relativity of space. Since space is homogenous, all positions in it
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are qualitatively indistinguishable. But positions are external to one
another, and so they stand in some relation. To affirm the relativity of
space is to affirm that these relations, and not any qualities of the
positions themselves, are what make the positions what they are. This step
takes Russell toward the "principle of differentiation" he is seeking, for
it begins, at least, to explain what makes what is, what it is and not
another thing. Strictly, of course, Russell would have here at most a
principle of differentiation for positions, but since Russell's goals were
much broader, I will continue to discuss a general form of the principle
concerning logical subjects, and ignore the very difficult problem of how
Russell got to the general version on his slim basis.
Now to infer the relativity of space from its homogeneity one needs
to make special assumptions. It is difficult to put these assumptions in
a form to which one can be certain Russell would have assented; for,
despite their appearing indispensable, Russell does not explicitly state
them. But I suppose the following would have seemed to him acceptably
precise. First, one must assume that distinct positions must be
distinguishable. Putting this in the general form Russell wants (and
assuming a broad scope reading of the implicit modal claim), we have:
It is necessary that distinct logical subjects be
distinguishable.
This assumption, evidently, is a form of Leibniz' Identity of
Indiscernibles, which may itself be regarded as a consequence of Leibniz'
Law of Sufficient Reason. (If everything true is true for some reason,
then for substantival difference too there must be a reason.) But the
principle I have stated is useless, unless we know the conditions under
which two things are discernible or distinguishable. To specify these
conditions, Russell may have assumed that positions are distinct only by
virtue of the qualities the possess or relations they enter into. More
generally:
Logical subjects are distinct only by virtue of the qualities
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or relations they enter into.
As was mentioned above, Russell held to the traditional metaphysical view
that there are, in the world, only substances, qualities and relations.
Given this, if Russell accepted the Law of Sufficient Reason, he probably
also made both the above special assumptions. I just noted why the Law of
Sufficient Reason might be taken to motivate the first assumption.
Assertions of substantival difference, according to that law, can not be
true on their own, but must be true for a reason. But in what would a
reason consist if not a fact (perhaps a necessary fact), and facts would
seem to be nothing other than logical subjects entering into qualities or
relations? Thus the Law of Sufficient Reason provides a motivation for
the second assumption as well. Now whether this was Russell's reasoning is
hard to determine, but he does appeal at times to the Law of Sufficient
Reason (1897 185, 1896x 39). Furthermore, Russell later took both the Law
of Sufficient Reason and the Identity of Indiscernibles as views
characteristic of "monistic idealism," which he says he subscribed to
during this early time (1900, 1907). In any case, we must recall that
Russell is seeking a reason for the substantial difference given in
sensation. This shows he thought something accounted for logical subjects
being what they are and not other things. Such an account is precisely
what the two principles from Leibniz would seem to provide.
I mention these debts to Leibniz (which are ultimately debts to
Spinoza) in order to give some indication of Russell's probable train of
thought in his version of the metaphysical deduction. But another purpose
is served as well. I shall need to assume a weak version of the Identity
of Indiscernibles later, when I argue in the third chapter that the
impredicativity of an object consists in its bearing certain relations
essentially. The issue of essential relations is already relevant here
too, for it is easy to see that Russell, in fact, took the relations
differentiating positions to be essential to those positions. Russell
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writes:
The whole essence of one part of space is to be external to
another part... (1897x 74).
Apparently, then, if one position or part of space exists in a possible
world, then so do others:"
From the absence of qualitative differences among positions,
it follows logically that positions exist only by virtue of
other positions (1896y 277).
Or again:
all position is relative; that is, a position exists only by
virtue of relations (1896y 276).
These statements are not as precise as one might like. "Relation," as
Russell says, "is an ambiguous and dangerous word" (1897 193). It is not
clear, for instance, whether Russell means that, given one position, all
others must exist, or only some others. If he means the latter, exactly
how many? And are these specific other positions or may they be
arbitrary? My guess is that Russell did not really address these
questions until 1898. At that time he came to believe that in fact all
other positions would have to exist, and this situation was unacceptable
to him. His response was to adopt atomism in the sense described above.
But this is a subject I discuss later. For the present it suffices to note
that Russell took the differentiating relations of positions to be, in
some significant sense, essential to those positions.
1.5 Essential Relativity and the Notion of Logical Subject
This fact, that Russell took the differentiating relations of
positions to be essential to those positions, leads to a very general
"Compare Kant: "erstlich kann man sich nur einen eigenen Raum vorstellen,
und wenn man von vielen RAumen redet, so versteht man darunter nur Teile eines
und desselben alleinegen Raumes.... Er ist wesentlich einig, das Mannigfaltige
in ihm ... beruht lediglich auf Einschrankungen." [A25/B39]. Russell may have
felt his essentiality claim was needed to obtain his goal of demonstrating the
necessity of geometrical axioms, and also justified by the quite reasonable idea
that things are not merely contingently themselves, i.e., that "x is distinct
from y" is always necessary.
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observation about Russell's notion of a logical subject. The general
observation is that Russell places conflicting demands upon this notion.
It was noted in the introduction that a logical subject is that about
which something true can be said. By this definition, anything at all is
a logical subject. But despite this, the fact that a position can be
differentiated from others only by means of relations essential to that
position led Russell to the' rather startling conclusion that positions are
not logical subjects. "Position," he says,
is a term in a relation, not a thing per se; it cannot,
therefore, ... exist by itself, apart from the other terms of
the relation (1897 86).
From this passage, it is clear that Russell required that a thing or
substance be able to "exist by itself" or per se. The idea that some
manner of independent existence is required by a substance has roots going
back at least to Aristotle; so it is not entirely peculiar to find the
idea in Russell. What is peculiar is that Russell equates substances in
this sense with logical subjects in the quite general sense given above.
"Matter, " he says for example elsewhere, "is not a mere relation or
adjective, but a thing, substance, or logical subject" (1897x 21; cf.
1896x 14). Similarly, an arbitrary spatial position is a logical subject
in the general sense, since geometrical axioms will in general have
something true to say about it; but since what it turns out these axioms
must say, according to Russell, is that positions depend for their
existence on other things, then positions are not logical subjects in a
new sense. Obviously if one insists on imposing conflicting conditions
upon a notion, contradictions will follow. In fact, to state such
contradictions as they apply to notions in the foundations of geometry was
one of Russell's main goals in (1897). The contradictions he formulated,
he thought, must inevitably arise in the foundations (cf. 1897 189). But
the inevitability Russell felt did not arise merely from wanton
equivocation. Rather, Russell thought the equivocation itself was
necessary. I am not quite able to see why Russell thought this, but that
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he did so can hardly be in dispute.
But my purpose in this Section is not simply to indicate a fallacy
in Russell, nor to show how the fallacy may have been motivated by other
beliefs he had. I am trying neither to refute Russell's early views nor to
show that they were plausible on their own terms. My point here is instead
to observe that Russell's equivocation, invalid or not, raises a
difficulty for Russell of a quite another sort. The difficulty is to
maintain his particular conception of the form of externality in the face
of his claim that the differentiating relations of positions are essential
to those positions. Let me elaborate a little further on this difficulty,
running the notions together just as Russell would have.
A position, according to Russell, cannot be a logical subject since,
being essentially related to other positions, it depends on them for its
existence. Position must, therefore, be a property of some underlying
substance. The obvious candidate is the point, but the position of a point
is its only differentiating feature: it is what makes a point the
particular point that it is. Now position is relative, so a given point
cannot be what it is, without there being other points bearing other
positions whose existence is implied by the existence of the position of
the given point. The essential property of a point is therefore a
relational property, so points too cannot be substances, or logical
subjects. This is what Russell means by saying that, "metaphysically,
space has no elements" (1897 68).
For Russell, the only other candidate for the logical subject
bearing positions, considered as properties, is space itself. But just
this causes difficulty for his foundational program, since it challenges
his notion of the form of externality. It is important to see, however,
that the idea that space is the logical subject, that space is itself a
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substance having positions as its properties, fits together very well with
several aspects of Russell's views. First, the idea that only one logical
subject is needed to account for geometrical knowledge must have been for
Russell a pleasant reminder of Bradley's monism, which affirmed the
existence of only one substance. But beyond such pleasant associations,
various considerations seemed to force him to treat space as a substance.
Space, recall, is "given in sensation" and "immediately experienced." But
"whatever is immediately presented has a This, and may therefore be
regarded, to some extent, as possessed of thinghood" (1896x 57). So space
can be neither relational nor "adjectival, " but a thing or logical
subject. Further, geometry seemed to be about space. If so, then the
correct logical form of geometrical axioms would make space their logical
subject. Axioms really ought to be given "in the most desirable form,
namely as adjectives [affirmed] of the conception of space" (1897 15).
Both these considerations gave Russell cause to regard space as a
substance.
But by far the most compelling reasons for doing so came from within
geometry itself, from the second axiom of projective geometry. This axiom
asserts that "space is continuous and infinitely divisible" (1897 132). As
was common at the time, Russell tended to regard these two properties as
definitionally equivalent. The substantiality of space followed easily
from its divisibility, via the apparent truism that "no mere adjective or
relation can be divided" (1897x 19).15 But its divisibility also seemed
to imply that space was "complex," the natural interpretation of which was
that it was composed of distinct logical subjects acting as parts. This
apparent implication, however, was incorrect, since the division could be
carried on ad infinitum. For Russell, every substance or "thing is either
5It is interesting that this is a "truism" Russell would come to deny. In
(1925), where are classes are dispensed with and only countable many individuals
assumed to exist, the continuum is divisible but nevertheless "degraded to an
adjective" (1896x 14), i.e., to a propositional function.
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simple, or built up of simple things" (1897x 19). Divisibility implied
space was a substance, but its infinite divisibility implied it was not
built up of simple substances. This was in accord with the essential
relativity of position, which implied that the parts of space were
essentially related to one another and thus not logical subjects. Thus
space was a simple substance, and if it could be said to have parts at
all, these could not be construed as independent logical subjects.
The substantial view of space was thus highly motivated by various
aspects of Russell's views, but it caused serious difficulties for
Russell. The difficulties threatened his refined account of the form of
externality. For, if geometrical axioms are really about some one single
substance, what can we possibly learn from spatial sensation about
substantival difference? What is to become of Russell's original claim,
which arose from his interpretation of Kant's metaphysical deduction
[B38/A23], that spatial sensation presents us with the very form of
substantival difference? Contra Kant, Russell hoped to "infer real
diversity, i.e. the existence of different things, ... from difference of
position in space or time" (1897 187). But difference of position, owing
to the axiom of relativity (as stated above in Sec. 1.3), seemed uniquely
unable to support any such inference. But then, no principle pertaining to
"substantival complexity," to difference of substance, was forthcoming
from an analysis of space. Russell was in hot water.
1.6 Getting to Monism
Russell's solution to this problem changed over the next few years,
but initially it took the following form. He held to the belief that
spatial sensation yielded knowledge of the existence of more than one
substance. Indeed, Russell continued to insist, at first, that the
positive content of the form of externality had to consist in principles
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which said what it was for one substance to differ from another. Only, the
substances of whose difference we learned in spatial sensation were not
themselves "parts" or "elements" of space. Space, says Russell, is "not a
thing, nor built up of things," "neither simple nor built up of simple
things" (1897x 20). For "real parts ... would be discrete elements" (1896x
17), and space is continuous. Yet Space is "no whole, either, of any real
sort" (1896x 13). Thus space is not composed of substances, nor yet itself
a substance, and it therefore had to be a property. Notice, Russell's view
is not that space consists in the fact that certain differing substance
possess some property. Rather, strange as it may be, space itself is said
to be a property. In Russell's mind, this immediately raised the question
whether space was a quality or a relation, for these were the only two
types of properties his view admitted. But in accordance with his belief
that spatial sensation taught us of the existence of many substances,
Russell held (at least at first) that space was a relation entered into by
the substances whose existence we determined from sensation. These
substances were related by the relation which was space, but they did not
literally compose space. Despite appearances, geometrical axioms were not
strictly about space, but about these substances; they did not attribute
properties to space, but spatial properties to these substances.
This, then, was Russell's initial solution. It was not without its
own difficulties, some of which Russell himself felt. There was first of
all the difficulty previously mentioned as to whether or not a property
can correctly be said to be divisible (1897x 19). Accordingly, Russell
came to believe that space was not divisible at all, and that its apparent
divisibility was "psychological illusion" (1897 196). Geometry was
"compelled" (1897 189) to treat space as a "thing per se', and it derived
from this the useful illusion that space was divisible, but the reality of
space was otherwise. I will not comment on this idea, except perhaps to
say that it has an early adherent in Spinoza. A second problem for
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Russell's initial solution was the difficulty as to precisely what
relational property space was supposed to be. One can easily enough think
of spatial relations, such as those denoted by such familiar phrase as "x
is some distance from y" or Ox is to the left of y." But these relations
could hardly be said to themselves be space. Even when Russell later came
to doubt that the property which was space was a relation, a problem
similar to this second one arose. Spatial qualities like being extended
are perhaps easy enough to imagine, but what quality was itself space? It
is not clear Russell ever recognized this question as a problem for his
solution.
Connected with this second problem is a third, this one recognized
by Russell himself. If space is a property, what exhibits it? Initially,
while Russell continued to hold that space was a relation, the third
problem required that he say just what stood in this relation. Here
Russell took the substances whose difference were known to us by spatial
sensation to be the things that stood in the relation he called "space."
The further question might well be asked as to just what these are, but
little need be said for my purposes. Russell did consider these substances
to be material (on the grounds that we may come to have true beliefs about
them through sensation), and he called them variously "material points
(1896x 14) and "particles" (1897x 23). He seems in fact to have identified
them outright with mass points.
Russell's initial solution did not last long. Sometime in 1897 he
came to believe that the space was a quality, and not a relation. It was
at this time that he wrote the dialectical argument with which I began.
The reasons for his change depend on an equivocation similar to that
mentioned above between the terms "substance" and "logical subject." Mass
points must on the one hand be substances, and thus exist "by themselves"
or independently; but on the other hand they seem to depend on further
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mass points to which they are essentially related. Again, the exact
details the "antinomy" Russell deduced from this need not be stated (see
1896x 18-19). The key point here is simply that, for much the same reasons
as he changed his view as to whether space was substantive or not, Russell
came to believe that space, though still a property, was not a relation.
Of course, the new view had still to resolve the third problem as to what
precisely exhibited the quality identified with space. Again, the
substance in question was material; in fact, strange to say, it was matter
itself: "Matter is the One Whole (sic), of which space and motion are mere
adjectives" (1897x 22). Russell's new solution left little room for the
form of externality he had labored so hard to put in place in (1897); for
there were no longer different substances to be sensed. But eventually
Russell simply could not see how the existence of distinct substance could
be made compatible with the apparent fact that they had essentially to
bear relations to one another. The hot water which Russell's systematic
equivocation had gotten him into in (1897) drove him to monism.
1.7 From Monism to Analytic Philosophy
Russell's shifting solution to the problem described in Sec. 1.5
shows his early indecision as to whether there was in the world one or
many substances. But the alternatives, as Russell saw them then, spanned
only the last two stages of his 1897 dialectic. I want now to resume my
discussion of Russell's 1897 dialectical argument with the goal of better
understanding what it was Russell gave up when he rejected idealism in
1898. I hope to show in Chapter 3 that an idea closely related to what he
gave up can be used to make sense of impredicativity.
In this Section I make use of possible-worlds semantics. Russell, of
course, had no such semantics in mind for his statements. It would be
wrong, therefore, to claim that the interpretation of the principles I
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discuss in this Section precisely capture Russell's ideas at the time. Yet
this is not to say that a possible-worlds semantics can be of no use in
the effort to become clear as to what Russell did believe as an idealist.
On the contrary, I think it will become evident that Russell had
interesting reasons for rejecting idealism, and that these make sense even
in a more formal setting. There is, too, an additional benefit to be
gained from using a contemporary semantics. I shall want to state my own
modal account of impredicativity in these terms, and having that account
and Russell's early views expressed in a similar way will greatly
facilitate comparison.
1.7.1 Russell's Dialectic Revisited
Russell's 1897 dialectic ran as follows:
The principle of our dialectic appears to lie in making the
Whole gradually more explicit. Our separate particles turn
out, first to be related to other particles, and then to be
necessarily related to all other particles, and finally to err
in being separate particles at all. With this we pass to the
plenum. (1897x 23)
I said in the introduction that the first stage of Russell's
dialectic may be taken to represent atomism, the philosophical framework
which Russell ultimately adopted, and in terms of which he tried a third
time to give an account of mathematical continuity. Yet the last two
stages of his dialectic retained a certain significance to Russell even
after he had so strictly dissociated himself in 1898 from idealism, which
is to say from the philosophical frameworks associated with the last two
stages of his dialectic. In particular, Russell continued to believe that,
once at the second stage, the transition to the third was unavoidable.
Roughly, this transition becomes Russell's later argument that monadism,
the philosophical framework associated with the second stage, collapses to
monism, that associated with the third (1900 58-9, 1907 39). Russell's
later claim suggests that he saw some difficulty getting to the second
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step at all. This, I think, can be seen to be the case.
In Russell's numerous arguments against the idealists, a principle
he calls the "doctrine of internal relations' plays a pivotal role.
Russell states this principle in a variety of ways, not all of which are
equivalent. Behind some of the statements Russell's gives of the principle
is the important, if imprecise, idea that a relation must be essential to
its terms. This idea may be formalized in the following way: for any x and
y, and for any 2-place relation R,
xRy - OxRy (1)
As an interpretation of the doctrine of internal relations, (1) is
intended to be a very general claim about all (2-place) relations. It may
be read: if any R relates any x to any y, it does so necessarily. In a
possible-worlds semantics, (1) will be evaluated as true just in case the
formula 'xRy' is evaluated as true in all possible worlds whenever it is
evaluated as true in some possible world.' 6 But in order for the use of
"O" in (1) to capture a notion of essentiality, it must be stipulated that
'xRy' may be assigned the value true even in worlds where one or both of
x and y do not exist. Without this stipulation, (1) would have to be
modified to express the essentiality of relations to their terms." 7 The
suggested stipulation, however, considerably simplifies the formalization
of the above imprecise statement of the so-called "doctrine of internal
relations, and may be accepted here despite the apparently odd idea that
"1Here and elsewhere I use the phrase O'xRy' is evaluated as true in a
world' as a shorthand for the phrase "for some assignment of objects to 'x' and
'y', 'xRy' is evaluated as true in a world.' Without the abbreviation, I should
say: (1) will be evaluated as true just in case if, for some assignment of
objects to 'x' and 'y', 'xRy' is evaluated as true in a world, then on that
assignment, the formula 'xRy' is evaluated as true in all possible worlds.
"An effective modification would be (1'): for any x and y, and for any 2-
place relation R, xRy-iO((Ex v Ey) -*xRy), where "Ex" is read "x exists" and is
interpreted as true in a given possible world just in case the value assigned to
"x" on that interpretation is an element of the domain of the possible world.
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NxRya may be true in worlds where x or y do not exist.
(1) bears an interesting relation to Russell's 1897 dialectic, but
before that is discussed, it may be useful to indicate how the early
Russell would have understood the words °any relation" as they occur in
(1). I said that (1) was intended to be a general fact about 2-place
relations. One might note, in the first place, t . the qualifier "2-
place& was redundant for Russell, since he tJ• Agh, all relations were 2-
place. More important, Russell says at (1897 198) that difference or
*externalitym is "a necessary aspect or element in every relation." In
other words, all 2-place relations are irreflexive. This view seems odd
today, but it is not necessary to pay it much heed. For my purposes it
does not matter whether we consider Russell as having accepted (1) for any
2-place relation whatsoever (all of them being, on his view, irreflexive)
or more simply as having accepted it only for all irreflexive relations R.
A very similar consideration applies to Russell's view that difference is
not itself a relation, but rather presupposed by all relations. The idea
may seem ludicrous today, since it is hard to image what else difference
could be, if not a relation. But I will let the matter pass, with perhaps
only the note that Russell woul', very probably have accepted (1) with "*"
substituted for "R."
Another point should be made regarding Russell's understanding of
the term "relation.0 Russell (most of the time) viewed predication as a
relation. To say that an entity exhibits a quality is to assert that a
special relation obtains between that entity and that quality. Thus what
we might be inclined to symbolize "Qx," Russell may have included as a
special instance of "xRy." If so, (1) for Russell would have as a special
case the following:
Qx - OQx (2)
If this is the case, and if, as I suggested earlier, Russell held that,
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among properties, there are only qualities and relations, he would have
been in a position to conclude that every property exhibited by an object
is necessarily exhibited by that object. This is certainly an odd view,
but it is worth noting that idealists like Bradley and Hegel may well have
wanted this conclusion. Later I will suggest that something quite like
this conclusion was important in Russell's rejection of idealism.
(1), interpreted in the above manner, is of special interest in
regard to the transition from stage one of Russell's 1897 dialectic to
stage two. In the dialectic, we begin with the proposition that "separate
particles [are] related to other particles." This was interpreted in Sec.
1.1 so as to imply that some irreflexive relation is instantiated. In the
hypothesis of (1), we suppose similarly that, for some irreflexive
relation R, and for x and y, two arbitrary possible entities, 'xRy' is
true in some possible world. In Russell's dialectic, we arrive with the
second stage at the proposition that particles are "necessarily related to
all other particles." This may be divided into two parts: namely, the
particles are necessarily related by some R; and they are all related to
one another by R. (1) clearly motivates the first claim, since the
consequent of (1) affirms that x and y are necessarily related by R. The
second part of stage two can be added by adopting the principle that, for
arbitrary x and y,
3RxRy" (3)
The consequent of (1), then, together with this latter principle, quite
plausibly represent the second stage of Russell's dialectic. For very
roughly, these two amount to the view that all things are necessarily
related (by some relation or other) to all other things.
The point of the above comparison is that the "doctrine of internal
'
9Russell would no doubt have preferred us to say: for arbitrary x and
arbitrary ~yx, 3RxRy, where R is irreflexive but not itself •; but such niceties
may be ignored.
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relations," interpreted as (1), plays a pivotal role in Russell's 1897
dialectic. In particular, (1) may be understood as motivating part of the
transition from the first to the second stage of Russell's dialectical
argument, his explanation or account of the continuity of the material
world. (1) then is well situated to be one of the principles Russell
rejected when he abandoned idealism in 1898. Below I argue that Russell's
rejection c• idealism consisted largely in his rejection of (1), but it is
important to note that there are other plausible principles which may have
been the doctrine of internal relations as Russell understood this in
1898. I wish to digress for a moment and state one such principle, which
will prove important in Chapter 3.
1.7.1.1 Ontological Dependency and Internal Relation
Perhaps the oddest fact about the doctrine of internal relations is
that Russell seems not to have stated it until well after he rejected it.
It seems to have operated as an unnoticed presupposition. There is, for
example, no general enunciation of it in (1897). One does find Russell
mentioning, in an almost offhand manner, "that interdependence which a
relation requires" (1897 198). The presupposition here would seem to be
that
any two distinct logical subjects, provided they are related
in any way or another, depend on one another for their own
existence.
Much later Russell claimed to detect a similar presupposition in the
writings of Joachim, an idealist .ather after the Bradlian mold, which
Russell expressed: if A is independent of B, A cannot be related to B
(1906b 529; cf. also 1907 37). It is conceivable that the notion of mutual
ontological dependency implicit at (1897 198) above is at work again in
Joachim. Indeed, the same notion might have been the motivation for
Russell's view noted above that "a thing per se cannot ... exist by
itself, apart from the other terms of the relation" (1897 86). In
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practice, then, the so-called doctrine of internal relations may enforce
some form of mutual ontological dependency upon related things. This may
formalized as follows: for any x and y, and for any 2-place relation R:
xRy - D(Ex * Ey) (4)
(4) represents a second plausible interpretation of the so-called doctrine
of internal relations as it was applied by idealists.
(4) does not follow from (1), but I suspect that in practice Russell
took the two to come to much the same thing. In any case, he apparently
had rather good reasons to accept (4), for it is plausible to suppose he
accepted other principles from which, together with (1), (4) does follow.
One of these is sometimes called "K", and ensures the distributivity of
L"Y with respect to "-"r:
D(A-+ B) -ý- ([A --+[]B). (4) follows from K, (1) and the following principle:
for arbitrary x, y and 2-place R:
D(xRy - (Ex A Ey)) (5)
That Russell held K seems plausible of itself. That he held (5) may
perhaps inferred from the following, which he wrote before his 1898
revolution:
whatever can be the subject in a true judgment must have what,
in opposition to existence, I shall call Being. (1898x 168)
If "xRy" expresses a true judgement, then the logical subjects x and y
have being. (5), then,. interprets "x has being" by "Ex, " which is said to
be true in just those possible world where x exists. While not an
historically accurate account of Russell's intention, (5) might still be
thought to be a serviceable approximation.
It should be observed that (5) does not run counter to the
stipulation made above, that "xRy" be interpretable as true in worlds
without x or y. The stipulation simply requires one to express an idea
explicitly, within a theory, rather than implicitly as a convention for
stating theories. Stating (5) explicitly helps to show that Russell had
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good reason to believe (4), a second interpretation of the doctrine of
internal relations. But in fact, it is not likely that Russell clearly
distinguished (1) and (4), or (5) from the stipulation opposite to the one
I made. (4) is not crucial to my account of Russell's rejection of
idealism, but it is relevant to my account of impredicativity in Chapter
3. With these remarks I will end my digression.
1.7.2 Revolution and the Rejection of Idealism
I come now to the main question: what principle or principles did
Russell give up during his 1898 revolution, in which he abandoned idealism
and embarked upon analytic philosophy? This question is a difficult one,
and I do not mean to answer it in any complete way. But something along
the lines of the following argument may well have occurred to Russell.
Let us suppose there are two logical subjects, x and y. Like
Russell, we might say these are known to us through sensation, or even
known a priori on the basis of a form of externality. More formally, this
may be interpreted as the claims that (i) *Ex" is true in some possible
world (not necessarily the actual world; call it w,); (ii) "Ey" is true in
some possible world wy (wy not necessarily the actual world); and (iii)
U"xy" is true in all possible worlds.
As mentioned above, Russell seemed to believe that there is a
relation standing between any two logical subjects. This was formalized by
(3) above. Thus for logical subjects x and y just introduced there is a
relation R such that xRy. More formally, this may be interpreted as the
claim that "xRy" is true in a world w. (Presumably w is the actual world,
but this is not important to my purposes.) It should be noted, however,
that it is not assumed that w=w, or that w=w,. For all we know, it could
be that wIw,*wJw.
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Russell further believed that any logical "subject in a true
judgment must have ... Being." This was formalized above by (5). This may
be interpreted in the present context as the claim that in every world w
where "xRy' is true, so is "Ex A Ey". Given (5), there is no possible
world in which "xRy" is true but in which x and y fail to exist. There is
as yet no reason to believe the converse holds; x and y may exist in
worlds where "xRy" is not true.
(1) supplies this converse. Given (1), and the x, y and R as above,
xRy - E cRy.
As interpreted above, this signified that, if "xRy" was true in one
possible world, it was true in them all. Now "xRy" is true in w, so "xRy"
is true in all possible worlds. By (5), therefore, "Ex A Ey" is true in
all possible worlds.
The problem with this is that x and y were perfectly arbitrary. It
was not even supposed at the outset that they existed together in any
single possible world. It follows that every possible entity, that is to
say every value of any free variable such as "x" or "y", exists in every
possible world. Similarly, regardless of the interpretation of "S" and
"z", "xSz" will be true in all possible worlds provided only that it is
true in some possible world. Parallel remarks apply to "Qx', given (2).
Put very roughly, everything possible is actual. Thus in the presence of
(i)-(iii), (3) and (5) then, there is no distinction to be made between
possible worlds.
In this context, it is difficult to attribute much significance to
"'0", the necessity operator. After all, if O[KRy" is true just in case
"xRy" is true in all possible worlds, and there is no distinction to be
made between possible worlds, why not assert merely "xRy"? I suggest that
this question, or one quite like it, is the question Russell came to ask
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himself in 1898, and his answer, that merely "xRy" should be asserted,
constitutes the heart of his 1898 revolution.
The idea that what Russell rejected in 1898 was the notion of
necessity fits well with the historical facts."9 In the first place, a
definitive feature of Russell's later metaphysics is the lack of any
robust role for necessity. For instance, Russell later writes that
Bradley' s
opinion seems to rest upon some law of sufficient reason, some
desire to show that every truth is "necessary". I am inclined
to think that a large part of my disagreement with Mr. Bradley
turns on a disagreement as to the notion of "necessity". I do
not myself admit necessity and possibility as fundamental
notions; it appears to me that fundamental truths are merely
true in fact, and that the search for a "sufficient reason" is
mistaken. (1910a 374)
Thus Russell thought his rejection of necessity marked a major point of
difference between his late metaphysics and Bradley's. But other
historical details fit well with the present account of Russell's
revolution. Without the notion of necessity, (1) become not false but
meaningless. Under these conditions, there is no relation R such that, for
some x and y,
xRy -+ ECRy
This is far stronger than a simple denial of (1), and yet it seems to be
what Russell held. For Russell the atomist, "fundamental truths are merely
true in fact." Insofar as (1) is an interpretation of the statement, "all
relations are internal", Russell, in rejecting (1), did not merely claim
that some relations failed to be internal; rather he insisted that no
relation was internal. Russell writes:
Mr Bradley has argued much and hotly against the view that
relations are ever purely "external". I am not certain whether
I understand what he means by this expression, but I think I
should be retaining his phraseology if I described my view as
the view that all relations are external. (1898x 142)
"See also (1903 454) quoted later. In a paper on Meinong, Russell wrote:
"it seems impossible to distinguish, among true propositions, some which are
necessary from others which are mere facts" (1904 26).
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I conclude, then, that Russell's 1898 revolution consisted very largely in
his rejection of the notion of necessity, and his consequent strong denial
of (1).
I will make one final remark concerning (4). Since the consequent of
(4) contains a necessity operator, Russell after his revolution must
apparently deny (4) any significance whatsoever. But just as (4) seemed to
act as an unstated presupposition for Russell the Hegelian, and so Russell
after his revolution seems to have generally left it unstated and not
singled it out particularly well as an instance (or even as a consequence)
of the doctrine of internal relations. In Chapter 3 I will return to the
question of the role of (4) in Russell's atomistic metaphysics. There it
will be found that the modal notion of mutual ontological dependency
formulated in the consequent of (4) can be extended in a certain way to
yield an modal account of impredicativity.
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chapter 2: Poincar6: Two Hard Choices
2.0 Introduction
I shall endeavor to explain Poincar6's ideas in the foundations of
mathematics, continuing in a historical and narrative style. It would be
sufficient to consider solely the contributions Poincar6 made to the
subject of predicativity, but it is advisable to examine Poincar4's more
general positions as well. By doing so, one finds prima facie tension
between what Poincar4 insists upon and what he forbids - more precisely,
between his opinions as to the legitimacy of "les vraies math4matiques"
and as to the illegitimacy of impredicative definitions. In brief,
Poincar4 first developed a general epistemological account of our
knowledge in arithmetic and analysis, but then later sought to restrict
our knowledge to predicative mathematics. Although the latter move is in
keeping with some aspects of his earlier theory, it is in serious conflict
with certain other positions Poincar4 did not wish to abandon. One must
allow for change in his views over this period of more than twenty years,
but Poincar6 nevertheless has some hard choices to make.
As in my discussion of the early Russell, I will develop Poincar6's
ideas in part by contrasting them with Kant's. This will add unity to my
overall discussion, but it helps as well because of the continuing
importance of Kant's ideas in regard to the philosophical issues of
impredicativity. The two hard choices Poincar6 has to make turn on his
interpretation of the Kantian conception of the synthetic a priori, which
Poincar4 appeals to in the foundations of arithmetic and analysis. In each
case, the only plausible formal equivalents of the conception are
impredicative, and Poincar6 must choose between an illegitimate Kantian
intuition or a legitimate formal impredicativity. I will suggest that this
conflict puts pressure on Poincar4's subjectivism, i.e., his belief in the
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dependence of mathematical entities on activities of the human mind.
2.1 Poincar"'s Program: The Primacy of Arithmetic
To account for mathematical knowledge, Poincar6 endorsed, with
certain important modifications, Kant's view that mathematical knowledge
is derivable from synthetic a priori intuition. Of course, the
significance of the term "synthetic a priori" is no clearer in Poincar6
than it is in Kant, but for general historical purposes a full analysis is
not necessary. The following rough and partial gloss will serve my initial
purposes, and would very likely meet with the assent of both Poincar4 and
Kant: mathematical knowledge is a priori, epistemically certain knowledge
of necessary truths which do not follow from the meanings of words used to
express them.2" Again, I will not undertake a complete exposition of all
the elements of this initial gloss, but I will come back to some of them
as my narrative demands more detail. Here I want to begin the discussion
by pointing out that Poincar4 (at least in the earliest phases of his
career) sought to trace the synthetic a priori character of mathematical
knowledge back to a single primitive a priori notion, the "intuition du
nombre pur, celle d' ou est sorti ... le v6ritable raisonnement
math~matique." "Cette intuition du nombre pur," he held, is "la seule qui
ne puisse nous tromper" (1900 122). With characteristic optimism, the
early Poincar6 conceived of this single indubitable intuition as
underlying every branch of mathematics:
Autrefois, on parlait d'un grand nombre de notions, regard6es
comme primitives, irr~ductibles et intuitives; telles 6taient
celles de nombre entier, de fraction, de grandeur continue,
d'espace, de point, de ligne, de surface, etc. Aujourd'hui une
seule subsiste, celle du nombre entier; toutes les autres n'en
sont que des combinaisons, et A ce prix on a atteint la
2
"It is best, perhaps, to indicate at the outset that Poincar6 does not
adequately distinguish the notions of aprioricity, certainty and necessity. He
takes each to be sufficient evidence for the others; e.g., if we know P with
certainty, we know it a priori and P is necessary. The triple mistake is
traditional, and I will not be calling Poincar6 on his error, although I will
have to interpret several important passages where it occurs.
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rigueur parfaite. (1899a 129)
My first major task, then, will be to examine this fundamental
intuition into natural number (see Sec. 2.1.1). But before that it is
worth pausing over Poincar4's list of reduced notions. Except for
fractions (the reduction of which by Poincar6's day presented no special
problem) all the mentioned notions receive explicit reduction in
Poincar4's hands.21 The notion upon which Poincard expended the greatest
effort was that of space, the topic of (1895), (1898), (1903) and (1912).
Its inclusion here among the non-primitive notions marks the first
important modification Poincar4 made to Kant: space is not a form of our
sensibility. Below I concentrate only on a component part of this
reduction, namely Poincar4's treatment of "le grandeur continue" or, more
simply, of continuity (Sec 2.2). This notion is important of course
because a correct analysis of it is required in the foundations of
geometry, analysis and topology, all of which Poincar6 made major
contributions to and considered part of "les vraies math6matiques".
Poincar6 believed that the reduction of continuity to the natural numbers
had been accomplished with "perfect rigor." This belief reveals his early
faith in the great arithmetization of analysis that had been pursued
throughout the 19th century. Poincar4 never wavered from defending the
certainty and legitimacy of analysis, but he was eventually to adopt a
principle which would leave him little room for an explanation of our
knowledge of classical continuity. This situation, we shall see, poses the
second of the hard choices I want to raise for Poincard: he believed we
had knowledge of classical continuity, which is impredicative, but he
rejected impredicativity (Sec. 2.2.2).
At the turn of the century, then, Poincar6 was upbeat. Not only had
2 Points are discussed in (1895 640-1), (1897 65-7) and (1898 24 ff), lines
in (1898 20), and surfaces briefly in (1899 130). Some indication of Poincar6's
view of fractions is found in (1893) and (1904 260).
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the long-sought arithmetization of analysis been accomplished, but it had
been accomplished with perfect rigor: "On peut dire qu'aujourd'hui la
rigueur absolue est atteinte" (1900 122). Poincar6 was aware that if
analysis was to be traced back to a primitive intuition of the natural
numbers, the construction of subsets ("combinaisons", elsewhere
"syst&mesm) of the set of natural numbers would have to be allowed for.
The infinite would have to be tolerated, but for Poincar4, even as late as
1902, this was not a problem:
Notre fagon de concevoir l'infini s'est 4galement modif6e. M.
G. Cantor nous a appris A distinguer des degr6s dans l'infini
lui-m&me .... La notion du continu, longtemps regard6e comme
primitive, a 6t4 analysde et r6duite A ses 616mentes" (1902a
93-4).
Poincar4 is writing here after almost twenty years of familiarity with
Cantor. He was one of the first mathematicians in France actually to
employ results of Cantor, and in 1883 he aided in the first French
translation of several of Cantor's important early papers.2 2 Thus, despite
Poincar4's later condemnation of the new "fagon de concevoir l'infini", he
evidently felt early on not only tolerance but considerable sympathy for
the work of Cantor. He included Cantor's theory, or at least as much of it
as was required for the analysis of the continuum within "les vraies
math4matiques" and accorded it the same "perfect" and "absolute" rigor he
found in other contemporary mathematics.
2.1.1 Pure Arithmetical Intuition and Mathematical Induction
But I now return to the single arithmetical intuition Poincar6 early
on identified as the sole primitive concept in mathematics and the source
of "le vdritable raisonnement math4matique". I mentioned that, although
22These translations, as it turns out, were Russell's first contact with
Cantor. His notes have been preserved and were published in (1896x 463-481). For
further references on Poincar4's early involvement in support of Cantor, see
Heinzmann (1985 15). Veuilleman (1968 213) states that Poincar4 in this early
period was "encore cantorien", and Hadamard (1921 161, 171) discusses generally
Poincar6's contributions to topology.
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Poincard considered himself a Kantian, he introduced certain modifications
of Kant's views, one of which was his denial that space was a primitive,
synthetic a priori form of intuition. The second modification is
Poincar6's specification of the "v6ritable raisonnement math6matique"
licensed by our a priori intuition into pure number. In particular, that
intuition underwrites the application of mathematical induction, "le
raisonnement math4matique par excellencem (1894 379; 1905 818). "Cette
rbgle,' he says, minaccessible A la dbmonstration analytique et a
l'exp6rience, est le veritable type du jugement synthdtique a priori"
(1894 381-2). 23 This idea, that mathematical induction is the principle
which articulates the content of the primitive intuition at the base of
mathematics, is new to Poincar4 and not to be found in Kant's own work.
But other familiar features of the traditional Kantian notion of synthetic
a priori are still found in Poincar4. For example, mathematical induction
for Poincar4 is the principle which establishes "la possibilit4 m&me de la
science math catique', understood as yielding certainty of truths which
are necessary but not analytic (1894 371; cf. Kant [814-15]). Secondly,
the principle of induction, according to Poincar6, "n' est que
l'affirmation d'une proprit64 de 1'esprit lui-m&me" (cf. Kant A36-7/B52-
3). As we shall see, there are other points at which one may wish to
challenge Poincar4's allegiance to Kant, but in these respects there is
similarity.
It was just noted that, according to Poincar6, the principle of
mathematical induction is an affirmation of a property of the human mind.
nHe goes on: "On ne saurait d'autre part songer A y voir une convention."
But in his interpretation, the logicists ('les logiciens intransigeants") would
soon dream of just that (cf. 1905 818). Notice the equation of conventionality
and explicit definability. Convention in Poincard is a difficult but crucial
notion, and his competing demands on it are discussed more later. Here the
difficulty is that, since conventions, cn his view, are neither true nor false
(1895 645, 1898 42), the logicist justification of induction on the basis of an
explicit definition, construed as a convention, could not be a justification for
believing induction is true. But this is obviously a misrepresentation of the
logicist position.
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It is not clear on the face of it what Poincar4 intends by this. How can
a mathematical principle just be the affirmation of a property of the
mind? Closer examination shows that Poincar6 has several theses in mind
which he is not always careful to distinguish. The property of the mind
which he wants to emphasize is a capacity. The assertion of the principle
of mathematical induction "n'est que 1'affirmation de la puissance de
1'esprit qui se sait capable de concevoir la r6p6tition ind~finie d'un
m&me acte d&s que cet acte est une fois possible' (1894 382). The idea
that the mind can indefinitely repeat certain types of acts is relatively
uncontroversial, although obviously a qualification such as 'in principle"
would have to be added and analyzed. Rather than undertake such an
analysis, I will try to explain the relation, as Poincar4 conceives it,
between this capacity or 'puissance" of the mind and mathematical
induction.
One thing is clear: the capacity Poincar6 has in mind is closely
related to our understanding of the sequence of natural numbers or, in his
terminology, to our 'intuition du nombre pur'. In fact, one indefinitely
repeatable act attributable to the mind is the very creation of the
natural numbers themselves:
Quand je parle de tous les nombres entiers, je veux dire tous
les nombres entiers qu'on a invent6s et tous qu'on pourra
inventer un jour' (1909 477).
It is odd, but not uncommon, to speak of creating or inventing
mathematical objects. The early Russell, for example, also held that
'counting creates numbers' (1897x 20). For Poincard, invention takes place
by definition or construction. Abstract mathematical objects
"n'existeront qu'aprAs qu'ils auront 4t4 construits, c'est-A-
dire aprbs qu'ils auront 4t4 d6finis' (1912 7).
Since the natural numbers are thought to be "invented" or "constructed" by
repeated acts of explicit definition, Poincar4 evidently conceives of the
natural numbers as being introduced, not as a totality by an explicit
definition, but successively by a so-called recursive definition. A
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"d6finition par r6currence", he says, "est d'une nature particuli&re qui
la distingue dbj& de la d~finition purement logique; [elle] contient en
effet une infinit6 de d6finitions distinctes" (1894 375). The synthetic
"intuition du nombre pur" itself, then, can be codified or expressed by
means of a recursive definition. This interpretation accords with
Poincar4's view (which is very important in Sec. 2.1.3) that mathematical
induction is not analytically deduced from prior synthetic principles, but
rather follows synthetically from a certain intuition (1894 371) ." For
induction is informally motivated by a recursive definition of natural
numbers, but cannot be formally deduced from it. Additional confirmation
of this interpretation is found in one assessment Poincar6 gives of the
significance of the principle of mathematical induction itself, which
implies that the natural numbers are indeed defined "par r4currence": "Le
principe d'induction compl&te', he writes, "signifie que sur tout nombre
qui peut §tre d4fini par r6currence, on a le droit de raisonner par
r6currence" (1906a 142, 1905 835). Thus the "puissance" of the human mind
indefinitely to repeat the act of adding one to a previous result
underpins our understanding of the natural numbers, and a recursive
definition of these expresses or captures our synthetic "intuition du
nombre pur'. Poincar4 stresses induction as the "le v6ritable type du
jugement synth6tique a priori" because induction is the primary principle
which spells out the content of the intuition represented by this
recursive definition, and he is correct to see this connection between
them as non-deductive.
From this it is clear that Poincard's conception of synthetic a
priori intuition in arithmetic actually consists in three distinguishable
theses. First,
24Cf. Beth (1955 234) on this point. Actually, Poincar4 seems to have
admitted the existence of explicit definitions of the (set of) natural numbers,
but denied that they yield induction "analytically'. In some cases, the only
strong principle appealed to in the relevant derivation is the axiom of choice.
See (1905 303, 1906 867). In all cases, some form of iminpredicativity is involved.
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i) the human mind has the power to repeat a type of act
indefinitely.
We see or intuit that "il n'y a pour ainsi dire aucune raison intrins&que
de s'arreter" (1893 31). Second,
ii) the natural numbers are created by the exercise of this
power.
A recursive definition of the natural numbers states the instructions or
rules for this "creation". Finally,
iii) we see by "une intuition directe" that our creations obey
the principle of mathematical induction.
The first two theses relate directly to a modal claim Poincar6 wants to
make about the human mind. The third thesis is more plainly epistemic in
that it offers an a priori justification for a specific proposition.
Still, Poincar6 can be found at various points identifying each of these
with the allegedly unique synthetic a priori "intuition du nombre pur."
For us, obviously, it is advisable to keep the three theses separate in
our minds. Note also that it is, strictly speaking, only at this third
stage, once we have intuited or seen the validity of instances of
mathematical induction, that we may meaningfully speak of "tous les
nombres". Before long we will see that some of these instances are in an
important respect impredicative, and this will raise the first hard choice
for Poincar4: he will have to chose between a legitimate impredicativity
or an illegitimate "pure intuition".
A few interpretive and historical remarks are perhaps in order here.
Poincar4 may not have intended a hard and fast distinction between i and
ii, but opted instead for a kind of structuralism. That is, he may have
thought that virtually any indefinitely extendable linear sequence of
mental acts was tantamount to the construction of the natural numbers.
First, Poincard was aware of instances of mathematical induction which
pertain not to the natural numbers, but to indexed mathematical entities
of other sorts. Second, Poincar6 evinces some doubt as to the genuine
definability of individual numbers (1905 823-4). Both of these suggest
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that he took the form or structure of indefinite repeatability to be more
important than the content of any particular indefinite sequence, and this
seems to be confirmed by certain statements Poincar4 makes (1903 427,
quoted below) which suggest even repeated human body movement suffices for
our intuition of number. Finally, in the following passage, which occurs
in a rather different context, Poincar4 once more appears to confirm that
he took a structuralist attitude:
Les mathematiciens n'1tudient pas des objets, mais des
relations entre les objets; il leur est donc indiff4rent de
remplacer ces objets par d'autres, pourvu que les relations ne
changent pas. La matibre ne leur importe pas, la forme seule
les intdresse. (1893 28; cf. 1906a 142 and 1898 40)
Still, it is not necessary for my purposes to establish Poincar6's
structuralism beyond the possibility of doubt. However ii is interpreted,
it is bound to appear astonishing. According to Poincar4, the natural
numbers are created by the human mind. In fact Poincar6 believes quite
generally in the dependence of mathematical entities on human mental
activity, and he eventually was to call this belief "idealism" (1909 10-
11). I will use the term subjective idealism about F's (or sometimes more
simply subjectivism about F's) for the view that F's are the products, the
potential products or even the acts themselves of the human mind. In
contrast to his views about mathematical objects, Poincar4 was not a
subjective idealist about actual physical space, for example. Although he
held that space was given to us in a contradictory form (cf. Russell 1896x
57) and possessed no intrinsic metrical properties or dimensionality, he
nevertheless thought it existed objectively (without "self-contradiction")
and exhibited other properties quite independently of our mental activity.
Mathematical objects, on the other hand, were created by, and are
dependent on, the activities of the human mind for their existence.
How early did Poincar4 adopt subjective idealism about mathematical
objects? This question is important because the restriction of
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mathematical knowledge to predicative mathematics is typically argued for
in terms of subjective idealism about mathematical entities. The
quotations included above show that Poincar6 was indeed a subjective
idealist about mathematical objects, but only as of 1909, three years
after his adoption of a predicativity constraint. There is, as far as I
know, no early statement of similar generality and explicitness, but it is
nevertheless reasonable to extend Poincar4's subjective idealism back to
his earliest writings in the philosophy of mathematics. Certainly in
(1893) the mathematical continuum in particular (as opposed to physical
space) is understood as a human creation; and in (1894), as we have
already seen, synthetic a priori judgements are said to affirm a property
of the mind to act. Further, in (1905 819) Poincar6 distinguishes
explicitly the "existence des objets mat4riels", which alone amounts to
*objective existence" (1905 31; cf. the later 1905 297), from "l'existence
en math6matiques". Thus in 1905, prior to the introduction of the notion
of predicativity, Poincar6 countenanced two sorts of existence: one
pertained to material objects and was considered "objective", the other
pertained to mathematical objects and was thus presumably "subjective".25
The strain of subjectivism about mathematics in Poincar4's thought, then,
seems to precede his adoption of a predicativity constraint in logic, and
it is probably out of this strain that his predicativism develops.
It is, however, the thesis iii which marks Poincare's most original
contribution to the philosophy of arithmetic. The leading function of the
"intuition du nombre pur" is that it licenses mathematical induction. The
third thesis asserts that mathematical induction is justified in an a
2SThe term "subjective" is not used by Poincard. To explain the non-
objective sort of existence, Poincar4 wrote that "en math6matiques le mot exister
ne peut avoir qu'un sens, il signifie exempt de contradiction" (1905 819). This
suggests the word "existence" could be strictly eliminated from mathematics by
making appeal to the property of non-contradictoriness in concepts (or
predicates). One must not infer from this the "conceptual" or "subjective" nature
of mathematical existence, however, since Cantor thought that the non-
contradictoriness of a mathematical definition was sufficient to commit one to
the "objective" existence of the entity defined.
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priori way for the "creations" mentioned in the first theses. This is an
important and interesting modification of Kant's views on the founding
intuition of mathematics. Thesis iii incurred the opposition of many of
the logicists, and was, according to Poincar4, the "objet principal du
dbbat" between them (1906b 867, 1905 832). Couturat (1905) for example
maintained that one could formulate an explicit definition of the natural
numbers from which it was possible analytically to derive mathematical
induction. At first, Poincar4 replied that the need to show the
consistency of the logicist definition required an unseen appeal to
induction (1905 829). But in an effort to formulate more general
objections to logicism, Poincar4 latched onto the paradoxes that had
arisen. Rejecting the idea that the paradoxes arose from ordinary
("vraies") mathematics, he charged that the paradoxes revealed a deeper
petitio systematically committed by the logicists. This deeper petitio
consisted in the violation of a principle banning impredicative
definitions and came to be known as the vicious circle principle. Below I
discuss Poincar6's charge in more detail. Here I want to emphasize that,
once the predicativity constraint had been formulated, Poincar6's primary
interest in it was not really the solution to the paradoxes at all (which
after all did not arise in "les vraies math6matiques") but rather the
resolution of "le vraie debat* concerning induction. Poincard claimed that
there was an essential appeal to an impredicative definition in the
logicist proof of induction, and that this undermined the alleged
analyticity of their demonstration. But, as we shall see below (Sec.
2.1.3), Poincar6's own justification of induction on the basis of a
recursive definition of the natural numbers (thesis iii) requires a
similar appeal to impredicativity (cf. Parsons 1983). This puts Poincar4
in a hard position: how can the impredicativity of the logicist proof of
induction indicate a vicious circularity while the impredicativity
embodied in the less explicit justification he favors be unobjectionable?
An exactly parallel difficulty will face Poincard in the case of
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continuity in analysis.
2.1.2 Poincar6's Kantian Credentials
An underlying difficulty here is the notion of synthetic a priori
intuition. As I have just suggested, it will turn out that the only
plausible formal equivalent of the allegedly synthetic character of
induction is precisely the impredicativity essential to the justification
of induction. One way to put this first hard choice Poincar6 has to make
is to raise the question: is the impredicativity of induction itself
responsible for the synthetic character Poincar6 wished to underline? But
here clarity as to the notion of the synthetic a priori must first be
maintained. According to the rough gloss of this notion given above,
Poincart's position includes the claim that induction is a necessary
truth, known a priori and with certainty, but which does not follow from
the meanings of words used to express it. Yet, traditionally, the notion
of "pure" synthetic intuition has involved much more than this. Kant does
not merely say that the justification of arithmetic requires appeal to an
underlying synthetic a priori intuition; he also ties this intuition to
time and the possibility of experience in general. He argues that since
all experience occurs in time, certain formal or structural properties of
time are deducible from formal or structural properties of experience. In
fact, for Kant, the form of experience ('Form des inneren Sinnes") just is
time; so that things in themselves, apart from experience of them, have no
temporal properties, and experience as we know it would be impossible
unless time had the formal or structural properties it does. Finally, Kant
would appear to be committed to the claim that the formal temporal
sequence with which we are acquainted a priori is isomorphic to the
standard model for arithmetic, for he believes that our knowledge of this
temporal sequence (i.e., of the form of inner experience) suffices for
knowledge of arithmetic. According to Kant, we can rest assured that
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arithmetical truths are necessary because their truth is a precondition of
experience.26
Recently, however, Goldfarb has asserted that Poincar4 does not
share with Kant this more robust notion of synthetic a priori intuition.
Poincar4's synthetic a priori "intuition du nombre pur," Goldfarb
believes, is not tied to time or the possibility of experience:
in Poincar6's hands the notion of intuition has little in
common with the Kantian one. The surrounding Kantian structure
is completely lacking; there is no mention, for instance, of
sensibility or of the categories.... Intuition, in
[Poincar6's] sense, ... might just as well be called
"immediate conviction" (1988 63)
According to Goldfarb, Poincar4's usage of Kantian terminology, as well as
his striking assertions of allegiance to Kant (cf. 1905 815-6; 1906 34),
are not to be taken at their face value. I have suggested above certain
modifications to the Kantian view which Poincar4 made, but Goldfarb would
rather emphasize the complete lack of the "surrounding Kantian structure"
and argue that Poincar6 has abandoned the traditionally Kantian notion of
pure arithmetical intuition with its links to time and the possibility of
experience. Poincarb, he thinks, ought not to be considered a Kantian at
all. In favor of his interpretation Goldfarb can point to the sudden
increase in Poincar4 around 1905 of candidate synthetic a priori
principles. How can all of the diverse principles Poincar4 suggests
indicate temporal order or the form of inner sensibility? This evidence
is strong, but I believe nevertheless that Goldfarb has overstated his
case. If one looks beyond Poincard's work on impredicativity to his
earlier foundational research, one finds a modified but nevertheless
traditional conception of the synthetic a priori.
Part of the difficulty in discovering the pedigree of Poincar4's
26As Moore (1899 399) argues, the inference Kant makes from necessity-for-
experience to necessity tout court is fallacious. I will not base my criticism
of Poincar4 on his frequent acquiescence to the related shift from aprioricity
to necessity.
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understanding of the synthetic a priori stems from his failure to use the
word "intuition" in a uniform manner. In (1900 121) Poincar6 distinguishes
several diverse classes of "intuition." The various classes are
represented by quite different kinds of knowledge, including knowledge of
traditional logical inference rules, convention, mathematical insight,"
synthetic a priori judgement, empirical induction, imagination and sensory
experience. (In (1912) he introduces "le veritable intuition g~ometrique"
to this list, and this, as we shall see, may mark a major shift in
Poincar6's late views.) Obviously, not all of these can play the important
role that pure synthetic intuition plays for Kant. A further difficulty is
that Poincart is not consistent in his discussions of the properties of
the different classes of intuition. In one work we read: "cette intuition
du nombre pur [est] la seule qui ne puisse nous tromper" (1900 122); but
a mere four pages later, he discusses "la Logique, qui peut seule donner
la certitude" (1900 126; 1899 129). In a subsequent paper, which repeats
entire passages from (1899a) and (1900), Poincar6 assures us that
Ul'intuition ne peut nous donner la rigueur, ni m&me la certitude" (1904
262). Poincard's use of the word "intuitive" therefore is not only non-
uniform, it is outright contradictory, and this makes the task of
extracting a traditionally Kantian notion particularly difficult.
Yet despite this jumble of inconsistent usage, Poincar4's different
classifications of knowledge, as well as their important properties, are
relatively straightforward. These, in fact, are drawn directly from the
Kantian tradition. Empirical understanding (including sensation,
27Mathematical insight, the ability to discover ("inventer" ) new
mathematical truths, was an important faculty for Poincar4. In (1900 129), he
tried to reduce this class of intuition to another: "C'est l'intuition du nombre
pur, celle des formes logiques pures qui ... permet ... d'inventer." The
reduction (not mentioned in any other paper) is not carried out, and since
"intuition" of this sort (insight) is admittedly fallible, it seems he could
achieve it only by denying that synthetic a priori intuitions always yield
certainty. Only in (1900) are conventions and (traditional) logical inference
rules called "intuitive", and the same applies (as far as I know) to empirical
induction.
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imagination representation and non-mathematical induction) are always
uncertain and never "sterile" or void of content. Inference rules of
traditional formal logic, on the other hand, are known with certainty but
the cost is sterility. "Tout raisonnement analytique est sterile" (1897
63). Convention is typically thought of as not productive of truth at all,
but there are exceptions in Poincar4's handling of this difficult notion
(see Sec. 2.2.1). Like Kant, however, Poincar4 maintains that the class of
certain non-sterile truths is non-empty, and these truths he "baptizes"
(1894 371) "synthetic a priori". With the exception of convention, all of
this is very much as it is in Kant, who first brings in the categories and
the forms of sensibility precisely in order to account for so-called
synthetic a priori knowledge, knowledge that is neither uncertain nor
empty of content. This already leads to a minor correction to Goldfarb's
rendering of Poincar'Bs "intuition" as "immediate conviction". Our
immediate conviction must be correct in the first place, so that what we
are convinced of must be true; and it must be non-sterile or non-analytic
- it must have content not entailed by the meanings of the words used to
formulate it. This correction is minor, however, since if Poincar6's
conception of the synthetic a priori went no further than this one could
hardly claim he was "vindicating Kant" (Goldfarb 1988).
Poincard, then, recognizes mathematical induction as a truth about
which we can be certain, but which is not analytic or "sterile", i.e., not
derivable from facts about the meanings of the terms required to state it.
He sees his position as a vindication of Kant, but without what Goldfarb
calls a "surrounding Kantian structure", these pledges of allegiance can
mean little. In order for Poincar4 to place induction in a "surrounding
Kantian structure", he would have to claim that it plays epistemic roles
similar to those played by the categories (forms of understanding) or the
forms of sensibility in Kant. As I mentioned, one crucial role these
"forms" play in Kant is to render experience possible at all. This raises
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the apparent problem that, even in 1894, Poincar4 did not take
mathematical induction to be the only principle in the class of certain
non-sterile truths (1905 818; cf. 1894 374). Instead he considers it
*typical" of such truths. He may mean that the others are logically
equivalent (i.e. various other formulations of mathematical induction),
but if not he will have to give some account of how non-equivalent
principles can both articulate the "form" of our understanding or
sensibility. At this early date the problem is perhaps not very severe,
for Poincar4 does not offer other examples of synthetic a priori
principl.es. But when Poincar6 went on the defensive against the logicists,
he claimed an enormous variety of non-equivalent principles were synthetic
a priori. These include all twenty of Russell's (1903) indemonstrable
propositions; our understanding of Russell's nine (1903) primitive
notions; the existence of logical sums and products (1905 829-30); the
passing from "the point of view of intension" to that of extension (1905
832); the existence of an infinite class (1905 311-2); and the axiom of
choice (1905 313).28 This plethora of candidate "forms" of our experience
gives powerful support to Goldfarb's claim that the term "intuitive" has
no special Kantian sense in, Poincar6. For how can this hodge-podge of
"principles" ever be made to articulate a coherent universal form of human
experience?
Goldfarb's point thus has particular appeal in respect to these
later "defensive" applications of the term "intuitive". Poincar6's purpose
is surely to show that the logicists have "immediate conviction" of
principles not traditionally part of analytic logic. His purpose is
dialectical, and this observation is reinforced by the fact that Poincar4
actually doubts most of the "principles" just mentioned, and considers
others outright false. But if we grant this, we save Poincar6 from the
2
'The same status is also suggested, albeit with hesitation, for our
understanding of one-one correspondence and even of independent variables (1905
830, 831). On the former, see Couturat (1900 26).
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obligation to provide a coherent account of how these many "principles"
together describe the "form" of our sensibility or understanding. Poincar4
does not really believe these "principles" fall into the special class of
certain truths not reducible to the meanings of the terms used to state
them. If no single coherent notion of "intuition" is extractible from all
of Poincar6's attributions, this at least does not affect the pedigree of
his own views about nature of the "intuition" underlying induction. But
Goldfarb's problem is not thereby entirely dismissed, however, since we
still have no account of the "Kantian structure" surrounding mathematical
induction. Without this, Poincar6's Kantian credentials with respect to
what he calls "le veritable raisonnement mathdmatique" are still lacking.
In this narrower domain, however, Poincar6's status as a Kantian is
justifiable. It was mentioned that, in Kant, the categories and the forms
of our sensibility make experience possible in the first place. Now it is
easy to show that Poincar4 believed in the existence of categories, or
forms of the understanding, playing this role.2" Poincar6 is quite
explicit about this in his writing on the foundations of geometry. It is
not so easy, but I think still possible, to show that theses i and iii are
presupposed by, and thus in some sense are part of, at least one such
category. If both of these can be accomplished, a third modification
Poincar4 made to Kant will be evident. The "pure intuition" underlying
arithmetic is not a form of our sensibility but a form of our
understanding, or at least part thereof. The "intuition du nombre pur" is
categorial. This constitutes a important modification but not, as Goldfarb
suggests, a total abandonment of Kant.
'Poincar4 seems to think of the categories as sets of propositions which
must be true if experience is to be possible. It will be noted that in this
respect Poincar4's categories are similar to Russell's "form of externality" as
discussed in the last chapter. Russell's "form" may also be identified with a set
of principles which must be true if (spatial) experience is to be possible. I
will say that a proposition is categorial if it follows from the set of
propositions which constitute the category.
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It is undeniable that Poincar4 made at least one Kantian distinction
relevant to our discussion, namtely that between the categories and the
forms of sensibility, since he held that the concept of group was a
category of thought:
le concept g6n6ral de groupe pr6existe dans notre esprit, au
moins en puissance. Il s'impose A nous, non comme forme de
notre sensibilit6, mais comme forme de notre entendement.
(1895 645)
The idea here is that the general concept of group, and in fact the
various concepts of more specific sorts of groups, are all available to us
a priori, although which group we choose to represent a given set of
experiences is not "imposed" upon us a priori. This idea is central to
Poincar6's account of geometrical knowledge, for
What we call geometry is nothing but the study of formal
properties of a certain continuous group; so that we may say
space is a group. The notion of this continuous group exists
in our mind prior to all experience; but the assertion is no
less true of the notion of many other continuous groups. (1898
41)
Thus the "general concept" of a group is a form of our understanding, and
that form is "filled out" in various ways by a priori constructions of the
pure understanding. We may then select, empirically or by convention, one
such result as that which best corresponds to our experience of space. One
step still within the a priori "filling out' process is the introduction
of the notion of continuity, to which we will later turn (Sec. 2.2.2). As
we shall see, however, Poincar6 makes explicit appeal to the "intuition du
nombre pur' in his account of our understanding of continuity. In fact,
all three theses distinguished above regarding the interpretation in
Poincar4 of arithmetical synthetic a priori intuition are implicated in
his account of continuity, although again Poincar6 is not always clear
which he means on any given occasion. What this implies, however, is that
both the notion of continuity and the three theses regarding our
"intuition du nombre pur" play specific roles in possible a priori
specifications of a general form of our understanding. This suggests a
very Kantian "surrounding context" for Poincard's use of the term
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"intuition"
More can be said than this, however. It is likely that the "form of
our understanding" actually contains "'Wintuition du nombre pur", in at
least two of the senses given above for the latter term. To see this, one
must observe that the continuous group which is (sic) space is a group of
displacements. Poincar6 offers a phenomenalist understanding of
displacement which he claims makes no appeal to spatial understanding. The
details of this account are irrelevant here (see 1895 639-41, 1897 64-5,
1898 7-12), but the consequences of the fact that displacements form a
group is highly relevant:
This ... fact, that displacements form a group, contains in
germ a host of important consequences. Space must be
homogeneous; that is, all its points are capable of playing
the same part. (1898 12)
Homogeneity (the property of space given by Russell as the "content" of
his form of externality) is explained by Poincar4 in the following terms:
If a displacement D transports me from one point to another,
or changes my orientation, I must after such displacement D be
still capable of the same movements as before the displacement
D, and these movements must have preserved their fundamental
properties, which permitted me to classify them [phenomenally]
among displacements. If this were not so, ... displacements
would not form a group. (1898 12)
Groups are closed under their associated composition operation. Thus after
any displacement, it must be possible to "add" any other displacement. But
this presupposes thesis i above, namely that the human mind has the power
to repeat a type of act indefinitely. Indeed, Poincar6 says
C'est de cette r4p6tition que la raisonnement math6matique
tire sa virtu; c'est donc grace A la loi d'homog6n6it6 qu'il
a prise sur les faits g4omdtriques. (1895 640; cf. 1898 9 ff).
The situation then is clear. Our understanding of the homogeneity of
space, according to Poincar4, requires that thesis i be true, that we can
repeat a certain type of act indefinitely. If this is our "intuition du
nombre pur', then this intuition is required in the a priori "filling out"
or specification of a general form of our understanding. Indeed, the use
of principles equivalent to mathematical induction on geometric figures,
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conceived of as in analytic geometry, rests upon our capacity indefinitely
to repeat an act-type in precisely the same way that our knowledge of the
validity of induction for natural numbers rests, in Poincar4's view, on
our ability to "create" the numbers, in short, to count. Whatever one
thinks of the truth of these foundational accounts, one at least cannot
doubt that, for Poincar6, the synthetic a priori intuition into pure
number plays a clear role in a "surrounding Kantian context' . This
intuition is an integral part of a category, or form of our understanding.
One final piece of evidence for my modification of Goldfarb may be
mentioned. It was said above that one basic role which the synthetic a
priori principles play in Kant is that they make experience possible: they
must be true if experience as we know it is to be possible. Now there is
an obvious sense in which mathematical induction makes arithmetic
possible, and Poincar4 is quick to exploit this (1894 371). But he also
seems to have held that, without synthetic a priori intuition, there would
be no experience at all as we know it. Again, this can be seen by
understanding the relation of our arithmetical intuition to the notion of
a homogenous group. In (1899), Poincar6 reviewed Russell (1897). This
incident, which marks their first scientific interaction, was an
impressive boost to the young Russell's career. Poincar4 begins by making
certain concessions:
M. Russell commence par 4tablir qu'aucune expdrience ne serait
possible sans une forme de extbriorit6 [et] que cette forme
doit &tre parfaitement homoghne. Sur tous ces points nous
sommes d'accord (1899 254; but cf. 1899 253; my emphasis).
As we have seen, however, Poincard attempts to base homogeneity of space
is precisely on an appeal to the "puissance" upon which mathematical
induction is said to be based. Thus this "puissance" and mathematical
induction itself are parts of a form of our understanding, and as such
'aucune expbrience ne serait possible" without them.
The question whether Poincar6 was a "structuralist" in the sense
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described above is related to the Kantian role of the synthetic a priori
in rendering experience possible. As was mentioned above, Poincar4's
objections to logicist definitions of individual numbers suggest an
indispensable role for individual numbers in normal thought (1905 823-4).
Although in (1894 373) and (1897 60) Poincar4 does imply that individual
numbers can be defined, he considers their definition irrelevant to
mathematical reasoning. This suggests that genuine definitions, i.e.,
explicit definitions that are both legitimate and informative, are not in
the final analysis possible. Again at (1903 427), discussing the muscular
sensations whose indefinite repeatability is appealed to in the
foundations of geometry, Poincar6 says "c'est de leur r6p6tition que vient
le nombre'. This again suggests that the nature of the entities standing
in sequence (here the muscular sensations accompanying human body
movement) is entirely irrelevant to mathematics; all that is relevant is
the form or structure of the sequence itself. More importantly, however,
Poincar4 asserts that this "r6p6tition suppose le temps." Now it is quite
possible that Poincar4 intended by this the Kantian view that our
understanding of the ordering of the natural numbers just is our
understanding of the structure of time. I know of no place in Poincar4
where he makes his opinion unambiguous, but certainly he leaves room for
this very Kantian position. In any case, he does conclude, A la Kant, that
knowledge of space presupposes knowledge of time. His idea is that our
knowledge of space arises from human body movement and this presupposes
some awareness of time. It is clear, therefore, that the sequence of
natural numbers remains for Poincard intimately related to (perhaps even
identical to) the structure of time, even though it does not articulate
the form of our "inner sensibility" but part of a form of our
understanding.
To conclude: the forms of sensibility are not the only synthetic a
priori forms according to Kant or, yet more curtly expressed, "intuition"
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need not translate "Anschauung". The categories, or forms of our
understanding, are also synthetic a priori. It is here that the "intuition
du nombre pur" fits in, according to Poincar6, not in connection with our
inner "sensibility." Arithmetical intuition is categorial. Contrary to
Goldfarb, Poincard does mention the categories and in fact makes epistemic
use of them in his account of our knowledge of mathematics. Arithmetical
knowledge is tLed to the possibility of experience, and may even be
tantamount to our understanding of temporal sequence. Poincar6's Kantian
credentials with regard to mathematical induction are thus solid. He
modifies Kant in order to vindicate him, and this modification should not
be construed as an abandonment of "surrounding Kantian structure."
2.1.3 The Hard Choice in Arithmetic
We have seen that Poincar6's foundational views were Kantian, that
he held that our knowledge of arithmetic is based on a categorial
intuition into pure number. This intuition, in the sense of thesis i,
renders experience possible, in the sense that it articulates an
experiential capacity we know ourselves to possess, namely the capacity
indefinitely to repeat certain types of acts (including physical acts of
movement). But it also suffices for arithmetic in that Poincar6 seeks to
justify induction on the basis of thesis i. This justification is given as
thesis iii above. I wish now to examine the problem that this
justification is irremediably impredicative.
The impredicativity of mathematical induction has been recognized by
some writers for over fifty years, but it has recently become the topic of
a great deal of new research. The earliest result concerning it that I
have been able to find occurs in Fitch (1938)." Early proof theoretic
'oFitch shows that transfinite induction up to of is not provable in Russell
and Whitehead's (1925), and this is well below F0, the proof theoretic number of
predicative analysis as determined by Schttte (1965) and Feferman (1964).
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studies of impredicativity carried out by Feferman and Kreisel
concentrated on notions of predicativity which included mathematical
induction, but both authors give clear and early indication that this
inclusion is motivated merely by historical considerations, and both
assert that mathematical induction is itself in a specific way
impredicative. Later, Royce published in (1969) a short proof based on
Gbdel's incompleteness theorem which showed again that induction was in a
specific sense not predicatively provable.3 Finally, some ten years ago
Parsons argued that the specific sort of justification of induction
favored by Poincard (namely thesis iii) reproduces the impredicativity
present in the formal justifications. Parsons' philosophical argumentation
is amply confirmed by the emergence lately of bounded or predicative
arithmetic, sub-theories of Peano Arithmecic which do not accept as valid
those instances of induction signaled by Parsons as impredicative. This
field is burgeoning, and bears interesting connections with theories of
computational feasibility and complexity.
The work just cited suggests that, with regard to the foundations of
mathematical induction, there are two broad alternatives one can adopt.
Either (A) one accepts an explicit definition of the totality of natural
numbers, and attempts formally to deduce induction from it; in this
alternative, induction is a theorem and its epistemic justification
depends only on the epistemic viability of the definitions, inference
rules and axioms employed in the proof. Or, rejecting this approach and
adopting the second alternative (B), one accepts a non-explicit definition
of the totality of natural numbers (a recursive definition) and eschews a
formal derivation of induction in favor of a more "intuitive" epistemic
motivation for its legitimacy in arithmetic. The first alternative splits
"Shoenfield proves the same theorem in a different way; his (1974) paper
is the standard reference to the theorem in the literature although it by no
means has priority. Schoenfield also shows that the identity relation is only
impredicatively definable.
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into two sub-cases, which are distinguished according to whether the
explicit definition of natural number used in the proof of induction is
predicative or impredicative. Understanding the impredicativity implicated
in the justification of induction in both these sub-cases of alternative
A is instrumental to seeing the existence of the impredicativity concealed
in the less formal approach, B.
The totality of natural numbers was first defined last century by
Dedekind and Frege, both of whom sought to transform the burgeoning
programme of arithmetization into logicism, the idea that ultimately all
the principles of mathematics were not arithmetical but logical in
character. Arithmetic itself, according to this view, was derivable in
logic alone from appropriate explicit definitions of the fundamental
concepts, such as natural number. Dedekind and Frege independently
succeeded in explicitly defining the property of being a natural number,
and their definitions, which are equivalent, provide examples of the first
sub-case of alternative A mentioned above. In contemporary symbolism, one
may express their definition as follows:
Nx =: VF(FO & Vy(Fy -+ FSy). -4 Fx)
Here "O" denotes zero and "S" denotes the one place function "the
successor of"; the exact definitions of these expressions are not
important here. From this definition, mathematical induction is easy to
derive. If, therefore, as Frege and Couturat maintained, this definition
is permissible within the confines of a logic whose axioms are analytic,
then induction is provable on analytic principles alone. This view would
garner little support today, since the logic underlying the definition is
second-order (and must be in order that the proof of induction, in its
full generality, may go ahead); and few would claim that second-order
logic is analytic. For among the values of the bound variable "F" are
properties which would require, for their specification, use of the
defined term "N". This shows not just the indispensable role of second-
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order quantification in the intended proof of induction on the basis of
the Frege-Dedekind definition, but also the impredicativity inherent in
this logicist justification of induction. The property N is defined in
part by the use of a bound variable which includes in its range not only
N itself but other properties whose specification requires reference to N.
Any attempt to remove such properties from the range of the bound "F" will
lead to an incomplete justification of induction.
Poincar6 was the first to point out the impredicativity of this
justification of induction, and he concluded that the justification was
illegitimate. If so, support was removed from beneath the claims Frege and
Couturat wished to make on the basis of this justification, including the
claim that induction could be proved analytically. On the face of it,
however, logicists need not yet abandon the hope of deriving induction
from principles of logic alone, even if they agree (as Russell was to do)
with Poincard's premise that impredicativity is illegitimate. For the
first alternative A includes, as a sub-case, the possibility of appeal to
a predicative explicit definition of the natural numbers. Russell's
repeated attempts to derive induction in ramified type theory (1908, 1910,
1925) are examples of this second sub-case. The failure of his attempts is
shown by Fitch and Schoenfield, and seems to have been known to Wang as
well. Recently A. George (1987) has given the matter a nice formulation.
Correcting an attempt Quine (1969) made to state an explicit predicative
definition of natural number, George offers the following definition:
Nx =: Va(xEa & Vy(Sya - ye a) . -+ Oar). &.
3a(xea & Vy(Syea -+ yea))
Here "a" ranges over finite sets only (at least one of each size), so the
definition is predicative. As George points out, however, the
justification of induction for an arbitrary predicate "Rx" in the language
on the basis of this predicative definition is still impredicative. Such
a justification would proceed by considering a set j={xey: 'Rx}, where y
satisfies the bound existential variable in the second conjunct of the
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above definition. The problem he points out is that 0 will in general be
impredicative, since some instances of "Rx" will contain bound variables
ca" ranging over 0 itself. If this is not permitted the justification of
induction for such "Rx" will not go through. Thus both sub-cases of the
first broad alternative A for the justification of induction make
indispensable use of impredicative definitions. Logicism, if it is to be
viable at all, must go impredicative.
It was precisely this fact which Poincar4 wished to exploit to
refute logicism: if the viability of logicism depends upon its acceptance
of impredicative definitions, and these are illegitimate, then logicism
itself is not viable. Moreover, his argument to the effect that logicism
depends upon the admission of impredicative definitions was not limited to
a consideration of the first sub-case alone. This is a point the
historical literature on Poincard misses. Poincar4 knew of, or at least
suspected, the existence of predicative explicit definitions of the
natural numbers." This is of great importance for the interpretation of
Poincar6's foundational program, for Poincar4 is sometimes thought to have
objected to logicism merely by arguing that the Frege-Dedekind definition
of natural numbers is illegitimate. If so, the existence of predicative
explicit definitions effectively thwarts his attack. The fact is, however,
that Poincard concedes it is possible explicitly to define natural number.
It is rather the justification of induction on the basis of such a
definition which introduces the alleged vicious circularity. This
circularity is thought to consist in the need to make use of an
impredicative definition in this justification. In other words, Poincard's
objection to logicism rests not just on the impredicativity of the Frege-
Dedekind definition of natural number (sub-case 1 of A), but equally on
the impredicativity George's exposition brings out (sub-case 2 of A).
2See (1905) pages 835, 303, 308-9, 867-8; compare (1905 32) with the
version published in (1908).
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Poincar6 concludes from this dual appearance of impredicativity that
induction does not follow analytically from the concept of natural number.
Rather, it follows synthetically from a prior intuition." After (1906),
it was on these grounds that Poincar6 condemned logicism. Logicism, he
thought, illegitimately extended logic into the impredicative. The result
was paradox and contradiction (1905 316; 1908 154).
The illegitimacy of impredicativity, on Poincar6's view, forced a
restriction of the devices of logic (including definition) to the
predicative. On this conception, however, a "logical" proof of induction
will not be forthcoming. Without this, Poincar4 argued, we must accept the
second broad alternative B sketched above for the justification of
induction, namely an "intuitive" justification on the basis of a recursive
definition of the natural numbers. This, as Poincar4 understood it,
implied a return to Kantian foundations, for the possibility of offering
a recursive definition of anything, let alone the natural numbers,
depended upon our ability indefinitely to repeat certain act-types (such
as counting and body motion) and this ability was considered necessary to
experience as we knew it. Now it turns out that the failure of a recursive
definition of the natural numbers to yield induction "deductively" (or, as
Poincard would put it, "analytically") arises from a kind of
impredicativity implicit in certain instances of induction. Poincar6
wanted these instances as much as he wanted any others, and if he wants
them, I am prepared to grant them to him. But the cost is that his
justification of induction (the "intuition du nombre pur" in the sense of
his thesis iii) is irremediably impredicative. To see this, I will now
review the justification of induction on the basis of a recursive
definition.
"Similarly, Poincar4 considers several proofs of Bernstein's theorem, all
of which are impredicative. He concludes not that the theorem is false or
unsupported, but that it is legitimate and based on synthetic a priori intuition.
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It is a commonplace that induction is not strictly derivable from a
recursive definition of the natural numbers. In such a definition, one
supposes initially that 1) zero is a natural number and that 2) the
successor of any natural number is itself a natural number. The
justification of induction stems from the so-called "extremal" clause in
this definition, which states that something is a natural number only in
virtue of these two "initial" assumptions. To see how this justification
is supposed to work, suppose now that we have a predicate "F" in the
language of arithmetic for which we know that 3) FO and that 4) if Fn,
then FSh, where n is recognized to be a natural number. The principle of
mathematical induction concludes that 5) "Fx" is true of all natural
numbers x. License for this conclusion is clearly the function of the
extremal clause, for falsity of the instance of induction in question
would consist in there being a natural number m for which "Fm" fails,
whereas the extremal clause seems to prevent there being any such m. By
(3), such an m could not be 0, and so by the extremal clause, m is a
natural number in virtue of clause (2) of the recursive definition. Thus
m is the successor of some natural number n. It is clear that if m were
the least natural number for which "Fm" fails, "Fn" would be true; but
then from (4) it would follow that FSn, which is to say Fm, contrary to
hypothesis. Thus the "intuitive" justification of induction (5) on the
basis of a recursive definition will go ahead so long as we are permitted
to assume m is the least natural number for which "Fm" fails. The extremal
clause is again relied upon here, for the assumption that m is least is
permissible only on the condition that there is no infinitely descending
sequence of natural numbers, and this condition is intuitively fulfilled
if the extremal clause is true. Like the bound second-order variable in
the Frege-Dedekind definition, the extremal clause has the function of
keeping to a minimum the entities satisfying the definition. Given this
(ordinal) minimality, falsification of induction on "F" would require
there to be a natural number m which is neither 0 nor the successor of any
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natural numiber. m would thus have to be a natural number, but not in
virtue of the initial suppositions (1) and (2), contrary to the extremal
clause (3). This motivation does not amount to a deductive proof, but the
truth of induction is "immediately evident" if the initial assumptions and
the extremal clause are.
This justification of induction is evidently the one Poincar6
accepted since, as I have argued above, he took our "intuition du nombre
pur" to be captured or expressed by a recursive definition and insisted
that induction followed synthetically from this intuition. But instances
of induction like those which give rise to the charge of impredicativity
in alternative A give rise again to a charge of impredicativity here. In
discussing the Frege-Dedekind definition, Poincar6 (1905 309-10) singles
out for special scrutiny instances of induction un predicates "Fx" which
contain as part the predicate "Nx" to be defined. These predicates, in his
view, by restricting bound variables to the natural numbers, presume that
the notion of natural number is already on hand. In this he sees a
circularity, but he is quite clear that the instances of induction in
question are perfectly legitimate: only their formal derivation is not.
Their legitimacy, he thinks, is made manifest by the "intuitive"
justification just given, even though the quantification involved in these
predicates is precisely the same. One is therefore forced to ask why the
same use of quantification is legitimate in an informal setting, but
illegitimate in a formal setting. Why does the use of bound variables
restricted to natural numbers presume the notion of natural number is
already on hand in the explicit derivation of induction but fail to do so
in the non-explicit derivation? Or why does presumption constitute a
vicious circularity in the one case but not in the other?
Poincar4 remains strangely silent on this question. Unfortunately,
the difficulty also threaten the coherence of his Kantian program in the
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foundations. Experience as we know it is possible, according to Poincar4,
only because we have the capacity indefinitely to repeat certain act-
types. It is therefore natural to ask what the precise content is of the
synthetic a priori "intuition du nombre pur" which has this function of
rendering experience possible? The Kantian programme in the foundation of
mathematics must surely not arrive at the point where it says: something
we know makes experience possible, but this cannot be stated. One might
just as well say: we can explain the possibility of experience, but this
explanation cannot be given. It may well be that a certain type of
inadequacy will affect our expression of the specific content of
underlying intuition which renders experience possible, so that a complete
statement of this content is impossible; but surely the attempt itself to
express this content in an admittedly incomplete way cannot be entirely
futile. Accepting this, however, one sees that the only content of
Poincar4's "intuition du nombre pur" which could play the role of
rendering experience possible is precisely the impredicative content.
This charge, that the seat of the explanatory power of Poincar6's
basic intuition is the impredicative content of that intuition, renders
Poincar4's Kantian foundation incoherent. Yet it appears to follow from
positions he allows are true. He admits that induction has impredicative
instances (that is to say, instances where the predicate in question
contains the predicate Nx). It is on the basis of this alone that he
rejects the logicist justification of induction which proceeds from an
explicit predicative definition of natural number. He admits as well that
induction restricted to its predicative instances is an inadequate
foundation for arithmetic. A model not satisfying induction, in its full
generality, is not, on his view, a model of arithmetic. The predicative
instances of induction, however, are evidently justifiable on logical
grounds alone, for these do not raise any of the difficulties Poincard
tried to put in the way of the explicit proofs of induction. Obviously the
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possibility of experience cannot depend only on that part of the content
of the underlying intuition which is merely logical, for the Kantian
doctrine is precisely that the synthetic a priori content does this.
Poincard is left with no choice: the synthetic a priori content of the
"intuition du nombre pur," which alone renders experience possible, is
precisely the impredicative content of the justification of induction he
favors. On his assumptions, the impredicative content of thesis iii can
alone fulfill the Kantian task of rendering experience possible.
The consequence is that, even for Poincar6, impredicativity can't be
all bad. This, however, runs contrary to his assertion that
impredicativity is indicative of a petitio or vicious circularity. I
conclude that there is a fundamental incoherence in the conjunction of two
of Poincar4's principles: the principle which pronounced impredicativity
illegitimate and the neo-Kantian view that arithmetic is based on a
specific intuition into numbers satisfying mathematical induction.
Ultimately, Poincar6 must make a choice between these two principles.
Interestingly, it was Poincar6's subjectivism regarding mathematical
entities which motivated him to accept both these principles. The
recursive definition of natural numbers he favored was understood as a set
of instructions or rules for the "creation" of natural numbers, and the
vicious circle principle is defended by citing limits on our power to
•create" objects. It seems to me that the fundamental incoherence of
Poincar4's two principles suggests a problem with his subjectivism about
mathematical objects. But this suggestion will have to be developed
elsewhere. I turn now to the hard choice Poincar4 must face in the
foundation of analysis.
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2.2 The Changing Place of Continuity
I turn now to Poincar6's views about the continuum. As is to be
expected, the notion of continuity, in Poincar6's view, is fundamental to
geometry; for, as was seen above, geometry for him "is nothing but the
study of formal properties of a certain continuous group" (1898 41). Now,
since the notion of this and other continuous groups is part of the "forme
de notre entendement," so too, apparently, is the notion of continuity
itself. In this section I will try to show that this is indeed the view
Poincar4 held. At issue is the classical notion of mathematical continuity
as defined in Sec. 0.3, which I will call "continuity in the mathematical
sense," or simply "mathematical continuity." It is useful to have these
terms available at the outset for the purposes of context-setting; but it
will not be until Sec. 2.2.2 that I come discuss Poincar6's own account of
our knowledge of continuity mathematical sense, which consists in a
dialectical construction of a mathematical continuum. In the next section,
I will look at some preliminary questions regarding the philosophical
context in which Poincar6's construction is to take place.
2.2.1 Convention and the Continuity of Actual Space
Space is a group, Poincar6 says, and geometry is the study of this
group. The idea here, quite simply, is that one can point to certain
group-theoretical facts to distinguish different metrical geometries, such
as the various non-euclidean geometries. Poincar4 believed that a
complicated series of empirical inferences and conventions would lead us
to the conclusion that actual space, understood as a continuous group of
displacements, is euclidean. We could have adopted other conventions, but
the ones we chose are, under our experiential conditions, the most
convenient. That we could have gotten by, under our experiential
conditions, with "non-euclideanr conventions shows, according to Poincar6,
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that there is no intrinsic metric of actual space: precisely measurable
distances do not objectively exist. Other properties of space objectively
exist, but precise metrical properties do not. The conclusion that actual
space is euclidean, therefore, is to be taken with an important
qualification: we do not conclude that euclidean geometry "est la
gbombtrie la plus vraie, mais [qu'elle] est la plus commode" (1895 645).
I will not go into Poincard's arguments for this view, but he held a
precisely similar position with respect to the number of dimensions of
actual space: this was decided by a series of empirical inferences and so-
called conventions, and we could have made the convention, even under
identical experiential conditions, that space has more or fewer dimensions
than three (the number Poincar6 believe to be "la plus commode"). There is
no fact to the matter regarding the dimensionality of actual space. In
general, Poincar4 holds that there is no fact to the matter underlying any
convention, for conventions are not strictly true or false, but merely
convenient.
The issue of convention is notoriously difficult in Poincar6. In a
late paper, Poincar4 expanded on its significance:
ce mot de commode n'est peut-Atre pas ici assez fort; un &tre
qui aurait attribu6 & l'espace deux ou quatre dimensions se
serait trouv6 dans un monde comme la n8tre, en 6tat
d'inf4riorit6 dans la lutte pour la vie (1912 498).
The idea that conventions are naturally selected for, that what is
convenient is that which promotes differential reproductive success,
raises problems that are difficult to answer. On the one hand, it begins
to make sense of Poincar4's strange claim that some conventions (including
those pertaining to the metric of space and to its dimensionality) are
non-arbitrary (cf. 1912 503). On the other hand, there is no reason to
think that conventions in the sense of evolutionarily selected-for beliefs
fail to have a truth-value. Perhaps Poincar6 has an argument here, but he
does not state it. The problem gets worse in (1912) where, as we shall
see, Poincar6 introduces a new synthetic a priori intuition into
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mathematical continuity, and seems to assimilate it to evolved conventions
as well, even though such intuitions clearly have a truth value according
to him. My own opinion is that Poincar4's extant writings are confused on
this issue, and the best we can do is recall at all times that Poincar6
makes competing demands on his notion of non-arbitrary convention. He
assimilates convention to evolved belief, and never faces up to the
question whether they therefore do, after all, have truth-values.
In spite of the difficulties affecting the notion of convention, one
must ask the question: is actual space, on Poincar6's view, continuous in
the mathematical sense by a convention? This question will arise again
later, but if we take it for the moment to be the question whether or not
there is a fact to the matter regarding the continuity of actual space,
then I think Poincard's answer will be that there is such a fact to the
matter. The conventionality of the metric of space and of the number of
its dimensions imply, for Poincar4, that actual space has no intrinsic
metric and no intrinsic number of dimensions. But the situation with
continuity is otherwise. Theories of actual space are possible according
to which space is not continuous in the mathematical sense3' (1895, 1898).
These, however, have been falsified by experience. (See (1898 15-6) for
the "experiment" which shows it to be true.) Had experience been
otherwise, we might have been led to favor such a theory of space, but in
point of fact this has not happened. The claim that actual space is
continuous in the mathematical sense is an empirical claim: we know it to
be true, but we know it without certainty. I bring this up now because we
shall see later that other aspects of Poincar6's views suggest that he did
in fact consider space to be mathematically continuous by convention. My
point here is that, if so, the competing demands he made on his notion of
convention come into conflict here, since there can be little doubt that
"On the phrase "continuous in the mathematical sense" see Sec. 0.3. The
phrase is meant to capture Poincar6's feeling that classical continuity alone is
somehow true continuity.
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he thought there was a fact to the matter regarding the continuity of
actual space.
So actual space is continuous in the mathematical sense, but this is
typically thougx.t of by Poincar4 as a contingent fact (1898 15-6), which
we infer for empirical reasons. Geometry supposes the notion of continuity
to be on hand, and the natural question is: where do we obtain this
notion? Again, there is some indication that this notion is part of the
resources of the pure understanding, in that Poincar6 does say the notion
of a continuous group is prior to all experience (1898 41), and that the
mathematical continuum, he says, "a 4tL cr64e de toutes pihces par
l'esprit" (1893 30). What is required, therefore, is a brief survey of
Poincard's account of the "construction" or "creation" of the mathematical
continuum. But there are still several unanswered questions concerning the
overall place of mathematical continuity in Poincar4's foundational
thinking. In particular, even if we obtain the notion of mathematical
continuity from synthetic a priori intuition, the question remains as to
the content of this intuition. Is it a special intuition into mathematical
continuity itself, or does the arithmetical "intuition du nombre pur"
already suffice? The answer to this question depends in turn on the
success of the arithmetization of analysis. We have seen that, early on,
Poincar4 accepted the success of this arithmetization, but in a far later
paper he seems to backpedal somewhat. It will be useful to map out the
alternatives in Poincar6's mind before turning to the details of his
"construction" of the mathematical continuum, the interpretation of which
depends upon the supposed content of the synthetic a priori intuitions at
work.
2.2.1.1 Arithmetization: Early Optimism
It is important to see that, for Poincar6, precisely the same notion
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of mathematical continuity underlies three separate mathematical sciences:
geometry, analysis, and Analysis Situs, or topology. "L'espace
g6ometrique" is continuous in the mathematical sense (1898 14-6), as is
the so-called "espace amorphe" studied by topology. Similarly, as I
indicate later, it is indubitable that on Poincard's view the real numbers
form a mathematical continuum. Clearly, then, the notion of continuity in
the mathematical sense is part of a common foundation for all three
sciences. But analysis and Analysis Situs seem to be more directly about
mathematical continuity than geometry is (cf. 1887 79; 1903 28); for
Poincar6 sometimes suggests that geometry presupposes this notion only in
so far as it is concerned with actual space, which we know only
empirically to be continuous in the mathematical sense. The question of
which of these other two sciences is itself properly the study of
mathematical continuity (as well as the subordinate question whether
"points" or "numbers" are the elements of the mathematical continuum) need
not be answered, since Poincar6 seems not to care (cf. 1893 28; 1898 40).
For example, he says at one place that the theorems of topology are among
the most beautiful known to the "analyst pur" (cf. 1912 484), and in (1893
26, 31) he indifferently attributes the notion of mathematical continuity
to the "analyst pur" and the "g4ometre pur." Similarly, the domain of
"l'intuition geometrique" which Poincar6 invokes late in life is not
geometry but Analysis Situs. My own feeling is that, while he accepted the
arithmetization of analysis without reserve, Poincar6 tended to look on
analysis as the true home of the notion of mathematical continuity; but
later, after he began to feel reservations, he preferred topology."
"SPoincar6 was one of the founders of modern topology, but he did not
conceive of the discipline in anything like the general way we do today. While
he considered topology to be concerned with certain properties of spaces,
construed as point-sets, the spaces in question were restricted to those whose
points were continuously ordered. Since nothing else was assumed about these
spaces (e.g., no metric was defined for them), Poincar6 understood topology to
be in some sense about the notion of continuity in its simplest and most
unencumbered form. This is implicit in some of the quotations given later, such
as (1912 185, 187).
98
Early in his career, Poincar6 thought that analysis had been
perfectly arithmetized:
dans l'Analyse d'auhourd'hui, quand on ver ;e donner la peine
d'etre rigoreux, il n'y a plus que des yllogismes ou des
appels A cette intuition du nombre pur (1900 122).
Thus our pure or a priori intuition into number justified not only
mathematical induction but analysis, including the important least upper
bound theorem, which shows, roughly, that the real numbers are continuous
in the mathematical sense (see Sec. 0.3). The "syllogisms" of mere logic
were needed for this justification, but they added nothing since "c'est
surtout en Logique que rien ne se tire de rien" (1887 79). Not logic,
according to this view, but the categorial intuition into pure natural
number accounts for our understanding of continuity in analysis. Thus
analysis does not stand alone: it is built from foreign resources with
imported labor. The resources are our capacity indefinitely to repeat act-
types such as counting (theses i and ii); the imported labor is the
synthetic justification of induction (given in thesis iii)i
L'id6e vague de continuit4, que nous devions A l'intuition,
s'est r6solue en un systeme compliqu6 d'inegalit6s portant sur
des nombres entiers.... Les Math4matiques, comme on l'a dit,
se sont arithmetis6es" (1900 120).
Notice that Poincar6 here says we obtain a "vague idea" of continuity from
intuition, and then "resolve" this into "un systbme compliqu6
d'in6galit6s" concerning natural numbers (i.e., Dedekind cuts). The
"intuition" intended here is obviously not synthetic a priori, since it is
called vague. Probably the word is being used in the sense of sensation,
or Kantian "empirical intuition" since, as we shall see, sensation is the
starting point of Poincar6's dialectical construction of mathematical
continuity. More important for present purposes is the implication that
specification of the "syst~me compliquc" involves no non-arithmetical
notions. We know today, however, that this claim is false. The use of sets
of natural numbers to represent real numbers, and the proof of the
mathematical continuity of the reals in their natural ordering, employs
means that go beyond what is fairly called arithmetical. The great
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arithmetization attempted in the 19th century has failed. In (1900),
however, Poincar6 was still riding high.
The philosophical consequences of the perceived success of the
arithmetization of analysis were enormous. According to Poincar6,
arithmetization showed that the rconception ordinaire" of continuity
employed by "metaphysciens" was "toute autre chose" than that constructed
by the "analyst pur". Speaking of the continuity conceived as in analysis,
Poincar4 says:
Le continu ainsi conqu n'est qu'une collection d'individus
ranges dans un certain ordre, en nombre infini, il est vrai,
mais exterieurs les un aux autres. Ce n'est pas 1a la
conception ordinaire, oi l'on suppose entre les 6l1ments du
continu une sorte de lien intime qui en fait un tout, oui le
point ne preexiste pas A la ligne, mais la ligne au point. De
la c641bre formule, le continu est l'unit6 dans la
multiplicitd, la multiplicit6 seule subsiste, l'unit4 a
disparu (1893 26-27).
It is useful to compare the metaphysical views maligned here to those the
young Russell would soon hold and publish. Russell found in the
foundations of geometry an antinomy regarding the notion of a point, and
generalized this to the Hegelian "contradiction of relativity" which he
thought inflicted any continuum. These "contradictions" were understood in
such a way as to imply something quite like "the celebrated formula"
Poincar6 indicates. "Projective Geometry," Russell says, "is founded on
the possibility of experiencing diversity in relation, or multiplicity in
unity" (1897 146; cf. 136, 181 ff.). Russell concluded that continua were
in one sense not "wholes," for they were not composed of simple parts, but
their elements nevertheless possessed "une sorte de lien intime qui en
fait un tout." The "lien intime" among elements of continua consisted in
the reciprocal ontological dependency which obtained among them (cf.
principle (4) of Sec. 1.7.1.1). This dependency, essentiality, threatened
according to Russell the very notion of the substantive point, and for
this reason he saw the notion of point as self-contradictory. He concluded
that "straight lines and planes are the true spatial units" (1897 193).
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Poincar6 says "le point ne pr6existe pas a la ligne, mais la ligne au
point." The views Poincar4 criticizes here significantly overlap with
those Russell later held, and the overlap is not accidental. The
"celebrated formula" is a veiled reference to Hegel, and precisely Hegel's
views were adopted by Russell.
Evidently, then, Poincar6 took the supposed success of the
arithmetization of analysis to refute not only Kant's view of space, but
also Hegel's. Kant was wrong to think that the form of spatial sensation
gave rise to a primitive intuition into continuity (Ausdehnung [A20-
1/B35]), and Hegel was wrong to take Zeno's paradoxes and Kant's
antinomies of reason as "contradictions" actually obtaining in nature.
Such "contradictions," judging at least from Russell, consisted in the
reciprocal ontological dependency among the elements of continua.
Poincar4, on the other hand, seems to believe that the elements of a
continuum exist independently of one another. It is evidently this belief
he intends to express when he says the elements of a continuum are
"ext4rieurs les un aux autres" and that they possess no "lien intime"
which makes them into a "whole". He sums up his view by denying the
"celebrated formula", which says that the continuum is "unit6 dans la
multiplicit4." According to the early Poincar6, "l'unitd a disparu" from
this formula. Although the elements are arranged in a "certain ordre" they
do not form any special "whole" or possess any special "unity" in virtue
of this. As we shall see, however, Poincar6 later shifts his position and
argues for the importance of some kind of "unity" in our understanding of
the "certain ordre" in question. This late unity is thought to imply that
the elements of the continuum do after all form a "whole" in some robust
sense, thought he continues to deny the elements of the continuum depend
upon one another for their existence. Acceptance of this sense of unity
(whatever it happens to consist in) will require that Poincar6 withdraw
his categorical denial of the "celebrated formula." At this early stage,
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however, Poincar6 still thinks of the Hegelian view of the continuum as
way off base.
2.2.1.2 Arithmetization: Late Doubts
There is considerable evidence that Poincar6 backed away from some
of his early hopes for arithmetization after having raised the problem of
impredicativity in 1906. Initially he raised this problem to obstruct the
logicist proof of mathematical induction. Of course, if induction was
purely logical and the arithmetization was a success, continuity would
also fall to the logicists. Some time after 1906, however, Poincar6 began
to sense problems with the arithmetization he had so firmly believed in,
and he began to speak about "l'intuition g6om6trique". Now Poincar6 may in
fact be returning here to a view he held very early on, for in (1887 90),
he wrote: "On peut montre que l'Analyses repose sur un certain nombre de
jugements synthetique a priori". The statement, however, is inconclusive,
since a "certain number" might well be one, which in the context would
imply that mathematical induction alone was required for analysis and
continuity. More likely, however, Poincar6 had not quite decided yet that
the arithmetization of analysis had been a success. It would take him only
a few years to do so, but by (1912 486) he was again having doubts: "Je ne
veux pas dire que cette <arithn4mtisation> des math6matiques soit une
mauvais chose, je dis qu'elle n'est pas tout."
The problem with arithmetization, Poincar6 came to feel, is that it
leads us to accept, as entirely satisfactory, what he calls the
"ddfinition analytique" of a continuum of n dimensions. This definition
runs as follows: a continuum of n dimensions is
un ensemble de n quantitbs susceptibles de varier
independamment l'une de l'autre et de prendre toutes les
valeurs r4elles satisfaisant a certaines indgalit4s (1912
486).
It goes without saying, perhaps, that this definition is imprecise and
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formally inadequate. But it is important to see that Poincar6's objections
were not based on formal considerations. Rather, he thought of the
definition as philosophically misleading:
Cette d4finition, irr4prochable au point du vue math6matique,
ne saurait pourtant nous satisfaire entierement. Dans un
continu les diverses coordonn6es ne sont pas pout ainsi dire
juxtaposdes les uncs aux auti~s, elles sont li6es entre elles
de faqon A former les divers aspects d'un tout (1912 486-7).
This "analytic" definition fails to incorporate certain intuitively
evident features of the mathematical continuum. It leaves unstated the
fact that the "coordenn6es" are "libes entre elles" and form "aspects of
a whole" which is the continuum. Although it is by no means clear
precisely what Poincar6 has in mind here, the similar language ("lien" and
"tout") in the early and late passages is arguably significant. It
suggests that Poincar6's late hesitation regarding arithmetization led him
to reconsider, and partially at least to withdraw, his early denial of the
"lien intime" among the elements of a continuum which "les m6taphysiciens"
had insisted upon.
This suggestion can be confirmed if we restrict attention to the
special case of the 1-dimensional continuum. According to the "analytic"
definition, a 1-dimensional continuum is the singleton of a single
"variable quantity" taking all real numbers as values. Poincard expresses
the philosophical inadequacy of this definition by saying that the
"coordonn4es" involved are not merely juxtaposed but "li6es entre elles."
But what are the "coordonn4es" involved here? Properly speaking,
coordinates are n-tuples of numbers which indicate the position of a point
in space. The coordinates here are therefore singletons of real numbers.
But Poincar4 is no doubt following the familiar convention of identifying
coordinates (in general, n-tuples) with the positions they indicate.
Assuming this, Poincart's difficulty might better be expressed as follows:
the positions of points on our 1-dimensional continuum are not merely
juxtaposed (as the "analytic" definition suggests) but "libes entre
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elles." Evidently, some philosophically essential fact about the ordering
of points along a line is left out of the "analytic" definition. Indeed,
all the definition says is that a 1-dimensional continuum is the singleton
of a "variable quantity" which takes all real numbers as its values. The
ordering of the points composing the continuum then reduces to the natural
ordering of the real numbers by magnitude. These too are not merely
juxtaposed but "li6es entre elles." The philosophical inadequacy of the
"analytic" definition therefore comes to this: nothing is said in this
definition about the underlying natural ordering according to magnitude of
the real numbers.
The difficulty can be put in another way. The traditional notion of
a "variable quantity", even on its own terms, has little content unless
one can specify precisely the values it can take. In this case, those
values are all the real numbers. But what does it mean to speak of all
real numbers? Where do we derive this notion? A similar question was
raised in arithmetic. What does it mean to speak of all natural numbers?
In Poincar6's understanding, it is only after we have accepted his thesis
iii, after we have intuited or seen the validity of instances of
mathematical induction, that we may meaningfully speak of "all natural
numbers." Now mathematical induction can be viewed as the characteristic
ordering theorem for the natural numbers. Poincar4's late answer to the
question whence we derive the notion of all real numbers follows his views
in arithmetic quite closely. Like the natural numbers, the real numbers
are given to us originally in a natural ordering, namely the ordering
according to magnitude. It is only after we have seen or intuited their
order-type that we may meaningfully speak of "all real numbers." Now the
characteristic ordering theorem for the real numbers is the least upper
bound theorem, which in its geometric form is sometimes called the
Vollstandigkeitsaxiom. It is undeniable that Poincar4 accepted this
theorem as true. All that changes late in his life is the content of the
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synthetic a priori intuition which underlies our understanding of
mathematical continuity. Rather than construct this continuum with purely
arithmetical resources, Poincar6 began to look on mathematical continuity
as the object of a special primitive intuition. As we shall see, both
interpretations are compatible with his early dialectical construction of
a mathematical continuum. For the moment, however, I wish to return to
(1912) and interpret more fully the philosophical implications of the
inadequacy of the "analytic" definition of mathematical continua of n
dimensions.
The failure of the "analytic" definition to provide any information
concerning the order-type of the real numbers is expressed by Poincar4 in
terms he also used in (1893). The definition is thought to leave
unspecified how the real numbers, or more generally, how the elements of
a mathematical continuum, are "libes entre elles" so as to form "divers
aspects d'un tout." The failure to do so "fait bon march6 de l'origine
intuitive de la notion de continu, et de toutes les richesses que reckle
cette notion." Notice here, once more, that the notion of continuity is
said to be intuitive, but this time it is evident from the context that
Poincar6 is referring to his newly introduced "intuition g6om6trique." The
precise sense in which this intuition is synthetic a priori is best left
to the side for a moment. For the present, simply note what it is that the
"richesses" of this intuition are thought to consist in. Unlike the
"analytic" definition, it reveals to us the wholeness of the continuum
which arises from its elements being "li4es entre elles" in a special way.
Geometric intuition shows us that the mathematical continuum is, in some
rich sense, a whole. This is evidently a withdrawal of Poincar4's early
denial that some "lien intime" among the elements of the continuum made
the latter into a whole ("tout") in some rich metaphysical sense. On the
basis of this denial, Poincar4 rejected what he called "la conception
ordinaire" of the continuum along with the celebrated formula of "les
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metaphysiciens." The unity, he said, had disappeared from the hackneyed
phrase that the continuum was "unit4 dans la multiplicite." By (1912), all
this had changed. Now the "aspect of the whole" is said to be missing left
out of a machematically adequate definition, and it is restored by appeal
to a non-arithmetical intuition. The existence of a specifically geometric
intuition must be accepted after all, on Poincar6's final view, for
otherwise we cannot account for the interrelation among the elements which
consists in their being continuously ordered. The unity of the
mathematical continuum has reappeared, and with it some interpretation at
least of the celebrated formula must be countenanced.
To be satisfied with the "analytic" definition, Poincar6 says, is to
make the mistake of replacing "l'objet A d6finir et la notion intuitive de
cet objet par une construction faite avec des mat6riaux plus simples". Now
Poincar4 is quick to point out that he does not mean that the correct
construction of the mathematical continuum requires "materials" as complex
as the continuum itself. He admits, on the contrary, that the "materials"
needed are after all simpler. Unfortunately, he does not offer a criterion
of simplicity. One necessary condition of simplicity which Russell
accepted, however, applies perfectly. For Russell, simple substances could
not be essentially related to one another. Similarly, Poincar4, despite
his weakening faith in arithmetization, continues to consider the elements
of the continuum as existing independently of one another. As he puts it,
the elements are "exterior to" and "absolument distinct" from one another
(1912 489; 1893 27). In fact, this view is, so to speak, the null
hypothesis, and so in an additional sense the "simplest" assumption to
make. Thus the problem with the "analytic" definition is not that the
"a•terials" used to construct the continuum are in no sense simpler than
the continuum itself. Rather, the problem with this definition is that the
"construction" itself out of these materials is not specified. The mistake
it makes is to leave unstated the manner in which the elements form a
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whole: the "certain ordre" in which the elements occur in a continuum is
not articulated by the purported definition.
In sum, then, quite late in his career Poincar6 began to believe
that the arithmetization of analysis could deceive us into thinking that
we understood the order-type of the real numbers when we did not.
Understanding this order-type was tantamount to understanding the "unity"
of the continuum which Poincar6 earlier either ignored or failed to
notice. Evidently, then, the unity of the continuum can be expressed as
some fact about the natural ordering of the real numbers. This fact is
essential to a philosophically adequate definition of the continuum and so
is presumably constitutive of the very notion of the real numbers
themselves. Arithmetization is not a bad thing, but it is not the whole
story either, for it passes over this constitutive fact in silence.
If arithmetization is not the whole story, some new intuition
besides the one into pure number is needed to explain our understanding of
the order-type of the real numbers. "Nous ... tirons la notion du continu
A n dimensions, non de la d6finition analytique pr6cit6e, mais de je ne
sais quelle source plus profonde" 11912 187). This more profound source
Poincar4 calls the "intuition gdom6trique," and "le v6ritable domaine de
l'intuition g6om6trique" is Analysis Situs. Analysis Situs, or topology,
makes no use at all of the notion of quantity, and is thus the "purely
qualitative geometry," contrary to the early Russell, who had reserved
this honor for projective geometry. Poincar6 writes:
L'espace, consider4 ind4pendamment de nos instruments de
mesure, n'a donc ni proprift4 m6trique, ni propri6t6
projective; il n'a que des propri4t4s toplopgiques (c'est-A-
dire de celles qu'4tudie 1'Analysis Situs). Il est amorphe
(1912 485).
True "intuition gdomdtrique" allows us to understand the amorphous
continuum of topology. This continuum is amorphous with respect to
metrical and projective properties, but it is nevertheless "qu'une
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collection d'individus rang6s dans un certain ordre, en nombre infini"
(1893 26). Our intuition allows us to recognize under what conditions two
spaces are topologically isomorphic, namely precisely when there exists a
continuous 1-1 correspondence between the elements of the two spaces. The
requirement that the function be continuous is essential, and is part of
the reason Poincar4 says the object of this new intuition is continuity
itself. It was this new intuition which was to take up the slack caused by
the hesitation Poincar4 had begun to feel regarding the arithmetization of
analysis, and restore to the content of our notion of continuity the sense
of unity. It is this intuition which is invoked to express what the
"analytic" definition failed to express, namely the natural ordering of
the real numbers. Our question is how well it can succeed.
2.2.1.3 The Kantian Credentials of Geometric Intuition
The continuiLy which is the object of true geometric intuition acts
as a "fond commun' (1903 281) for the various geometries (projective and
metric, euclidean and non-euclidean) which can be constructed upon it. But
it is not yet clear that this intuition is "pure," i.e., that it is a
synthetic a priori intuition. The issue does not concern merely the rough
and partial gloss given above, but also the more traditional and robust
Kantian sense. The key issue (since we are no longer concerned with time)
is whether experience as we know it presupposes, or would be impossible
without, the topolcgical notion of cor-tinuity. "Apropos des th6oremes de
l'Analysis Situs', Poincar6 asks just the right questions:
Peuvents-ils &tre obtenus par un raisonnement d6ductif? Sont-
ce des conventions d6guis6es? Sont-ce des v6rit6s
expbrimentales? Sont-ils les caractbres d'une forme imposbe
soit A notre sensibilit4, soit A notre entendement? (1903 285)
Poincar6 raises these questions in (1903) but does not answer them there.
This is due to the fact that he is there concerned mainly with the number
of dimensions of space. The possible answers to the present question are
restricted, however, by Poincar6's views about certainty and aprioricity.
108
The truths of topology are known with certainty, so they must be known a
priori. They cannot be "des verites exp4rimentales." Yet they cannot be
obtained by deductive reasoning alone, since then they would be empty of
content. Moreover, since they are indeed true, they cannot be the result
of mere convention in the way the number of dimensions is. This leaves
only the Kantian option. Poincar6 writes:
Je conclurai que nous avons tous en nous 1'intuition du
continu d'un nombre quelconque de dimensions, parce que nous
avons la facult6 de construire un continu physique et
math6matique; que cette facult6 pr6existe en nous A toute
exp4rience parce que sans elle, l'experience proprement dite
serait impossible et se reduirait A des sensations brutes,
impropres A toutes organization, que cette intuition n'est que
la conscience que nous avons de cette facult6 (1912 504).
Geometric intuition is indeed pure. Without it, experience "proprement
dite' would be impossible. It is categorial, and provides a foundation not
for topology alone, but for analysis and (in part) for geometry as well.
These sciences too are embedded by Poincar4 in a "surrounding Kantian
context." The inadequacies of the arithmetization of mathematics show,
according to Poincar6, that a new categorial synthetic a priori intuition
must be called upon in the foundation of those fields which depend on the
notion of continuity in the mathematical sense. And just as arithmetical
intuition (formulatable as the principle of mathematical induction) rests
upon our capacity to "create" the natural numbers, so too here geometric
intuition rests upon our ability to "create" a mathematical continuum.
I mentioned that the theorems of topology resting on this intuition
were considered by Poincar6 to be true. Thus they could not be the result
of mere convention in the way that the metric of space was. But strangely
enough, Poincar6 seems to allow in (1912) that these theorems, despite
being based on a categorial intuition which renders experience possible,
were at the same time due to non-arbitrary convention. Apparently the form
of our experience has been selected for. To see this, one must realize
first that in his review (1902) of the first edition (1899) of Hilbert's
Grundlagen der Geometrie, Poincar4 singles out the so-called "Axiome der
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Anordnung" as the specifically topological axioms. He criticizes Hilbert's
presentation of them, which does not allow one easily to see that they are
independent of the axioms in his other groups. But Hilbert left out of the
first edition what would in later editions be called the
"Vollstandigkeitsaxiom." This axiom ensures that the spaces in question
are mathematically continuous, and Poincar6 fills the gap left by Hilbert
by formul.ating for him one version of this second-order axiom. Now
Poincar6 would have wanted to include a version of the
Vollstandigkeitsaxiom among the axioms of topology, for precisely this
axiom represents the content of the geometric intuition he later takes to
supply the subject matter of topology, as we have seen. Although in
Hilbert's treatment the Vollstandigkeitsaxiom is not among the "Axiome der
Anordnung,7 it does impose an ordering condition on the elements that
constitute the spaces under investigation. With this background, we can
now turn to Poincar4's late assimilation of geometric intuition to
convention.
In (1912) Poincar4 returns to Hilbert's "Axiome der Anordnung" in
the context of a discussion of his Kantian foundations for topology.
Speaking of these axioms, he says:
les axioms ne sont pas, en realit6, pour nous simples
d6finitions, des conventions arbitraires, mais bien des
conventions justifides. Pour les axiomes des autres groupes,
je tiens qu'elles sont ... les plus commodes; pour les axiomes
de l'ordre il me semble qu'il y a quelque chose de plus, que
ce sont de v6ritables propositions intuitives, se rattachant
A 1'Analysis situs (1912 503).
The argumentation here is complicated and condensed, but notice first that
Poincar4 asserts that the axioms of order are both "conventions
justifi4es" and "vWritables propositions intuitives." Of course, given his
inconsistent use of the term "intuition," this in itself need not be
surprising. In fact, however, Poincar6 goes on to trace our knowledge of
the axioms of order back to geometric intuition, which we have just seen
to be synthetic a priori: "ces v6rit6es, telles que les axionmes de
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l'ordre, nous sont r4v416s par l'intuition" into mathematical continuity
(1912 503). This statement comes a mere four pages after the passage
quoted above in which Poincar6 says that justified conventions are
naturally selected for. The competing demands on the notion of convention
are becoming intolerable, for "conventional" axioms are conceived of as
true, synthetic a priori beliefs laid down in us by evolution. Perhaps the
notion cannot be saved, and that, as far as I am concerned, is just as
well. But we should not let this cloud our perception of the general
outlines of Poincar4's view. Evidently the axioms of order and geometric
intuition into mathematically continuous order are pulled very close
together, and appear to share fundamental epistemic properties. Geometric
intuition provides us with an original model of the axioms of order. In
this model, the elements also satisfy a version of the
Vollstandigkeitsaxiom; i.e., they are continuously ordered in the
mathematical sense. We ourselves construct this model, but the possibility
of this construction is built into our understanding: it is a form of our
understanding. Our understanding arose in our evolutionary history and is
a product of natural selection. If this is the correct interpretation,
then not just the axioms of order but our understanding of mathematical
continuity as well is at once synthetic a priori and "conventional" in the
sense that it arose via natural selection.
Again, one might well object to the use of "convention" in this
sense, especially if conventions are thought to lack truth-values. I am by
no means interested in preserving the word in this context, except for
purposes of historical accuracy. Poincard seems to have thought it was
important. It is perhaps worth noting that the apparent blending of
evolutionary convention (or belief) and Kantian forms of experience, while
perhaps confusing, fits in well with other views Poincar6 held (cf. also
Russell 1897 187). According to Poincar4, "pour un &tre complAtement
immobile, il n'y aurait ni espace, ni g~om4trie" (1903 294; cf. 1898 7).
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The idea is that we learn about space by exercising our capacity for human
body movement, for it is only through movement that we obtain the notion
of displacement, and geometry is the study of a continuous group of
displacements. We have already met with this idea above, but in the
present context its significance lies in the fact that the capacity for
human body movement is in all major details hereditarily determined. It is
reasonable to conjecture that Poincar4 knew this, since ablation
experiments on the cerebellum performed already for decades had shown it
played an important role in coordination and integration of movements. But
it is beyond the scope of my study to argue conclusively that Darwin and
Kant are joined in quite this way by Poincar6.
2.2.2 Poincar6's Construction of Mathematical Continuum.
I want now to discuss in more detail "la facult6 de construire un
continu ... math6matique." I will try to make my discussion sensitive to
the change in Poincar4's views over time. The purpose of my discussion
will be twofold. Through it, the precise point will become clear at which
appeal to "geometric intuition" would be needed in the construction of the
mathematical continuum. Secondly, by comparing this construction with a
parallel formal development of the foundations of real number theory, it
is possible to determine a formal equivalent of this geometric intuition.
Evaluation of this formal equivalent will then show the impredicativity
implicit in the original intuition into topological continuity. We shall
find, I think, that Poincar6 must again choose between an illegitimate
intuition or a legitimate impredicativity.
Our understanding of mathematical continuity occurs in three stages,
but it begins, as it did for Russell, in sensation. It begins with "les
donnees brutes de l'expbrience, qui sont nos sensations" (1893 29). The
leading characteristic of sensation is what Poincard calls its
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"imperfection'. The imperfection of sensation prevents us from
distinguishing in sensation what we can easily infer are distinct:
Il arrive que nous sommes capables de distinguer deux
impressions l'une de l'autre, tandis que nous ne saurions
distinguer chacune d'elles d'une meme troisibme. (1903 286)
For example, the sensation produced by objects of 10 and 12 grams
respectively may be easily enough distinguishable, even though neither is
distinguishable from the sensation produced by an object of 11 grams. This
situation is characteristic of what Poincar6 calls "the physical
continuum, " and he expresses the "formule du continue physique" as
follows:
A=B & B=C & A<C
This formula Poincar6 considers "repugnant to reason" (1898 14): "11 y a
l&, avec le principe de contradiction, un d6saccord intol6rable" (1893
29). We escape this contradiction by an "artifice" (1898 14), the a priori
construction of the mathematical continuum. But before continuing with the
next step of this construction, a few interpretive remarks are perhaps in
order.
Poincar4 is quite clear that to arrive at the recognition of the
physical continuum we must make many conventions and abstractions (1912
490-1). Phenomenally, it is no easy matter to isolate the sensation
produced by an object of 12 grams to the point where we can compare it
directly with another sensation. The music playing in the background must
be ignored. The possibility of this wholesale abstraction is not one I
wish to question; for my purposes it does not matter if Poincar6's
phenomenalist attitude is viable. Similarly, I will ignore the related
difficulty regarding the "contradiction" given in sensation. The problem
here is that, unless we specify the conventions and abstractions in
certain ways, the formula of the physical continuum will not actually
entail a contradiction. For the identity sign "=" is obviously being used
conventionally: literal identity is not intended, only identity in some
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respect, or similarity. Similarity is not transitive, but the
"contradiction" Poincar6 wishes to deduce from the formula depends upon
the transitivity of the relation denoted by "=". Comparable problems
infect the interpretation of "<", but I am not interested in raising this
sort of problem for Poincar6. I grant he has shown that sensations are
imperfect in that the "donn4es brutes" of sensation are "contradictory."
Having assumed this, one cannot fail to notice the historical
precedent in Hegel. Poincar6's account of the psychological genesis of the
notion of continuity is dialectical. Indeed, after "escaping" the
contradiction given in sensation, Poincar6 will introduce the mathematical
continuum of the first order, which will also be found, on certain
assumptions, to be contradictory. The repair leads to the notion of
classical continuity, or continuity in the mathematical sense. But
Poincar4's preference for a dialectical construction of mathematical
continuity should not be taken to indicate any great allegiance on his
part to Hegel. After all, Poincar4 maintained throughout his career, in
(1893) as well as in (1912), that the elements of the continuum were
modally independent of one another. Moreover, he also held (at least at
the time of writing (1893)) that the "celebrated formula" was false: the
mathematical continuum is in no sense unity in multiplicity, for there is
no unity. It is interesting to note in this regard Russell's reactions to
Poincar6's vacillations. In (1897x 78-9), Russell lauds Poincar6's
dialectical account of the notion of continuity as showing conclusively
that this notion is "conceptual", and not sensational. He does not at this
time mention the disappearance of the unity from the celebrated formula,
with which he can hardly have agreed. In (1903 347), however, Russell
passes in silence over Poincar4's dialectic but quotes him with approval
on the falsity of the celebrated formula. By the time Poincar4 considers
reintroducing a sense of unity into his new "g4ometrique intuition,"
Russell has himself reintroduced impredicativity in the form of the Axiom
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of Reducibility. In my opinion, both of these devices are misleading in
that they merely disguise the impredicativity necessary in any account of
mathematical continuity. Moreover, if, as I argue in detail later, the
impredicativity of the mathematical continuum consists in the mutual
ontological dependency obtaining among some of its elements, then a formal
account will be forthcoming of "celebrated" unity which both early
Poincar4 and late Russell wished to eliminate.
Hegel's view is that the continuum of mathematics is "self-
contradictory." According to Russell (1897), this "self-contradictory"
character stems from the combination of the homogeneity and the relativity
of continua. Homogeneity requizes that a continuum have distinct elements,
but the relativity requires that these not be ultimately distinct, since
they stand essentially in specific relations to one another. I have
indicated above how the alleged "contradiction" here, which Russell sought
to identify with the Kantian form of sensation, is based on a confusion of
two separate notions of logical subject. But it is interesting that, for
Poincar4 too, the contradictory character of sensed continua stems
precisely from its elements being distinct but not distinguishable. One
can see Poincar4's position as a response to the view that continua such
as space are given in sensation. Hegel begins here and pronounces continua
self-contradictory. Poincar4 claims sensed continua are not continua in
the mathematical sense, which are free from contradiction. Clearly
Poincar6 is trying to account for, but also limit the significance of, the
"Ineinandergeflossensein" which Hegelians considered the essence of
continuity. Thus he denies that elements of the sensed continuum are
"exterior" to one another, but insists (even very late in life) on their
being exterior in mathematical continuity."36
"Cf. Russell (1897 189; 1896x 17) and references there. McLarty (1988)
gives a nice explanation of the topological facts which may have motivated the
notion of elements not being external to one another in the mathematical
continuum.
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According to Poincar6, "our representations are simply the
reproductions of our sensations" (1898 5). Thus represented continua
suffer the same self-contradiction as sensed continua. By consequence,
knowledge of continuity in the mathematical sense is not representational.
Since geometrical space is continuous in the mathematical sense, "we
cannot image geometrical space.... We cannot represent to ourselves
objects in geometrical space, but can merely reason on them as if they
existed in that space" (1898 5; cf. 1895 635, 1903 424). This view is
connected with the idea that it is from human body movement that we learn
about space. We do not literally represent objects in space; we "localize"
them only in the sense that we know what movements are necessary to obtain
them. This, however, brings out an interesting difficulty for Poincar6's
view: what is non-representational knowledge? How can we know about
something without representing it? If, as he later thought, our knowledge
of the mathematical continuum is based directly on a synthetic a priori
intuition into continuity, then this intuition itself is not
representational. From a Kantian point of view, this is confusion, since
intuitions, even pure intuitions, are representations ("Vorstellungen").
But I leave this matter to the side.
To escape the "contradiction" of the sensational or representational
continuum, one makes use of the arithmetical intuition represented by
thesis i above. The "contradiction," according to Poincar6, forces us
first to recognize that B is distinct from both A and C. But this raises
the question: how many distinct elements (or possible elements) exist
between A and C? Poincar6 contends that the contradiction will not be
alleviated by postulating only a finite number of such elements, since we
can always imagine between them others, D, E, and F, which reproduce the
"contradiction" inherent in the physical continuum, i.e., such that D=E,
E=F but D<F. In short, once we begin to intercalate terms between A and C,
"nous sentons que cette opbration peut &tre poursuivie au delA de toute
116
limite et qu'il n'y a pour ainsi dire aucune raison intrins~que de
s'arr&ter" (1893 31). We "sense" this (sic) via the capacity postulated by
thesis i above:
Tout se passe comme pour la suite des nombres entiers. Nous
avons la facult6 de concevoir qu'une unitd peut &tre ajout6e
A une collection d'unit6s; c'est gr&ce A l'exp6rience que nous
avons l'occasion d'exercer cette facult6 et que nous en
prenons conscience (1893 31).
The result is the "continu math6matique du premier ordre" (a dense series,
in the sense of Section 0.3), knowledge of which is therefore synthetic a
priori, since the same fundamental "puissance" is employed in creating it
as is employed in creating the natural numbers. Again, serious questions
could be raised about this account, but raising these is not part of my
purpose here. Suffice it to say that the use of mathematical induction to
conclude something about all the terms interpolated in this second step
would no doubt be legitimate by Poincar4's lights, so that this stage of
the construction of mathematical continuum is thoroughly arithmetical, and
involves thesis iii discussed above as well.
The next and final step engenders the "continu de deuxibme ordre,
qui est le continu math6matique proprement dit" (1893 32). Poincar6's
introduces this final step as follows. It is clear that if two continuous
lines of merely first order were to cross, they need not overlap, or have
a part in common. By an "effort de plus" the "gdomAtre pur" is able to
derive a contradiction from this. This contradiction will not be
alleviated unless one admits the existence of elements in the continuum
corresponding to all real numbers. The "effort de plus" involves, as
Poincar4 conceives it, taking the limit of the common area of two crossing
represented lines, e.g., two crossing one-dimensional physical continua:
La partie commune nous apparaitra comme un point qui
subsistera toujours quand nous voudrons imaginer nos bandes de
plus en plus minces, de sorte que nous admettrons comme une
v4rit4 intuitive que si une droite est partag4e en deux demi-
droites, la frontibre commune de deux droites est un point
(1905a 55, cf. 1893 32)
This passage, which I will interpret more precisely in a moment, raises
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numerous difficulties. The most obvious is perhaps the question whether
the "v4rit6 intuitive" to which the pure geometer appeals is a new non-
arithmetical synthetic a priori intuition or somehow a further application
of the "intuition du normbre pur." From what I have said above, it should
be clear that Poincar6 vacillated on this question over the years, so let
me put this first question aside for the moment as well. A second
difficulty parallels the problem I raised a moment ago for the dialectical
transition from the physical to the first-order mathematical continuum.
Various assumptions have to be made to obtain the "contradiction" inherent
in the inferior continuum. Last time we saw that Poincar6 assumed the
relation denoted by 0=" was transitive, and this seemed dubious. Here,
however, the problem is yet more serious. The assumption needed to show
that the first order continuum is self-contradictory seems to be precisely
that crossing 1-dimensional continua always overlap. Since crossing first
order continua do not always overlap, they cannot be continua "proprement
dit." But the assumption states (admittedly in an imprecise form) the very
essence of the continuum of the second order, so Poincar6 seems to be
reasoning in a circle. First order continua, he seems to be saying, are
inadequate precisely because there are not second order continua. It is
hard to see how his dialectic is to get off the ground.
The nature of this difficulty can be brought out by a consideration
of the example Poincar6 uses to illustrate the final step in his
construction of the mathematical continuum. This will serve as well to
clarify the passage quoted and render clearer Poincar6's argument. But,
unless I am mistaken, the argument does have a circular character. What
will remain apparent, however, is that even at this early stage Poincard
believed we had synthetic a priori intuition into classical mathematical
continuity. His later vacillation concerns only whether this intuition was
entirely arithmetical or only partly so. The example he uses bear this
out. But, I shall argue, his intent with this example entails, as a
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special case, the postulation of elements of the continuum corresponding
to impredicative real numbers. This is fine and well before (1906) when
Poincar4 first banned impredicativity. After that time, his continued
belief in synthetic a priori knowledge of classical continuity defies
explanation. Poincar6 cannot have things both ways: either his synthetic
a priori intuition is impredicative, or it is not; but then, it does not
yield knowledge of mathematical continuity.
The pure geometer is able, by a special effort, to conceive a limit
to the diminishing common area of two crossing 1-dimensional physical
continua. This limit is the point. Since the two overlapping physical
continua are arbitrary, the special effort of the geometer ensures such an
intersection-point will always exist. The "v6rit4" that "deux lignes qui
se traversent ont un point commun ... parait intuitive" (1893 32). But if
'lines' are first-order continua, this "truth" is false. Thus the
contradiction:
La contradiction serait manifeste dbs qu'on affirmerait par
example l'existence des droites et des cercles. Il est clair,
en effet, que si les points dont les coordonndes sont
commensurables 6taient seuls regard6s comme r4els, le cercle
inscrit dans un carr4 et la diagonale de ce carr6 ne se
couperaient pas, puisque les coordonndes du point
d'intersection sont incommensurables. Cela ne serait pas
encore assez, car on n'aurait ainsi que certains nombres
incommensurables et non pas tout ces nombres. (1905a 54)
I wish to draw attention to Poincar4's leading conclusion here, which is
that fewer than all the incommensurable numbers "ne serait pas encore
assez.' Any two curves which cross one another must have a point in
common. The example Poincar4 gives is, as he indicates, not sufficient to
demonstrate his contention, but what this contention is is clear enough.
When we inscribe a circle in a square, and then draw a diagonal of the
square, the diagonal crosses the circle twice. In order to speak of the
'points" at these crossings, it is necessary that we do not conceive of
the perimeter of the circle as merely first order continua. For such
continua have gaps, and the crossings may fall on the gaps and not on
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points.
If these considerations are meant as an argument for the leading
conclusion I just mentioned, the appropriate response to them is: so what?
Certainly it "appears intuitive" that the diagonal of the square and the
perimeter of the circle intersect, or cross at a point and not at a gap.
Certainly they might cross at a gap if these lines were merely first order
continua. There is nothing incompatible about believing both these at
once. One may further admit that if "lines" (such as the perimeter of the
circle and the diagonal of the square) always cross at a point, then
•lines" are not so-called first order continua. But we have as yet no
reason to jettison the idea that continua "proprement dite" are merely
first order: we might just as soon jettison the "apparent intuition" that
there are "lines" in the relevant sense, i.e., lines which always cross at
a point. Thus there is no compelling motivation to join in the "effort de
plus" of the pure geometer and pass beyond the first order continuum to
the "continu math6matique proprement dit." Poincar6's argument for the
necessity for this move is circular.
2.2.3 The Hard Choice in Analysis
Criticism of Poincar6's dialectical account of the creation of the
mathematical continuum, however, is not my real concern. Poincar6 wants
classical continuity, and I am prepared to let him have it. Let us just be
clear what he has. He has a continuum composed of elements corresponding
to all real numbers. He has this, not just as an accident of his early
exposition of the foundations of analysis, but even in his final writings,
in which (as we saw above) he hesitantly accepts as "mathematically
adequate" the "d4finition analytique" of dimension, which commits him to
"variable quantities" taking all real numbers as their values. Again, in
an almost casual way, Poincar4 (1902) pointed out that Hilbert (1899) had
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not succeed in studying "notre espace" because he neglected to include
what came to be called the "Vollstandigkeitsaxiom," a version of which
Poincar4 actually gives and which is equivalent to classical continuity as
it has come down to us from Dedekind (1872) and Cantor (1895). For
Poincar4, classical continuity is not just acceptable, but a necessary
idea for the foundations of geometry, analysis and topology. If, early on,
he had a mistaken faith in arithmetization, and held that the elements of
this continuum could be "created" simply by virtue of the arithmetical
capacity given as thesis i, later he had the mistaken impression that such
elements could ultimately be defined predicatively. As if sensing his
mistake, he introduces in (1912) "l'intuition g~om4trique" to justify our
knowledge of "ce continu ... primitivement amorphe" (1903 281) and
backpedals from his earlier metaphysical objections to the Hegelian "lien
intime" among its elements. "Unity" and "wholeness" of the continuum
return with this new intuition, but the "lien" never gets quite so
intimate as the early Russell evidently thought it was; for while the
elements of the mathematical continuum are "li4es entre elles," they
remain "exterior l'un A les autres", or "externally related" as Russell
would have put it. For Poincar4, the elements which compose the
mathematical continuum are modally independent of each other.
Now, in my view, it is this last point which makes Poincar6's views
metaphysically inadequate. His cherished belief in a continuum in the
mathematical sense commits him to the existence of all real numbers. His
early faith in arithmetization was actually incompatible with this
commitment, but later his 1906 ban on impredicativity was incompatible
with it as well. If there are no impredicative real numbers, there is no
continuum of real numbers. This can be seen by the following illustration,
which improves upon Poincar4's admittedly inadequate example of the circle
inscribed within a square, but does not admit any postulate Poincar6 would
have wanted to deny. Let f be a continuous function such that f(0)<0 and
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f(l)>O. Recall that the notion of continuous function is supposed to be
justified by Poincar4's "intuition g6om4trique" (1912 485-6). The x-axis
and the curve described by f are crossing 1-dimensional continua. Clearly
Poincar4 is committed to the claim that these continua cross at a point p
with coordinates (r,0). Now in general, r will be not only non-
arithmetical, but impredicative. Any definition of certain such r's in the
language of analysis will contain bound variables ranging over r. To put
this in a more general way, any definition of certain r in the language of
analysis will contain bound variables whose range is a set s containing r
as an element. I think it could be argued that this statement requires a
modal interpretation: in every possible world in which such an
impredicative r exists, there also exist the other elements of s. r is
essentially related to these, and cannot exist independently. Belief in
the mathematical continuum thus requires, contra Poincard, that we
relinquish the claim that its elements are modally independent.
The argument for this will have to be made elsewhere." My concern
at present is still the philosophical context of Poincar6's attempted
construction of the mathematical continuum. Poincar4 never rejected
arithmetization, he only limited its significance. In certain
circumstances, according to him, arithmetization could lead us into a
misunderstanding of the phrase "all real numbers." Mathematically adequate
definitions using this phrase were in such circumstances apt to be
philosophically inadequate. Philosophical adequacy could be attained only
by introducing a categorial intuition into mathematical continuity, just
as the justification of mathematical induction, on his view, could not
proceed through any explicit definition of natural number, but required
"Chapter 3 is intended to go part of the way toward this goal by presenting
a theory of impredicativity involving similar claims of mutual ontological
dependency. There, however, the claim will not concern the real numbers
specifically, but only impredicativity as it is understood in Russell's ramified
type theory. I hope in the future to extend this account to standard set-
theoretic constructions of the real numbers, and thus explicitly to justify the
suggestion made above.
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appeal to a categorial intuition. Actually, the parallel between the two
branches of mathematics is deeper than this. In arithmetic, the "informal"
justification of induction succeeds only by hiding impredicative
principles in "categorial intuition'. In analysis, the impredicativity of
the continuum needs similar hiding. Poincar4's "intuition gbombtrique" can
account for the "construction of the mathematical continuum" only if it is
considered equivalent to formally impredicative principles. The mathematic
continuum is impredicative, and if Poincar6 wants to say impredicative
definition is viciously circular, he will have to hide the impredicativity
of his own creation. Kantian synthetic a priori intuition is a suitable
device for such concealment; it appeared at least to have worked in
arithmetic to much the same effect. This deeper parallel leads to a second
very hard choice Poincard has to make, a choice which has exactly the same
form as the choice we saw he had to make in the foundations of arithmetic:
why is the impredicativity of mathematical continuity illegitimate if
formalized, but legitimate if kept at the level of "intuition"? It is as
if saying what you mean made what you say meaningless, but passing over
what you mean in silence expresses your intentions perfectly.
The choices Poincard has to make face us as well. Contemporary
formal developments of impredicativity support a distinction like
Poincar4's between "mathematical adequacy" and "philosophical adequacy" in
definitions. Take analysis first. The set (or concept: it does not matter
which we chose) of real numbers can be defined in mathematically precise
fashion; we owe such definitions to Dedekind and Cantor. Such definitions
say, in a mathematically irreproachable way, what it is to be a real
number. The standards for "irreproachability" are high, and would have
satisfied Poincar4, for there are predicative definitions of the set
(concept) of real numbers. In the same way, there exist a predicative
"mathematically adequate" explicit definition of the set (or concept) of
natural numbers. By themselves, however, the predicative definitions of
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these two sets (concepts) are "philosophically inadequate" and should not
satisfy us entirely, and the reason is similar to Poincard's reason for
philosophical suspicion of the "definition analytique" of the 1-
dimensional continuum. This failed, he thought, to license talk of all
real numbers, and such talk could be justified only by consideration of
the natural ordering in which the real numbers are presented to us. The
philosophical inadequacy of contemporary predicative definitions of the
real numbers ought really to raise in us the same suspicions. We do not
have license to talk about "all real numbers" if part of our understanding
of this conception is that the real numbers are continuously ordered in
the mathematical sense. The predicative definition of the real numbers
does not support proof of the classical continuity of real numbers, and so
it "gives" us the real numbers only in an abstract sense, i.e., without
justification of their natural ordering properties. In contemporary formal
understanding of arithmetic, the same dichotomy applies: the predicative
definition of the natural numbers does not support proof of mathematical
induction, and so it "gives" us the natural numbers only in an abstract
sense, i,e., without justification of their natural ordering properties.
Induction and the least upper bound principle are not only the fundamental
theorems of the ordered structure of the numbers systems they "define,"
but they can even be put in quite similar forms,'" so that the distinction
between the two number systems lies in relatively weak differentiating
axioms.
It seems to me, therefore, that Poincar&'s attempt to shunt the
formal power of explicit theories of arithmetic and analysis off into
intuition does not work. He can only say his intuition suffices if he
swears himself to silence on the issue of how it suffices. This may have
been part of what Goldfarb intended by finding little of Kant in
Poincar4's notion of intuition. For the latter's insistence that
"Compare e.g. the treatment in Huntington (1905).
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Rgeometric intuition" justifies the least upper bound theorem (like his
insistence that thesis ii justifies mathematical induction) appears to
reduce to an ineffable mimmediate conviction. Still, it would be wrong to
separate this from the "surrounding Kantian context" evident from e.g.
(1899 254) and (1912 504). It appears strange to us today to claim that,
if we had no a priori capacity to define second-order mathematical
continua, ordinary experience would be impossible; but such, I believe,
was Poincar4's view.
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chapter 3: Modality and p&redicativity
3.0 Introduction
In this chapter I give a modal account of impredicativity. The
principal modal notion in this account will be what I call reciprocal
ontological dependency. The basic idea behind this notion appeared in
Section 1.7.1.1. as the consequent of principle (4), which was one
formalization of the so-called doctrine of internal relations. Roughly, x
and y may be said to be reciprocally ontologically dependent if they are
distinct and the following holds:
O(Ex e4 Ey)
This notion is one which Russell apparently rejected during his 1898
revolution. Yet in (1903) Russell defined, and made systematic use of, a
notion of strict (or non-reciprocal) ontological dependency. I begin this
chapter by stating a certain difficulty Russell's definition poses in the
context of his post-revolution rejection of modality. I then go on in
Section 3.3 to say how a solution to this difficulty can be extended in a
specific way to define a notion of reciprocal ontological dependency which
is key to the modal account of impredicativity I support.
In the remainder of this introduction, I want to accomplish two
things. First, I want to describe the modal semantics I will use
throughout this chapter. Second, I want very briefly to sketch some
technical logical results regarding Russell's ramified type theory.
Ramified type theory is Russell's official logic. In this logic, Russell
sought to define basic mathematical notions such as natural number and
continuity, and to deduce key mathematical theorems. The technical results
I sketch concern how effective Russell's logic can be in attaining these
goals. This sketch will also facilitate the presentation of my modal
account of impredicativity in Section 3.3.
126
3.0.1 Possible Worlds Semantics
In what follows I take as an underlying logic a free modal logic
with two logical predicates "=" and "E" for identity and existence.
Sentences are defined in the usual way and are assigned truth-values
relative to a possible world. Bound first-order variables occurring in
such sentences are understood to range over the objects in the possible
world relative to which the sentence is assigned a truth-value. Free
first-order variables, by contrast, are assigned values from the union of
the domains of all possible world. Thus first-order free variables range
over what may be called the possible objects in the model. As in chapter
1, I sometimes say *'xRy' is evaluated as true in world w" to abbreviate
Ofor some assignment of objects to 'x' and 'y', 'xRy' is evaluated as true
in world w."
*ExO is assigned the value true in a world just in case the possible
object assigned to "x" is in the domain of that world. Again as in Chapter
1, I adopt the convention that, with the exception of "E', predicates may
be true of objects in worlds where those objects do not exist. This
convention is often made only with respect to the predicate "=', since it
simplifies the theory of identity:
x=y -, O(x=y) (R=)
x*y -4 (xfy) (R•)
But here the convention is extended to other predicates as well. The point
of this extension is similarly to simplify expression of the claim that
other predicates hold essentially of objects of which they hold at all.
Parsons (1983a 298 ff.), for example, has proposed that modal principles
similar to those just stated for identity should be adopted for set
membership:
xey -4 0 (xEy) (Re)
xy-, o (xy) (R)
There are obvious ways of stating the above principles under the opposite
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convention. Given the convention, however, the existential consequences of
truths must be made explicit. Thus Parsons also argues for a principle
equivalent to following:
(xey Ay Ex) (Es)
In Parsons' view, the existence of a set in a given possible world
requires that each of the elements of that set exist in the same possible
world. By contrast, the existence of all the elements of set in a possible
world is not sufficient for the existence in that possible world of that
set. Parsons' goal is to supply an analysis of the intuitive idea that
sets are constituted by their elements. Similar remarks would seem to
apply for example to extensional mereological wholes.
3.0.2 Meta-mathematical Results concerning Ramified Type Theory
I come now to certain meta-mathematical results pertaining to the
logical strength of Russell's ramified type theory. I will describe these
results only in the briefest outline, and only in so far as they are
relevant to my account of impredicativity. The results are important
because they show that Russell's type theory was not sufficient to define
key mathematical ideas nor to prove certain key mathematical theorems. The
theorems which cannot be proven in Russell's ramified type theory may be
said to be impredicative, since type theory is based upon a principle
expressly formulated to prohibit the use of impredicative definitions and
exclude the postulation of impredicative objects.
Russell originally formulated ramified type theory as a means of
resolving the paradoxes that emerged around the turn of the century, but
also as a logical foundation of mathematics. Ramified type theory, then,
was the official logic used in Russell's foundation of mathematics. But
Russell's "logic" comes with a specific interpretation, which is to say
with a specific ontology consisting in an infinite hierarchy of
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propositional functions classified into types. It was crucial to Russell's
foundational goals that key theorems of mathematics be seen to be true on
this interpretation of type theory, as well as derivable within his logic.
In particular, Russell wanted to prove in his logic both the principle of
mathematical induction and the least upper bound theorem. These two
theorems are plausibly thought to be indispensable to any theory which
sets out to provide a definition or analysis of the concepts natural
number and real number or continuity respectively. The question is whether
these theorems are, as Russell hoped, derivable in ramified type theory.
Now Russell's original formulation of ramified type theory included
a principle he called the axiom of reducibility." With this axiom in
place, there is no difficulty deriving the two theorems just mentioned.
But the axiom of reducibility did not prove popular; and in (1925) Russell
decided that it had to be rejected. Although Russell thought he could
still prove mathematical induction in ramified type theory without the
axiom of reducibility, he saw no way of deriving the least upper bound
theorem. Russell's hope of having derived mathematical induction without
the aid of the axiom of reducibility was dashed in (1944) when GSdel
pointed out an error in Russell's proof.
In the years after 1925, more general methods were worked out for
determining whether a given theory could or could not deductively yield a
given theorem. Developments in proof theory and other areas of logic have
made it possible to measure and compare the proof-theoretic strength of
theories, and under some conditions to say when certain theorems are
beyond the means of a particular theory. Various attempts were made to
reformulate Russell's type theory in accordance with the increased
standards of rigor, and to determine whether Russell's error could be
3"In point of fact there is more than one axiom of reducibility. Their
precise content need not be explained here; see (1907 241-244) and (1910 55-60,
161-167).
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repaired, and also whether the least upper bound theorem is derivable in
a more rigorously formulated ramified type theory. From these developments
it has turned out that Russell's ramified type theory is insufficient to
prove either of these theorems, which may therefore be considered
impredicative in a particular sense. More important perhaps, one must
conclude that ramified type theory by itself is inadequate as a foundation
for classical mathematics.
My concern in what follows will be to express in modal-semantic
terms one principle underlying Russell's type theory. This principle,
called the vicious circle principle, states what it is to be predicative
on Russell's theory. Violations of the modal interpretation of this
principle will suggest a general account of impredicativity. It is hoped
that being clear on the original sense of "impredicative" in Russell will
be of assistance in future attempts to extend the present modal account to
set-theoretic or other foundations of mathematics.
3.1 Necessity and Logical Priority
I want now to return to Russell's rejection of modality. I argued in
Chapter 1 that the principal notion Russell rejected when he abandoned
idealism was the notion of necessity. Although there is considerable
evidence for this, there are also passages in which Russell seems to
qualify his rejection somewhat, and others where Russell seems positively
to require some notion of necessity. I begin by restating some of the
relevant principles from Chapter 1. I then discuss in terms of these
principles the qualifications Russell sometimes seems to make regarding
his rejection of necessity. But the main goal of this section is to
discuss Russell's definition of a form of strict ontological dependency
and to show why it is be interpreted modally.
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The principles I discussed in Chapter 1 and which are also relevant
in this chapter are the following. For any x and y, and for any 2-place
relation R,
xRy - EkRy (1)
xRy - O(Ex 4 Ey) (4)
O(xRy - (Ex A Ey)) (5)
In addition, I discussed the non-modal principle that, for arbitrary x and
y,
3RxRy (3)
Now Russell's rejection of necessity led him to deny (1) in a strong way.
(1) was not false, according to him, but meaningless. Perhaps Russell
should have denied the others in the same strong way, to the extent, at
least, that they make use of the notion of necessity. But Russell did not
uniformly do so. I want now briefly to indicate what became of these
principles in Russell's analytic period. I will leave (3) out of account
here, since the necessity operator is not needed to state it; but it may
be said that Russell evidently would have believed (3) even if the
relation * were excluded from the range of the bound '"R.
At times, Russell's rejection of necessity seems total, as for
example in (1900a) when he wrote that "the subject of modality ought to be
banished from logic" (cf. 1904 26). At other times, however, it seems that
Russell retained some rather thin conception of necessity definable in
terms of material or formal implication:
Everything in a sense is a mere fact .... What is true, is
true; what is false, is false; and concerning fundamentals,
there is nothing more to be said. The only logical meaning of
necessity seems to be derived from implication. (1903 454; cf.
1910a 374)
Russell is never very clear on what this derived notion would be, and the
details are not important here. The point here is just that Russell's
rejection of necessity sometimes seems less than total. Still, Russell
made no systematic use of his derived notion, nor did he try to use it to
interpret (1) in a new way. Similarly, Russell's qualified rejection of
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necessity was in no way used to make (4) seem plausible or even
meaningful. Despite his occasional qualifications, Russell rejected (1)
and (4), as well as the modal notions of essentiality and reciprocal
ontological dependence"4 associated with them.
Principle (5), however, did seem to live on in some form in Russell,
despite the occurrence in it of the notion of necessity. Even after 1898
Russell appears to affirm (5), since he wrote passages quite similar to
(1898x 167-8), which was interpreted in chapter 1 as an affirmation of
(5):
whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true
or false proposition, or can be counted as one, : call a
term..... every term has being, i.e., is in some sense. (1903
43)
This again would suggest that Russell's rejection of necessity was not
total, but it is not my concern to spell out an interpretation of (5)
Russell would have accepted. Suffice it to say that Russell's use of "may
be" and "may occurm must apparently have some modal interpretation.
Yet despite his rejection of modality, Russell defines at (1903 137-
8) a form of strict ontological dependency which he calls logical priority
and which would seem to be a modal notion. Russell's definition is not
perfectly explicit, but is based on his claim that the "logical priority
of A to B requires" that "B is implies A is, but A is does not imply B
is. It is difficult to formulate this definition without the aid of modal
notions Russell rejected, but an obvious first try would be the following:
x <ip Y = : (Ey -4 Ex) A -(Ex -4 Ey) (6)
Here "x <. y" can be read "x is logically prior to y" or, alternatively,
"y strictly presupposes x'. This is intended to bhe strict logical priority
"In (1904 26), Russell goes so far as to conclude that "the subsistence or
being of a whole cannot presuppose that of its parts in any sense in which that
of the parts does not presuppose the whole." Although, as we shall see, Russell
elsewhere defines a notion of presupposition for which this statement is not
true, (1904 26) can be taken to confirm that Russell had little use for the
notion of reciprocal ontological dependency.
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in the sense that the relation <, is asymmetric. Now Russell's original
definition as quoted was intended by him to capture the intuitive idea
that e.g. a part of a whole is logically prior to that whole because,
whereas the part could exist without the whole, the whole could not exist
without the part. But (6) fails to capture this idea, at least if "-10
represents material or truth functional implication. In fact, under these
conditions, "x <p y" is true iff y does not exist and x does. There are
further difficulties, since it is not clear what significant role the
existence predicate "E" can play in Russell's extensional, non-free logic.
With "Er as Russell's 'being," if "all terms have being," clearly "-Ex" is
always false.
Clearly the idea Russell is trying to express at (1903 137-8) would
be better captured by interpreting O-V in (6) as some form of
counterfactual implication or as C.I. Lewis's strict implication. But
Russell had no real way to understand "-9 except as material implication.
This is presumably why Russell elsewhere calls logical priority a "very
obscure notion. " I suggest the following alternat "ve formulation of
Russell's notion of strict presupposition or logical priority:
x <1p y =: D(Ey -• Ex) A -O(Ex -4 Ey) (7)
According to (7), Ox <P, y" is defined to mean that it is necessary that,
if y exists, x does, but it is not necessary that, if x exists, y does.
The existence of x presupposes that of y, but the reverse is not true.
Thus despite Russell's sweeping rejection of necessity, his own notion of
logical priority would appear to require it.
One might, therefore, pose the following dilemma for Russell. He
must either reject his notion of logical priority or embrace (7), and with
it some modal-semantic notion of necessity. In what follows, I will use
the possible-worlds semantics described in Sec. 3.0.2 to interpret (7). On
this semantics, "x <, y" will be interpreted as true just in case x exists
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in any possible world where y does, but it is not the case that y exists
in every possible world where x does. By posing the above dilemma for
Russell, I do not mean that, short of rejecting his notion of logical
priority, Russell must accept a possible worlds semantics; for Russell
need only interpret the necessity operator in (7), and this can presumably
be done in some other way. On the other hand, nothing turns in the sequel
on which semantics Russell would have to accept if he were to accept (7);
and for present purposes a possible worlds semantics is as good as any.
Thus (7), as I henceforth interpret it, is not intended in any
historically accurate way to capture Russell's own intention with his
definition of logical priority; but it will, I hope, help to promote
clarity in subsequent discussions.
3.1.1 Serious Difficulty for Russell
I said that Russell must either reject his own notion of logical
priority, or embrace (7), and with it some modal-semantic notion of
necessity. But Russell cannot reject the notion of logical priority. He
uses it not only in (1903) but in a far more important way in (1910). Thus
for example Russell's characterization of ramified type theory uses terms
that are meaningless unless something like his notion of strict logical
priority is employed. My purpose now is to use the above possible-worlds
semantics to interpret some of the claims Russell makes in (1903)
regarding propositions, and in (1907) and (1910) regarding propositional
functions in his ramified type theory.
In (1903), speaking of the mathematical theory of the real numbers,
Russell writes:
For the comprehension of analysis, it is necessary to
investigate the notion of whole and part, a notion which has
been wrapped in obscurity ... by the writers who may be
roughly called Hegelian (1903 137)
Russell is not announcing a mereological foundation of mathematics, but
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rather using the term "whole" in the quite general way that was common at
the time. He goes on to distinguish three quite different so-called "part-
whole" relations: set-membership, set-inclusion (subset of) and
proposition-constituenthood. (Like Russell, I will ignore the second,
since it is definable in terms of the first.) What is of interest here is
that, according to Russell, each of these relations formally implies
logical priority; that is, if "xRy" abbreviates one of "xey', x"fy", or "x
is a constituent of a proposition y', then the following holds for all
values of x and y:
xRy -+ x <4 y (8)
Again, it is hard to make sense of this implication in Russell, but,
suitably interpreted, (8) seems quite plausible. Parsons for example has
argued for a modal principle equivalent to the following to account for
the sense one has that elements constitute the sets of which they are
menmbers.
O(xey A Ey - Ex) (EE)
Notice that (Es) follows from (8) together with the definition of logical
priority given in (7).
The relation expressed by Ox is a constituent of the proposition p"
is, according to Russell, indefinable. But Russell nevertheless feels
confident that the relation formally implies logical priority:
Again, if we take a proposition asserting a relation of two
entities A and B, this proposition implies the being of A and
the being of B, and the being of the relation, none of which
implies the proposition [even conjointly] (1903 137-8)
Observe that Russell says that the proposition implies the existence of
its constituents, rather than that the existence of the proposition does.
Nevertheless his idea is evidently that the proposition is a kind of whole
which strictly presupposes its "parts" or constituents, much as a set
strictly presupposes its elements. Notice too that Russell quite clearly
states that the relation (a propositional function) is a constituent of
the proposition. When the propositional function is itself complex and has
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constituents, these are in turn presupposed by the proposition. This
changes in (1910), when Russell denies that propositions are after all
wholes, and claims that "the values of a [propositional] function are
presupposed by the function, not vice versa* (1910 39, 44). Still, what
applied earlier to the proposition applies later to the propositional
function. Russell will continue to insist that a propositional function
strictly presupposes its constituents, which are thus logically prior to
it.
3.2 The Vicious Circle Principle and Russellian Bound Variables
Indeed, understood correctly, this latter claim is the very basis of
Russell's ramified type theory: it is tantamount to Russell's vicious
circle principle. Analysis of Russell's explication of ramified type
theory, and of his formulations of the vicious circle principle, will show
this to be the case. The key idea will be that bound variables, on
Russell's view, are not letters but constituents of propositional
functions, and as such are presupposed by such functions. What this
amounts to practically is that the values of a bound variable are strictly
logically prior to propositional functions which contain them.
We have already seen Russell claim that "the values of a function
are presupposed by the function, not vice versaA (1910 39; cf. 54).
"This," according to Russell, "is a particular case, but perhaps the most
fundamental case, of the vicious circle principle." I do not want to
examine this particular case in detail, except to indicate the prominent
role in it of the notion of presupposition. Frankly, it is difficult to
make any sense of this notion except in terms of (7), and we have already
seen how ill-suited this definition is in the context of Russell's
metaphysics. Yet here it is again occurring in the "most fundamental case"
of the vicious circle principle, which is itself the foundation of
136
Russell's mature logic, ramified type theory. Unless some modal notions
are employed, it seems to me, one cannot strictly make sense of Russell's
logic. Furthermore, once this point is accepted, it becomes possible to
understand violations of the vicious circle principle in modal terms.
Russell at one point gives the following convoluted formulation of
the vicious circle principle (VCP):"
given any set of objects such that, if we suppose the set to
have a total, it will contain members which presuppose this
total, then such a set cannot have a total. By saying that a
set has "no total," we mean, primarily, that no significant
statement can be made about "all its members. 0 (1910 37)
This statement obviously calls for analysis, but it may be considerably
simplified before such analysis sets in. It is worth noting up front,
however, that the notion of presupposition occurs again in this more
general formulation of the VCP. I take it that Russell means (at least in
part) the following:
no significant statement can be made about any plurality of
objects if any of the objects in the plurality presuppose that
plurality
It must be noted at once that a "significant statement about a plurality"
is an interpreted sentence which contains a bound variable understood as
ranging over the objects in the plurality. Russell's principle represents
an attempt to restrict what may count as the range of a bound variable, or
a type. It must also be said under what conditions an object presupposes
a plurality. Here it is vital to bear in mind that Russell is thinking of
propositional functions with constituent bound variables that range over
the plurality. "Whatever contains a bound variable," so another statement
of the VCP goes, 'must not be a value of that variable." Thus an object
presupposes a plurality if it contains a bound variable which ranges over
"It is important to note that "set" here does not mean what it might in
discussions of contemporary set theory. What Russell means by it might be better
expressed by us as "plurality'. I use this term to avoid confusion with the
contemporary notion of a set. More is said about pluralities below. It might also
be noted that Russell uses the word "about" here in an unusual way. Usually he
prefers to say a propositional function is about the value of the free (not
bound) variable(s) occurring in it.
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that plurality.
The VCP as stated must be understood in the context of Russell's
logic. For Russell, the range of bound variables is fixed and not subject
to re-interpretation. In order to make the same significant statement
about two distinct pluralities, one doesn't reinterpret a special
linguistic entity, but, as Russell would say, one substitutes one entity
(a bound variable) in the proposition for another. Consider, by contrast,
a predicate Ox is at least as tall as every one in Room 101". In one
sense, the property expressed by this predicate is the same regardless of
who happen to be in Room 101. If only very short people are in Room 101,
one need not be especially tall to have this property. If quite tall
people are there, one must be taller to have the very same property. But
regardless how tall one must be to have the property, the property does
not itself consist in having just this height. Rather, the property
expressed by the predicate can be regarded as one and the same, no matter
who's in Room 101 and no matter how tall one must be to be taller than
anyone in it.
Russell, however, does not in general regard predicates in this way.
Russell's view is more nearly comparable to the idea that the property
expressed by Ox is at least as tall as everyone in Room 101" changes as
people enter and leave the room. This is due to the fact that, according
to Russell, a bound variable is a constituent of a propositional function,
and the ranges of bound variables are fixed by the natures of the
variables. To change the range of the bound variable in a propositional
function, one must change the bound variable; and by doing this, one
changes the propositional function to a different, if systematically
related, one. Thus the fact that bound variables are not letters (as they
are for us) and are subject to fixed interpretations (instead of to
interpretations that vary however we stipulate), leads Russell to regard
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the interpretation of a bound variable as crucial to the identity of
propositional functions.
3.3 Pluralities, Existence, and Ontological Dependency
The vicious circle principle, as Russell understood it, stated a
condition that pluralities must meet if significant statements were to be
made about them. Since a significant statement about a plurality is an
interpreted sentence containing a bound variable which has this plurality
for its range, Russell's condition amounts to a condition that a plurality
must meet if it is to constitute the range of a bound variable, or a type.
In this section I want to formalize the condition on pluralities
that, according to Russell, makes a plurality suitable for being a type.
Before this can be done, I need to say more about pluralities, including
what it is for a plurality to exist, and what it is for an object to
presuppose a plurality. I use the capital letters "X", "Y", "T", etc., to
symbolizes pluralities and "EX" to symbolize "X exists". Let me begin with
some remarks about the interpretation of these symbols.
The capital letters, "X", "Y", "T", etc., are to be understood as
free plural variables." Substitutends of plural variables are plural
terms, for example plural descriptions. Thus a substitution instance of
"EX" Imight be "the Hindu gods exist". But it is sometimes useful to speak
of pluralities in the singular, as in '"a plurality exists" or "the
plurality of Hindu gods exists." I will use such singular notation, but I
am not to be understood as making an ontological commitment to anything
other than the things in the plurality. In particular, no single entity is
to be identified with the plurality. There may well be a set of Hindu
gods; there might even be a mereological sum of Hindu gods; but
aI will not make use of bound plural variables.
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ontological commitment to any such single entity constituted in some way
by the Hindu gods will have to be made separately, and will not be
understood as following from "EX'. To say that a plurality X exists, then,
is only to say that the things in the plurality exist.
The things that can be in pluralities are the values of the first
order variables. In the modal-semantics I am working with, these may be
thought of as possible objects, which is to say elements of the union of
the domains of all possible worlds. In principle, a given plurality could
have objects in it which do not exist together in any possible world, but
if "EX" is true in a world, then everything in the plurality exists in
that world. This claim is reminiscent of Parson's principle (Ee) quoted
above, and may be formulated in a similar way. If an object y is in a
plurality X, I will write
y C X
Then the following principle may be accepted concerning pluralities: for
any y and for any plurality X,
O(y o X A EX -+ Ey) (9)
(9) serves to formulate the idea that a plurality, like a set, is
constituted by the things that are in it. Unlike sets, however, which need
not exist in possible worlds where all their elements do, a plurality is
nothing other than the things in it, and so it does exist in every
possible world where all those things do."
I said above that the VCP can be understood as Russell's attempt to
articulate a necessary condition for a plurality to act as the range of a
bound variable, or a type. Roughly, types are pluralities none of whose
"Note that it is essential that (9) be formulated with free first-order
variable "y", since binding "y" in (9) would make the consequent true in every
world. For similar reasons, the claim that pluralities exist in every world where
all of the things in the plurality exist is not to be formulated by "iJVy(y - X
A Ey -+ EX)*.
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members presuppose the plurality. I want now to extend Russell's notion of
logical priority to apply to pluralities.
Y <1p x =: O(Ex -+ EY) A -O(EY -+ Ex) (10)
"Y < p x" may be read "Y is logically prior to x" or "x strictly
presupposes Y'. It seems plausible that some objects strictly presuppose
some pluralities; for example, a set x whose members were exactly the
objects in a plurality Y may be said to strictly presuppose Y. By Parsons'
principle (Fe), every element of the set x exists in every world where x
does, and this is all that is required for Y to exist in a world. Thus it
is necessary that "EY" be true in all possible worlds where "Ex" is true;
hence the first conjunct holds. But the existence of all the elements of
a set does not require the existence of the set; thus the second conjunct
holds as well.
Russell's VCP was understood above as stating that a plurality is a
type only if no object in the plurality presupposed the plurality. One
might therefore formulate the idea behind Russell's VCP as follows:
x G Y-+x <1 Y (11)
Unpacking the definition, one arrives at
x o Y - O(EY -- Ex) A -O(Ex -4 EY)
The first conjunct is redundant given (9), so (11) may be simplified to:
x -c Y -ý -O(Ex - EY)
Only pluralities which satisfy (11), and thus strictly presuppose
everything in them, may be said to constitute a type. Note that this
condition on a plurality is not sufficient for it to be a type, since it
obtains for pluralities which are included in pluralities satisfying the
condition.
Now let E"#" denote a propositional function of some type. Suppose
that it has as a constituent a bound variable of type n, and let Y be the
range of this bound variable; that is, Y is the plurality consisting of
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the objects of type n. Then it seems clear that Russell believed
Y <1i p (12)
This ensures that 4±, which contains a bound variable, is not a value of
that variable; for if it were, then by (11) it would follow that 02 <,P Y,
whereas <1p is asymmetric.
Accepting (11) as a formulation of the idea behind the VCP, one sees
why Russell might have accepted the VCP as a principle of logic. If it
were ever the case that
x Y A -(x <P, Y) (13)
then from the latter conjunct one could derive
-O(EY -+Ex) v O(Ex -t EY) (14)
The first disjunct of (14), however, is not compatible with (9) and the
first conjunct of (13). So the second disjunct of (14) must be true. But
this too would have seemed strongly counter-intuitive to Russell. Why
should the existence of one thing imply the existence of many things, none
of which are all parts of the former in any recognized sense? In fact, the
second disjunct of (14) must have appeared contrary to fundamental
metaphysical principles. The status of the VCP as a logical principle
seems secure.
There is of course one metaphysical framework according to which it
is not so absurd that the existence of one thing should require the
existence of others, namely the holism of "the writers who may be roughly
called Hegelian." In the same year that Russell completed his first
version of ramified type theory, he renewed his an attack on the
idealists. In the course of this attack, he characterizes the view he
rejects by saying that it admits the existence of organic unities or
significant wholes:
In a "significant whole, " each part ... involves the whole and
every other part.... The whole is constitutive of the nature
of each part
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Clearly on this view, which further maintains that "there can be one and
only one ... significant whole" (1907a 34; quoted from Joachim 1906 78),
it is true for any x and Y that
O(Ex -+ EY) (15)
This, however, leads to much the same position as that associated with
Russell's idealism (principles (1)-(5)) as this was discussed in Chapter
1. By (15), every possible object exists in every world where any possible
object exists. Thus when Poincar6 suggested the VCP in 1906, Russell must
have felt that it had to be correct, since a denial of it seemed lead to
back to a notion prominent among the idealists.
According to (15), it is necessary that, if one thing exists,
everything does. To deny (11), however, all one needs is that there is
some plurality Y and some x c Y such that "D(Ex -+ EY)" is true. To deny
the VCP as based upon (11), one only need allow that there be some
significant statement about Y; which is to say that Y be the range of some
bound variable. Notice that, if *O(Ex -+ EY)" is true, so is "O(Ex " EY)",
so that the denial of (11) amounts to the claim that there is a Y and an
x mo Y such which are reciprocally ontologically dependent as this was
defined at the beginning of this chapter. According to the VCP as based on
(11), no range of a bound variable can be a plurality which is
reciprocally ontologically dependent on something in itself. On the modal
semantics I am using, this amounts to a denial that there are possible
worlds where such pluralities exist. The domains of such worlds violate
the VCP. Either there are no such worlds or the VCP is false.
On one sense of "impredicative" in Russell, an object x which
reciprocally presupposes a plurality Y is impredicative. Given the above
modal considerations, such an x will exist in a possible world just in
case Y does. This is the primary tenet of my modal account of
impredicative.
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It seems to me that we have no good reason to deny there are
possible worlds whose domain are pluralities some of whose members require
the existence of all such members. There seems to be no obstacle at all to
making significant statements about such domains. The VCP therefore
appears false, and the notion of reciprocal ontological dependency
perfectly coherent. Indeed, given the formalizations above, there appears
to be no principled reason why Russell could accept his notion of strict
ontological dependency as meaningful, but deny meaning to the notion of
reciprocal ontological dependency.
Moreover, since ramified type theory is not itself inadequate for
defining key mathematical notions or deriving key mathematical theorems,
it is hoped that the above modal account of the VCP and impredicativity
will be of some use explaining what adequate foundations of mathematics
are committed to. What is needed here, for example, is a development of
modal set-theoretical foundations of mathematics, along the lines of
Parsons (1983a) perhaps, but extended to included the notion of reciprocal
ontological dependency. It could then be investigated whether, for
example, real numbers impredicative with respect to the language of set
theory are subject to any special modal conditions. But this investigation
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